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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates what it means to call art music composition creative. 
Research into the concept of creativity has taken place mostly in science-based 
disciplines and is reviewed for its relevance. Discussions on what may constitute the 
foundations of creativity in music are conducted. Musical creativity is not bounded by 
normativity, consistency, truth-boundedness, optimization or effability for its recognition 
and is largely aesthetic. Current research methods are seen to be mainly explanatory, 
objective and analytic, and necessarily fall short in understanding musical creativity. It 
thereby undermines the validity of these methods when used to justify one’s 
understanding. The undermining invariably takes place by disrupting logical and 
reasonable expectations. 
The significance of this research is that it attempts to find and describe essences of 
the subject matter, creative musical composition, the effect of which actually disrupts 
grounds for finding essences in the first place. It no longer seeks to explain creativity in 
musical composition. Accordingly, this thesis argues that creativity in art music 
composition may be better understood through philosophical phenomenology, more than 
through analysis. Evidence seen as experience and description naturally includes 
aesthetic considerations. 
What composers say is regarded as being potentially helpful to understand their 
musical creativity. They are approached using an interview technique where problem 
solving, truth-boundedness, optimization and reasonable causality are set aside as 
essential precepts. Responses are interpreted intuitively to reveal essences present. Trains 
of thought that reveal essential properties in interview content are intuited. They show 
that communication is a prominent essence to motivation for being creative. Perceptual 
attitudes and experiences are often provoked by disruption to sonic expectation. 
Creativity in art music composition then becomes a generic initial step in the way it 
communicates and inspires through playing with musical expectation. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 A Starting Point 
As each new art music composition is created and launched by the composer 
before interested peers and public, it undergoes a journey. That journey includes 
performance, reception, judgment, explanation and description, implying an anticipation 
of it finding some place of acceptance in the musical world. In both conception of the 
work by the composer and reception by players and listeners, the concept of creativity is 
used. Creativity is often cited as present throughout the art world in many contexts and 
normally in a positive regard. A description with such a word must sit in support of 
understanding a music that can speak for itself. But describing music through words 
remains important as it aids appreciation and understanding in social and cultural 
contexts. A fascinating interchange or sharing takes place, including affect and effect. 
What the composer creates and how its performance unfolds causes reflection and 
comment from all those who interact with the music. That sharing can be seen as a form 
of communication too, one that continues in re-performance and through an on-going 
critique. The critique can be quite independent of a sense of definitiveness in terms of 
problem-solving or truth-telling. This scenario already suggests that to be definitive about 
one’s understanding of creativity in the musical context could invoke unnecessary 
circumscription to the content and meaning of what is shared. 
The aim of this thesis is to understand what we mean when we describe the 
composition of art music as creative. The aim provokes questions as to what sort of 
presuppositions and enquiry could give confidence in being successful when taking on 
the task. Presupposing creativity is potentially present in the musical domain and a shared 
property enables any knowledge about it to be communicated. A structured and rational 
method might be found efficacious to some degree. But of special interest in 
understanding musical creativity is the challenge that it provokes by showing itself 
through properties such as the unusual, unpredictable, unexpected, non-contextual and 
perhaps anti-conceptual.1 The subject matter does not have to invoke reason or logic2 in 
                                                          
1 Michael Inwood, “Adorno,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderick. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 8. Inwood thinks that Adorno’s negative dialectic aims “to dissolve 
conceptual forms before they harden into lenses which distort our vision of, and impair our practical 
engagements with, reality.   … When concepts fail us, art comes to our aid. … Art, especially music … 
represents a demand for freedom and a critique of society.” 
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its understanding. To pick out such properties is to perceive the disruptive aspects of 
what is put before us. The disruption is regarded as non-pejorative by being seen as 
interrupting the normative.3 
Disruption is of particular significance in philosophical terms. Michel Foucault 
brings this aspect of evidence and perception to the fore in The Archeology of 
Knowledge, when saying: 
Beneath the great continuities of thought … beneath the persistence of a 
particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical activity, one is now trying to 
detect the incidence of interruptions. …they suspend the continuous 
accumulation of knowledge …4 
David Lapoujade, in reviewing the work of Deleuze, calls that review Aberrant 
Movements.5 Deleuze is seen to break away from Kantian Idealism and eternal returning 
advocated by Nietzsche, a move that creates ‘lines of flight’ that disrupt the normativity 
assumed in intellectual modes of thought. 
Calling music creative welcomes and invokes disruptive properties, rather than 
treating them as aberrations or as a failure to support hypotheses. Disruption also gives 
rise to the perception of newness, often seen as unpredictability. The many and varied 
ways in which the word creativity is used tends to gloss over recognition of the 
importance of these properties. Perceiving and saying something or somebody is creative 
latently suggests the properties are present as phenomena. It is as if we valued creativity 
because of them, but with little thought as to why. Of course, the case is often made that 
treats these properties as defining aberrations. The goal in that case is emphatically one 
of finding only a consistent understanding of creativity. However, being musically 
creative requires attention to experiencing and describing such phenomena and the 
effects they have upon us, as best we may if we wish to wrestle with eventually 
explaining music with a consistent understanding. 
We also need to start from a viewpoint that, because the focus is on creativity in 
and from musical composers, the source is human. This then ushers in another challenge 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 Logic is being used as it refers to traditional logic but may extend to philosophical logic as well. 
3 Sandra Rosenthal and Patrick Bourgeois, Mead and Merleau-Ponty: Toward a Common Vision (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 4. Rosenthal and Bourgeois automatically link 
continuity to creativity in an opposition dualism, in effect saying creativity is disruptive of normality. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. Sheridan Smith, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 4. 
5 David Lapoujade, Aberrant Movements, trans. Joshua Jordon, (USA: MIT Press, 2017). The Introduction 
starting page 7 explains that Lapoujade sees Deleuze making aberrant movements of thought 
throughout his works. 
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similar to the first. If the source of the creativity is human, the instances recognized as 
creative will not necessarily be consistent and reproducible anyway. Humans are at times 
irrational and illogical, possibly indulging in deception and fraud. They do not always 
appear to function consistently.6 Creative ability in musical composition could also be 
linked to eccentricity or illness but this aspect does not form part of the present line of 
enquiry.7 
Using the word creative is significant in that it suggests some form of concept 
and/or phenomenon is present that is at the least identifiable. Its presence attracts 
attention and encourages a positive response8 sometimes overtly experiencing the 
unusual, the unpredictable, the beautiful, the valuable and the surprising.9 In recognizing 
creativity, we have come across a phenomenon that often eludes explanation. If creativity 
is seen to be strongly linked to the sensory, the possibility of understanding it via a 
phenomenological method must be entertained. 
Creative persons can be active in many guises: painting a beautiful picture, writing 
eloquent and persuasive prose, devising an impressive theory, negotiating to resolve 
difficult diplomatic problems and, in our context, composing music to ‘touch one’s soul’. 
At the same time, the word can be used to refer to an actual art work such as a sculpture, 
or behavior exhibited such as to perform a daring high-wire act, i.e., there are both 
passive and active instances. We attribute creativity at the least to who we are, what we 
produce and how we behave, and are prepared to treat the experience as if human 
involvement is to be judged at some juncture.10 Creativity also hints at the aspirational. It 
indicates the creator aspires to reach towards a new position of achievement or 
understanding, one that is potentially unconstrained and unbounded. 
                                                          
6 This is an aspect of evidence that psychology frequently regards as aberrative, i.e., atypical and to be 
ignored, according to the definition in the Merriam Webster dictionary. 
7 William Frosch, “Creativity: Is There a Worm in the Apple?” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 83 
(1996): 506–508. Oliver Sacks has published clinical research on the specific connection between 
musical ability and psychiatric extremes: see Oliver Sacks, “The Power of Music,” Brain 129 (2006): 
2528–2532, and Oliver Sacks, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the Brain, (London: Macmillan, 
Picador, 2007). 
8 There is the concept of dark creativity which has malevolent content, but that is not dealt with in this 
thesis. See David Cropley, Arthur Cropley, James Kaufman, and Mark Runco, The Dark Side of 
Creativity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
9 Margaret Boden, Creativity in Art: Three Roads to Surprise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). It is 
interesting to note that Margaret Boden comes from a scientific background that concentrates on 
finding structural and objective ways to explain creativity. She has recently given her attention to 
creativity in art. 
10 Creativity is seen as a manifestation of ‘one or more of product, process and behavior’ as a recurring 
theme in its exposition. 
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General creativity is usually understood through being part of well-established 
intellectual domains.11 Amongst a number of approaches, it is normally characterized in 
an extensive literature based on psychometrics.12 Composite parts of a creative solution 
may appear pedagogic, but creativity is part self-discovery and self-discipline13 and may 
not yield to pedagogy.14 Creativity relies on some expertise for its manifestation so that it 
does not refer to what is seemingly flippant, spontaneous or out of character. 
Some characteristics of creativity in art music composition appear intransitive,15 
substantiating no power to pass on or over to, but they do invite further participation. 
There is no ipso facto guarantee that the next generations of ‘creative’ composers will 
come out of even well-founded conservatoriums. Persuasion and receptivity gain 
importance in augmenting or bypassing pedagogic approaches.16 
                                                          
11 E. Paul Torrance, “The Nature of Creativity as Manifest in Testing,” in The Nature of Creativity: 
Contemporary Psychological Perspectives, ed. Robert Sternberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 42. 
12 Jonathan Plucker and Joseph Renzulli, “Psychometric Approaches to the Study of Creativity,” in 
Handbook of Human Creativity, ed. Robert Sternberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
13 E. Paul Torrance, “The Nature of Creativity as Manifest in Testing,” 58. 
14 It is as if we are looking for creative praxis but then find it confined within the one person. To 
presuppose pedagogy will always be inferable from enquiry, and thence presuppose I am researching to 
find the consistent method that will determine how anybody could ‘compose creatively’, is invalid. 
15 Fred Maus, “Classical Instrumental Music and Narrative,” in A Companion to Narrative Theory, James 
Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 466–483. Maus reviews what ‘transfers’ 
in a narrative, a concept seen by him to be problematic in instrumental music. He cites three key 
objectors; Jean-Jacques Nattiez (music has no subject or predicate), Carolyne Abbate (music has no 
past tense) and Peter Kivy (music involves extensive [literal?] repetition). I see this debate being 
framed in terms of metaphoric transitivity and whether literary or verbal narrative is in any way 
constructed like a musical narrative? Does the plot of a fictional novel resemble that of an instrumental 
work, with development and recapitulation? I would answer that it may or may not and that some may 
say there is no need to care about making the comparison anyway. If narrative as part of 
communicating is deemed important for musical creativity, we need to say why. 
16 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 365. Scruton says that 
“our understanding of music is expressly likened [by Schopenhauer] to our knowledge of the inner life, 
when we know it not [even] by description but by acquaintance.” In reference to persuasion, Edward 
Pearsall and Byron Almen, “The Divining Rod On Imagination, Interpretation and Analysis,” in 
Approaches to Meaning in Music, ed. Byron Almen and Edward Pearsal (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006), 8, write of an associative approach to musical meaning. They state: “The 
analyst, as much as the composer, is involved in the creative process of artistic communication, which 
is effective insofar as it is persuasive to the community to which it is directed.” In reference to 
receptivity, Michael Spitzer highlights this point by dwelling on mimesis in his Music as Philosophy: 
Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), 278, where he identifies 
aesthetic experience as mimetic in the form of an ‘exact imagination’. This is also depicted by Shierry 
Nicholson Exact Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1997), as we literally ‘follow’ a work, tracking its tensions and emotions. Such actions are not possible 
unless some receptivity is present, even if critical in nature. See also Romand Coles, “The Power of 
Receptivity,” in The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought, ed. Nikolas Kompridis (New York: 
Continuum, 2013), Chapter 7. Coles has recently extended his thoughts towards the relationship 
between aesthetics and politics and highlighted that there is a receptive attitude to creativity at play here 
too. 
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Attributes (or properties) normally used to understand creativity include value that 
could simply suggest what we look for is useful and estimable. Yet art music is often 
composed with no obvious purpose, utility or meaning in mind, and may suggest the 
valuable property is sui generis. Since creativity is valued in some way, it may derive 
more from aesthetic properties and come under scrutiny as in Kant17 judging what is 
beautiful or sublime. For Kant, aesthetic judgment involves disinterestedness, 
universality, necessity and purpose. This type of judgment recognizes there is no object 
upon which to focus. Such a judgment can still lead to the formation of concepts and 
intuitions by virtue of Kant holding that all we experience can be understood by the 
power of judgment. He places that power firmly within the compass of nature which is 
normally governed by rules for its understanding and cognition. But Kant regards the 
achievement of producing fine art (his category into which music is placed) as happening 
in the absence of teleology, objectivity and utility. It is the genius who is then capable of 
making this possible. A genius is capable of transcendental thought that gives a unique 
rule to what is made, not just how it is made. Kant’s approach to judgment and the role of 
the genius in the musical context is discussed in the thesis. 
Much music is purely instrumental and all music is at root anti-scientific.18 The 
composer literally reaches for whatever sounds suit personal objectives that need have no 
basis in reason. The music is still described or circumscribed by such means as form, 
melody and harmony. Adding aesthetic properties to the attributes already mentioned 
offers categories with which to both detect and determine instances of creativity. But by 
so doing, a significant challenge is added to selecting relevant attributes, now in the 
absence of teleology and utility. Some attempts to come to grips with this situation have 
already been published.19 
A journey from our starting point towards plausible answers reviews the numerous 
ways the concept and meaning of creativity has been understood and used in various 
                                                          
17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951), Book 1, 
Third Moment §17. In his definition of the beautiful, Kant says: “A flower, on the other hand, such as a 
tulip, is regarded as beautiful, because we meet with a certain purposiveness in its perception, which, in 
our estimate of it, is not referred to any end whatever.” Also used by Stanley Cavell, “Music 
Discomposed,” in Must We Mean What We Say? (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 198. 
18 David Huron, “The New Empiricism: Systematic Musicology in a Postmodern Age. Lecture 3,” (paper 
presented as part of the 1999 Ernst Bloch Lectures, Department of Music, University of California, 
Berkeley, USA, 1999). Huron points out the limitations of using a solely scientific methodology for 
music. 
19 Richard Willgoss, “Creativity in Contemporary Art Music Composition,” International Review of the 
Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 43 (2012): 423–437. Richard Willgoss, “Art Music Compositional 
Creativity. Coming Close: What an Interview can reveal about Creativity in the Contemporary Art 
Music Composer,” Journal of Music Research On-Line 5 (2014): 1–23. 
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intellectual disciplines. Recognition is given to the presence of an immediate perception 
of creativity which makes it personal and internally recognized, thereby evident only to 
the perceiver. This is distinguished from creativity being identified formally; in this case, 
pedagogy and structure have already transformed or translated its essence into a mediated 
version of the original perception. Since the fields of research are extensive, reviews of 
the published work have necessarily been selective to concentrate on musical matters. 
The thesis thus seeks to find understanding (as meaning) in calling art music 
composers and their output creative. Chapter one sets the scene and introduces the 
challenges and paradoxes involved in moving towards a plausible result. The 
phenomenon of experiencing music, in being seen to disrupt normal modes of 
understanding, is explained. Chapter two contextualizes the meanings associated with 
using the concept of creativity in a number of different intellectual domains. This reveals 
how diverse such meanings and motivations for its use are. In each case the relevance or 
otherwise to the musical context is identified. Chapter three looks at three groups of 
attributes and properties concerning concepts associated with creativity. When associated 
with genius and inspiration, behavioral traits come into focus and show up difficulties in 
explaining extraordinary musical achievement by means of logic and reason. When 
associated with expertise and intuition, the role of pedagogy comes under scrutiny, 
showing dependence upon uncategorizable means in a search for ‘the genuine’. When 
associated with beauty and imagination, the way we make aesthetic judgments becomes 
important. When taking a philosophical approach to creativity, the rational, logical and 
universal are normally given pre-eminent status but are not necessarily applicable in 
musical matters. Chapter four introduces phenomenology as a way of overcoming an 
incompatibility between creativity, seen as necessarily disruptive and thereby aberrations 
to already-established modes of understanding, and creativity seen as some genuine 
semblance of lived reality through perception. Chapter five discusses the necessary 
conditions needed in using a phenomenological method as an alternative approach. It 
explores the meaning of creativity somehow embedded in the art music composer’s 
world. Chapter six describes the application of the method to using evidence from a 
series of interviews with active art music composers. Chapter seven firstly summarizes 
the data obtained as an explanation. An Appendix lists and categorizes the answers to the 
questions asked in the interviews. The thesis then uses the information available in the 
evidence to intuit the presence of essential properties and traits. Chapter eight briefly 
reviews each chapters’ content and conclusions. 
11 
 
The result of this exploration identifies essences of the subject matter, by intuition, 
in evidence obtained as close to live music performance (real music) as possible. They 
are to be found in descriptions given by composers. Composers are seen to play a role 
that makes them generic communicators who can use disruption of expectation (and other 
means) to indicate creative aspects of their own efforts. Moreover, their efforts also 
provide creative opportunities for those who subsequently perform or listen and critique. 
 
1.2 Musical Compositional Creativity 
Composing art music can be considered to be a creative activity that gives rise to 
a type of music that is but one part of a spectrum of diverse music from around the 
world.20 Interestingly, the whole spectrum is now called upon by some composers to find 
inspiration. Their compositions have a form of pluralism and is thereby sometimes called 
world music.21 In a culture of pluralism, the freedom to mix and match all types of form, 
genre and style is exercised by composers, performers and listeners in their separate 
handling of musical matters. If the music under consideration is regarded as art music, it 
takes on a form that has basic properties which assure it gets direct attention, rather than 
remain in the background as ambient muzak. Art music also encourages the creation of 
music for aesthetic and non-utilitarian purposes. Within these two broad characteristics, 
many existing musical genres and forms can be considered to be art music from time to 
time.22 
Creativity in or of art music could be most obviously seen to emanate from the 
mind of the composer as the source that then gives rise to a form of notation, such as a 
score. All other creativities might then be considered derivative upon that source. If so, 
subsequent creativities would be largely subservient to what the composer’s initial 
prescriptions call for. Historically informed performance relies to some extent on such a 
view to generate authenticity. But the historically informed performance approach 
                                                          
20 See, for example, John Davis, “In Praise of Shades of Grey,” Resonate, Australian Music Centre, 26 June 
2013, published on-line at URL = http://www.australianmusiccentre.com.au. Davis addresses what art 
music is and all the ‘shades of grey’ possibly entailed. 
21 Philip Bolhman, World Music: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See 
also Keith Howard, “What Is World Music: Whose World and Whose Music?” presented as part of The 
Alfred Hook Lecture Series, University of Sydney, Conservatorium of Music, 23 April 2010; Keith 
Howard, “World Music: Whose Music and Whose World?” Journal of Migration and Society 1 (2010): 
1–34; Philip Ball, “Harmonious Minds: The Hunt for Universal Music,” New Scientist 10 May (2010): 
2759. 
22 Eric Clarke, “Creativity in Performance,” in Musical Imaginations: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on 
Creativity, Performance and Perception, eds. David Hargreaves, Dorothy Miell and Raymond 
MacDonald, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 17–30. 
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provokes debate as to what and when music actually becomes music and not a derivative 
manifestation. According to Goehr, the work concept is open, and has both original and 
derivative aspects. She notes its use in the present, but refers to important historical 
knowledge about the past and its prevailing customs governing the syntax conveyed to 
the player then, not now.23 Hence a performance can be derived (relatively literally) from 
the score yet original (creative) in its interpretation of carrying out the inferred desires of 
the composer. This viewpoint raises how different ‘types’ of creativity (if that is how 
they are categorized) may come into play in music. 
Creativity exercised in composing the score becomes primary evidence but seen 
through the immediacy of a contemporary performance event. We could then say a 
musical work is not a musical entity until it is performed in some way. But this then 
makes the performers pre-eminent, even with the pre-conditioning role for the composer. 
But a performer’s creativity might be quite different though subsequent to that exercised 
by the composer who created the entity from which performance is realized. 
Paul Thom’s interest is in the ontology of performance. He sees the composer’s 
work, depicted as a score, to be a set of directives.24 In that sense he also recognizes 
separate roles for composer, performer and audience such that their creative contributions 
could differ too. He brings out one significant difference between them all when speaking 
about interpretation: 
Any interpretation has an object – that of which it is an interpretation. The 
interpretation is made by an interpreter. What is made must in some ways 
exceed the object; and because of this, interpretation involves creativity. 
The interpretation cannot simply reproduce the object; but it does represent 
the object, and because of this fact, interpretation requires fidelity to the 
object.25 
If this were so, composers are not really interpreters. Yet they ‘create’ the object in 
Thom’s terms as thought manifestation. Creatively, there may be a genesis for it in 
some other way, such as to be ex nihilo,26 in a sense ineffable and untraceable. This 
                                                          
23 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay on Musical Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 89–90. 
24 Paul Thom, For an Audience: a Philosophy of the Performing Arts, Temple University Press: 1993. 
25 Paul Thom, “Toward a Broad Understanding of Musical Interpretation,” Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie, 12 (2006): 438. 
26 To refer to some assertion as ex nihilo is to claim no explanation can be given for its assumption or truth. 
This differs from being axiomatic in that axioms are self-evident truths, thereby truth-bounded, even if 
not explicable. 
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does not involve fidelity to anyone but self. Thom’s performers (and assumedly 
critics in due course) are also seen as creative in the way they necessarily exceed 
through interpretation. The mix of creative properties liberated by opportunity and 
emphasis changes. Yet, and maybe ironically, the composer relies to a significant 
degree on performance for her compositional creativity to be made manifest. 
Repeated performances of the same work are given and can differ due to time or 
place or performers’ interpretations. Different instances of performance of the 
same work may then exhibit different creative properties. 
Experience makes us aware of creativity in both actions and perceptions (poiesis 
and aesthesis) because, seen as a shared concept, creativity is embedded both in initiation 
and response. We can ‘compose art music creatively’ or ‘perform art music creatively’ 
but also perceive what we see and hear to be ‘creative art music’. We are actively 
conscious of the music in many ways: by composing, by audiating, by performing, by 
listening, by imagining, by critiquing and commentating, by enjoying, by hating, and so 
forth. Just suggesting this initial three-way speaking of how we might perceive creativity 
provokes many questions. Intentionality is present in creative thinking and doing but 
what are we conscious of when we perceive creativity in each context? What effort do we 
make to cognate creativity as distinct from just experiencing it? Should cognition be 
primary over and above perception and intuition? If so, this must lead us only to 
reasoned, consistent conclusions? But could cognition also be symptomatic of reflection 
detecting the break with the expected logical reasoning about previous experience? If so, 
unpredictability and surprise, as already mentioned, then form a major part of 
recognizing creativity in this context and then (counterproductively) detract from 
cognizing and finding consistent evidence. Should we then not necessarily look for 
consistency of experience and evidence in perceiving ‘the musically creative’? If so, 
determining the essence, that makes the variety of phenomena of creativity adhere 
together in a reasonable way, will need to accommodate such inconsistency or even 
remain inconsistent. On the other hand, is it possible that the creativity associated with 
music is primarily embedded in an experience, perhaps never to be repeated? That 
experience can defy being communicable in standard language form because music 
enables us to inhabit thought worlds inaccessible to spoken language, reason and logic. Is 
it then possible that experiencing music embedded with creativity takes place in all types 
of involvement (composing, playing, and listening) at a non-conceptual and perhaps non-
14 
 
communicable level? If so, how much or little of that experience may we then be able to 
understand and/or share? 
When being artistic, in one sense, an intentional and causal connection can be made 
between an object and the maker, or an event and its performer. For a tangible object 
such as a painting or sculpture, there seems to be an identifiable entity. But how can an 
entity such as a play or musical work, that has multiple instances in performances as 
some form of theatre, have just one ontological source. Is the ontology the script or score 
or in the perception of the performances, or a combination of both? The former emphasis 
suggests a leading role for a composer’s creativity to somehow be ‘within’ the score. The 
latter makes the performance essential to realizing any manifestation of creativity that 
may be present. Each performance is different from another in time and place and in 
other ways. If, as is reasonable to expect, there is something distinctive about creativity 
exercised in each performance, how might some distinct validation of it in each 
performance then be made?27 Is it possible with the more tangible art work, such as an 
original painting or sculpture, to perceive creativity from copies, facsimiles, photographs 
and the like in such a way that we might still be able to intuit essences? If this were 
possible, this phenomenon would emanate from the numerous instantiations that all had 
the potential for engendering the same experience.28 How might all such sources give rise 
to effects that are potentially categorizable and consistent? Need we concern ourselves 
with origin at all if a Husserlian phenomenological approach is chosen where the issue of 
the reality of the object itself is bracketed? 
In this regard as already mentioned, Lydia Goehr proposes that historical 
considerations are important for understanding what a musical work is. She makes a case 
that analysis, though useful in some ways, is inadequate for understanding musical 
matters. Analysis tends to promote a false clarity (from Adorno).29 For the work-concept, 
                                                          
27 The ancient Greeks who, through oral tradition, attended performances of plays which they already knew 
well, did not necessarily re-learn the story line or ethical argument. They were entertained by the way 
the group of actors portrayed their roles. Attendance was to experience the new and unexpected in 
rendition or rhetoric as much as any faithful portrayal of the playwright’s text. It could be said that this 
was the source of the creative effort that distinguished one performance from another. 
28 See for example Aron Edidin, “Listening to Musical Performance,” Contemporary Aesthetics 13 (2015): 
un-numbered. Edidin argues that: “… often enough, recordings provide a suitable vehicle for this sort 
of attention [a full appreciation of the music] …” He regards recordings as substantially providing the 
aesthetic experience that was possible at the live performance. 
29 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay on Musical Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 73–74. 
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seen historically, “is an open concept with original and derivative employment;”30 
leaving room for change and description as adequate means to understand it. Goehr 
distinguishes between Platonic and Aristotelian views of the ontology of a musical work. 
Platonic views give preeminence to ideals whereas Aristotelian thinking renders them 
secondary and derivative upon concretization. A ‘definitive performance’ thus 
accentuates timeless ideals whereas a ‘performance of perfection’ the ability of the 
contemporary performers. Being more Aristotelian gives room for distinguishing 
performances as creative in their own right. Being more Platonic can reduce creativity to 
a derivative status as simply a means (a craft or techne) that helps to display the ideal in 
question. Intuition does not play a significant part in her argumentation and her concerns 
concentrate on originality and an interest in Werktreue ideals.31 Anyone enquiring about 
creativity is referred to ‘originality’ in the index. She declines to reach a final conclusion 
about the efficacy of using ‘musical work’ as a category. She admits that: “Wonder can 
increase rather than be diminished despite a philosophical and historical understanding of 
these [musical conceptual] ideals.”32 Here she indicates a response similar to that of 
Margaret Boden and within this thesis which embraces the inexplicable and ineffable and 
no further explication or analysis seems needed. 
If a causal source for creativity in the musical context is found necessary, looking 
at a musical score alone is examining product with the subsequent judgment being 
ontological and reductive. The object is an artifact of creative activity, not the person 
who created it.33 If understanding behavior of a composer is deemed creative through 
being reasonable and objective, the findings would only speak of types of composers as if 
they were categorizable in some way, not the composers themselves. If, instead, one were 
to look only upon performance as the epitome of where creativity took place, there would 
be no recognition of the composer’s creative efforts to produce the music in the first 
place. Rhetoric would dominate, notwithstanding further debates on authenticity and 
Werktreue ideals. If the presence of creativity is made dependent only upon satisfying the 
critique of analysis, even using such categories as taste and style, the judgment would be 
based only on external standards accepted for use in such arbitration. 
                                                          
30 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay on Musical Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 8. 
31 Werktreue (faithful to the original) ideals are mentioned as a way in which analysts try to answer 
definitional questions. Fidelity to the composer’s intentions and prescription from which a live 
performance gained its existence, figures highly in answering questions. 
32 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay on Musical Philosophy, 243. 
33 As to whether the source could be other than human is discussed later in the thesis. 
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A method for defining creativity might seek to find concepts and properties to 
explain it with rational precision. The beneficial outcome could then be that rationality 
itself does not necessarily invoke precision but, in combination with precision, makes for 
an explanation to be very powerful. But pinpointing with precision where creativity 
enters in is obscured. No single reference point or genesis seems apparent in all the many 
differing stages of interacting with music. The encompassing way in which we use the 
word in different contexts also causes difficulties. For creativity is often spoken of 
colloquially in a vague and elusive way. In most contexts, a positive approach to its 
understanding is taken.34 The concept of creativity is also an extensively researched term 
reflecting a discovery of ways in which intellectual and practical independence, 
originality, value and efficacy have been achieved. Creativity is also seen as a 
phenomenon whereby we concentrate on effects experienced as instances of an 
underlying essence to what has been detected. The colloquial use takes place in common 
speech, not requiring precision of meaning. The extensive research is meant to enable 
exactly the opposite, i.e., a clearly defined set of properties for a specific intellectual 
discipline. The phenomenal deals only with perceived effects and not necessarily with 
‘the thing in itself’. This three-way (and maybe more) approach to use of the concept 
makes the quest for a workable definition problematic, especially if some universal use is 
in prospect. 
A diversity of approach characterizes the background research into creativity 
studies. Presumptions about what is significant evidence change. If we are able to 
accumulate knowledge using prescriptive method, then theorizing and inductive 
experimentation, as a form of discovery, become significant. When embracing aesthetic 
properties, perception of effect becomes more significant so that, in the arts, description 
is important.35 Descriptively, humans are imaginative, inspired and intuitive about what 
they sense, or inventive and innovative in what they propose and do, and may be 
described as intentional in being human. Along with intentions, concepts of being 
authentic, as opposed to fraudulent, and genuine or sincere as the opposite of artificial, 
                                                          
34 Liam Hudson, “The Question of Creativity,” in Creativity, Philip Vernon ed., (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 
1970), 217. Hudson recognizes in 1970 the problem of coping with creative as a colloquial term, 
lacking definitive meaning. 
35 Margaret Boden, Creativity in Art: Three Roads to Surprise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Boden has recently addressed creativity specifically from an artistic point of view. In his review of 
Creativity and Art: Three Roads to Surprise by Margaret Boden, Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 69 (2011): 423–425, Paisley Livingston examines Margaret Boden’s case for using ‘value’ as 
an essential property of creativity and finds it is not convincing. But both authors attach ‘the novel idea’ 
to any instance of creativity. 
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come into play. If creativity is a human property, then human unpredictability will 
necessarily interfere with the consistency of all of what we perceive as significant 
anyway. 
The nature of creativity in music could rely upon the ontological output of the 
composer because products of substance such as scores, recordings and re-performance 
are overtly created. Yet the picture of what is, both real and tangible, would still be 
incomplete. Music is only real when (re)played for us to experience and respond to 
within a social context. That is the real context in which to make judgments of critique 
and value. But music in its performed state is both immediate (we live in the moment of 
just what we are hearing at any instant) and reflective (we integrate what we perceive 
with memory over time, into form, genre etc., even within the time of hearing a complete 
performance). These considerations show how integrated the role of the composer can be 
seen to be with all other music participants in producing and experiencing ‘real’ music. 
In making creativity of the composer the focus, the challenge is to then appropriately 
identify the composer’s contribution that subsequently persuades us all to respond in both 
playing, listening and conversing about composers’ offerings. 
A review of ways in which an understanding of creativity has been approached is 
now undertaken. The concept of creativity is treated as both a single entity and in relation 
to other concepts. Meanings and underlying philosophies are extracted from the 
approaches, along with the role aesthetics plays in understanding creativity. Reference to 
the musical context is made throughout. 
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2 Conceptualizing Creativity 
 
It would be prudent to decide upon a way to detect and/or experience the presence 
of creativity in art music composition only after discussing what is already on offer in the 
literature. There is extensive research that depends upon the assumption of the scientific 
paradigms of causality, objectivity and refutability (Karl Popper calls this falsification). 
They and psychological studies make verifiable explanation the key to success. With 
these precepts, the objectivity desired generates knowledge that does not depend upon 
human immanence for its ongoing validity. 
In contrast, philosophical phenomenological approaches are less well represented, 
in understanding our world without necessarily asserting what is real or objective. Here 
things as they appear (or are given), not as they are in themselves, are important, with 
roots in Kant’s transcendental idealism. To adopt the phenomenal approach is to 
concentrate on appearance as a necessary given state of reality. To aid this approach, 
Husserlian phenomenology brackets reality. His epochē suspends belief in the existence 
of objects in consciousness in a search for some form of purity in the subject matter. 
Similarly to Husserl then conceding the presence of reality through a ‘natural attitude’, 
Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre all have practical concerns to encounter 
the world in some way through the quality of being in it. Presciently, Husserl claims, in 
his last major work, science itself, as a searcher after truth as reality, is in crisis anyway 
because: “The ‘crisis’ of science a[i]s the loss of its meaning for life,”1 as a distortion of 
subjectivity. He argues for meaning coming from a more transcendental and 
phenomenological viewpoint than from ‘sterile lifeless facts’.2 Part of the crisis is his 
realization of the need to speak more about a life-world or a lived experience. This theme 
is taken up by Merleau-Ponty in concentrating on integrating the body/mind duality into 
a unity as a creative body-subject, and is discussed later on. 
The Neyman-Pearson paradigm (the scientific method)3 is used for much research 
on musical creativity.4 Yet consider the variety of ways the concept of creativity appears 
                                                          
1 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction 
to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr, (Evanston, USA: Northwestern University Press, 
1970), para. 2, 5. 
2 See Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 8 and 13. 
3 Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, “On the Use and Interpretation of Certain Test Criteria for Purposes of 
Statistical Inference,” Biometrika A 20 (1928): 175–240 and 263–294. 
19 
 
in common speech about music. To say: “The composer’s works are judged creative” is 
to take an interest in creativity as product and is ontological. We assume the being-ness 
of a score from which a performance is made in real time, and there are causal and 
temporal associations to be made. To say: “The composer’s technique or craft is creative” 
is to take an interest in creativity as a process5 and is more method-orientated, involving 
craft and algorithm. This route lays emphasis on pedagogy. To say: “The composer 
behaves creatively” is to take an interest in creativity as behavior consistent with our own 
concepts of what being creative is, and psychological. To say: “I feel invigorated when I 
am creative” suggests creativity is described phenomenologically through an assumption 
that there is a qualitative essence of invigoration we have encountered; explanation gives 
way to description of effect. Connected to these different ways of speaking is that 
creativity comes with embodiment. There is no abstract concept of creativity under 
examination; someone or something is intentionally ‘in mind’: the composer or the 
composition, the painter or the painting. 
Induction and abstraction (deduction) from evidence are used to form and refute a 
hypothesis. Similarly, reflection upon what is produced through eidetic reduction 
intuitively extracts essence from phenomenological experience. In recognizing that 
creativity has the property of breaking away from preceding logical expectation, both 
hypothetical and eidetic reasoning are actually compromised. A dialectic of 
understanding has to then embrace this property, one that raises the potential importance 
of intellectual disruption. Such disruption is being made indicative of the way music is 
called creative, in experiencing the unusual, unpredictable, unexpected, non-contextual, 
the non-logical and like effects. 
The consistency present in inductive evidence,6 required to make a hypothesis 
credible, may not be found. Likewise, perceiving instances of creativity, that only 
partially reveal what we are dealing with, no longer necessarily leads on to contributing 
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 Otto Laske, “Music Composition as Hypothesis Formation: a Blackboard Concept of Musical Creativity,” 
34–41, (paper presented at AI ’89, Prague, Hungary, 1989). See also Lucy Green, “The Assessment of 
Composition: Style and Experience,” British Journal of Music Education, 7 (1990): 191–196; Dean 
Simonton, “Computer Content Analysis of Melodic Structure: Classical Composers and Their 
Compositions,” 31–43; David Collins, “A Synthesis Process Model of Creative Thinking in Musical 
Composition,” Psychology of Music 33 (2005): 193–216; Elizabeth Goncy and Charles Waehler, “An 
Empirical Investigation of Creativity and Musical Experience,” Psychology of Music 34 (2006): 307–
321; Aaron Kozbelt, “Performance Time: Productivity and Versatility Estimates for 102 Classical 
Composers,” Psychology of Music 37 (2009): 25–46. 
5 This category is the closest one might come to the ancient Greek concepts of techne and craft. 
6 Induction works only because of a belief in the immediate status quo of consistency. Once just one black 
swan has been sighted, all of the previous inductive consistency claimed by asserting ‘all swans are 
white’ has been lost. The evidence can no longer be interpreted in that way. 
20 
 
evidence to a consistent eidetic reductive conclusion (an essence). What may appear 
creative in one context may not appear so in another. Caution should be exercised in 
automatically expecting, in this musical context, that either induction leads to finding 
universal properties in compositional creativity, or deduction leads to revealing principles 
of creative composing. Even with intuition, extracting essence(s) of compositional 
creativity from reliable evidence (deemed to be in thoughts, mind and consciousness) can 
be compromised by inconsistency. 
To assess whether a Kantian approach to creativity in the musical context is going 
to be helpful, a review of his philosophical stance in this regard is needed. Much of the 
explanation Kant gives is expressed as if composed of elements of a formal system,7 and 
is taxonomic. This already limits its applicability to intellectually disruptive thought. The 
categories used are often dualities, e.g. reason in contrast to understanding. Kant ‘thinks’ 
in terms of judgment and cognition. For him, there is an a priori principle contained 
within the mental faculty (power) of the ability to judge. Its validity is examined in his 
Critique of Judgment. Judgment is the power to build knowledge by placing particulars 
under universals. There is an a priori assumption that space and time are boundary 
conditions upon judging sensible and conceptual reality, all of which takes place in the 
mind. Since judging takes place in the mind, i.e., in nature, it only judges the experience 
of phenomena. There is for Kant no direct access to judging noumena, i.e., things in 
themselves. Kant posits sources of knowledge come from the sensible and the 
conceptual. For Kant, intuition is immediate sensible experience rather than the 
contemporary notion of coming to understanding without using reason. It is, for him, 
sensibility (sensing) and the imagination that gives rise to intuitions. Intuition for him has 
the property of ‘free play’ in the way it works in not relating to particular concepts. 
Knowledge of the sensible depends on having the necessary concepts in place 
beforehand, e.g. that of substance. Knowledge of the conceptual enables more concepts 
(determinate entities) to be formed. Concepts necessarily limit their legitimate ranges of 
application. 
For Kant, it is judgment that does the intellectual heavy lifting by mediating 
between understanding and reason to generate individual acts of subsumption (placing 
particulars under universals). Reason is theoretical when there is the possibility of 
                                                          
7 A ‘formal system’ is a concept used mainly in the disciplines of computer science and artificial 
intelligence. The system consists of symbols for representation, a grammar to manipulate symbols, 
axioms and a set of inference rules. It is strictly finite in conception and execution. 
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sensible action that produces theory (constructs, syllogisms); it draws out inference and is 
analytic (logical). Reason is practical when it is the cognition of sensible nature and can 
lead to the possibility of moral action upon sensible nature. However, cognition is 
constrained by truth-boundedness where truth is un-concealment (aletheia) in showing 
(proving) the validity of propositional correspondence. (Hegel shows truth through 
illusion.) Understanding provides concepts as universals and is theoretical and intuitive. 
In the sense that judgment becomes transcendental (Kantian), it examines and tries to 
understand the connection between what we sense and ‘the thing itself’. The meaning of 
what Kant meant by ‘transcendental idealism’ remains controversial.8 
In exercising its power, Kantian judgment operates in a number of different ways. 
Determinate judgment is cognition entirely contained within existing concepts and is 
reasonable. It gives power to the unifying view in science that supports teleology and 
causality. It fully determines the particular. It enables communication and sharing in a 
move towards universality. Kant claims that these three properties demonstrate the 
validity of nature being seen to have such an a priori principle in judgmental power. 
Indeterminate or reflective judgment works without having the need for concepts. It does 
a job for itself and is not necessarily causal. It uses imagination and becomes determinate 
through being able to form concepts. There is no presupposition that imagination cannot 
work in other ways. For imagination can give rise to intuition as a form of sensibility. 
Imagination can also give rise to things that are not true. But imagination can also lead to 
cognition (determinate judgment). 
Other forms of judgment feed off the (in)determinacy duality. Teleological 
judgment is only understood by virtue of its purpose. Purpose is the concept of having 
been designed and/or manufactured. A definite purpose can be to do or accomplish 
something as utilitarian or intend a meaning that is like something as if to reach towards 
perfection. Aesthetic judgments are a form of reflective (indeterminate) judgment, and 
need not begin with or end up with concepts. They are called judgments of taste by Kant 
and involve being disinterested, universal, necessary and purposive without purpose. The 
teleology is different to that of science. 
Understanding the meaning of creativity in art music composition necessarily 
involves making the concept of creativity and its particular effects under scrutiny 
                                                          
8 Nicholas Stang, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., found at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/kant-
transcendental-idealism. 
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communicable through the power of judgment. To that end, explanation and/or 
description with words comes into play and is distinct from just experiencing live music. 
In tackling this objective in a Kantian way, the properties of musical creativity that are in 
prospect as present have the nature of indeterminacy. Indeterminate judgments are still 
teleologic to Kant, i.e. the beautiful object is perceived as beautiful as if it had a purpose, 
but no purpose can be found or is apparent. This aspect of the beautiful is what provokes 
us to look for concepts even though we do not find them. 
Kant’s purpose in art is to stimulate reflection into imagination. Beauty has a 
purpose but without being able to state a definite purpose in mind. Art is not truthful; it 
shows truth through only offering a semblance to the thing itself as outward appearance 
and not necessarily true. The reception of the art work is an aesthetic experience and 
involving aesthetic judgment. In looking directly at creativity in art music composition, 
we are approaching art more through poiesis (the conditions that enable production) than 
aesthesis (the conditions for perceiving). This can change the role of judgment and 
cognition in each case but Kant actually deals mainly with aesthesis. Art for Kant differs 
from science in that it centers on skill (craft and techne) rather than the accumulation of 
knowledge (cognition). Pleasure comes from achievement of purpose but art is not made 
to generate a gratification other than the pleasure of doing it. Whatever is produced is a 
by-product. Fine art is distinguished from just agreeable art (into which he puts music) in 
that the latter is simply pleasurable to our senses alone without the need to conceptualize. 
However, the former gives rise to a cognitive judgment. In discussing fine art, Kant 
himself moves the focus from aesthesis more to poiesis. Fine art made by humans is still 
part of Kant’s nature and rule-bounded. Yet this cannot make sense, unless the freedom 
of humans to make in art what they choose and be subject to the a priori principles of 
nature, is reconciled. Calling music an agreeable art strips it of cognitive content, yet 
saying music can be experienced as beautiful raises it back to his category of fine art. 
This seeming contradiction is defended by him in concluding that music must be 
aesthetically judged. 
In referring to Kant’s ‘nature’, it is a term with several meanings: sensory as in the 
nature of, natural as essential to the entity, not generated by human will, or teleologic 
with respect to laws of nature. To overcome paradoxes which arise with these meanings, 
e.g. humans are of nature but free to make fine art which is not of nature but must appear 
‘natural’, Kant invokes the concept of genius, someone who has the talent to, through 
their nature, “give the rule to art”. This means geniuses are not contingent in making fine 
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art and there are no rules that can be stated for its production. The genius determines 
what is made much more than how it is made. So fine art is produced by non-contingent 
individuals, is non-conceptual to start with, comes from rules about what is produced 
rather than how, and appears original and natural. At this point, it can be seen that 
creativity in general could have a Kantian flavor placed upon it by regarding it as a term 
that embraces Kant’s views on aesthetic judgment and cognition. But to assume this 
would immediately fail to address the disruptiveness of thought in prospect when 
encountering creativity in music. 
Figure 2.1 shows semantic connections that can be made between experiential and 
real properties and has pathways that invoke both cognitive and aesthetic approaches to 
judgment. Existence is expressed in terms of entities, things and objects. Things that 
appear are phenomena. Entities are essentially the same as specific things, where things 
are interchangeable with objects. Objects consist of substances upon which identifiers are 
placed. All three existential terms suggest that what we are dealing with is ontological. 
As soon as they become sensate, they are phenomena whence they have an effect giving 
rise to percepts that form in the perceiver’s mind. Percepts are the result of perception 
and have no conceptual content. Minds reflect upon percepts by applying beliefs, desires 
and notions that turn percepts into propositions with which to form concepts. Concepts, 
nowadays regarded as ideas anyway by some, can be energized (worked upon) by 
imagination into ideas that logically reduce into precepts via explanation (as theory). The 
divide between having a concept or idea that leads to reasoned and logical precepts, as 
opposed to directly intuiting essences, rests upon how beliefs, desires and notions affect 
our thought. Precepts, canon and essence all have the nature of being abstract, 
epistemological and noumenal. They are expressible via attributes, such as class and 
property, to make them identifiable as semiotic, not real. Validity of any of the properties 
and actions connecting them as portrayed in Figure 2.1 rests upon the philosophical 
viewpoint taken. 
In Figure 2.1, aesthetic judgment takes place in the right-hand pathway with Kant’s 
concept of genius spanning the step between beliefs, desires and notions through to 
essence. In the sense that a genius is also part of nature (as per Kant), then the other parts 
of the semantic net can be regarded as necessary too. Figure 2.1 also shows the way that 
language constructs can enable each of the semantic steps to be described and taken. The 
divide between the cognitive and the intuitive routes is made in such a way that Kantian 
views are partially included. 
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We experience the music itself but choose some categorical or descriptive 
representation of the effect phenomena have upon us. Music as sound (along with smell, 
taste, touch and sight) is not necessarily classed as a form of language. Music gets 
transformed into language constructs in order to be communicable beyond the impact of 
immediate live performance. When creativity is invoked, those language constructs might 
be expected to also express how the disruptive aspects noted in music play a role. That 
disruption calls for a re-assessment of how Kantian judgment and the judgmental steps 
outlined in Figure 2.1 may be used to understand what we mean by calling music 
creative. Adopting any of these categories or descriptions, as possible containment to 
thoughts about creativity in composing art music, means that communicability is working 
within those chosen categories and their relationships. The subject matter—literally 
interacting with music—becomes manifest in some way through perception, but is itself 
then disruptive to cognition and intuition. 
Music is not automatically conceptual nor must be conceptualized for it to be 
epistemologically contained. Yet the musical creativity that it may entail or have 
embedded within it cannot be communicated unless some form is put upon such 
perceptive thoughts. In this thesis, musical creativity becomes conceptual as it is 
compared to and linked with other concepts, then shared. As will become apparent, the 
eidetic and intuitive route to understanding via phenomenology is given prominence.  
However, at this point, just one method for coming to an understanding of art 
music compositional creativity is not being chosen. The various approaches to creativity, 
and the way they can illuminate our understanding with respect to musical composition, 
are now to be reviewed, necessarily in terms of the conceptual models used by them. The 
literature shows present understanding of creativity mostly supports categorizing it as a 
product, a process or a behavior, and provides us with some philosophical understanding. 
Creativity is also seen as having historical and relational ties. Other concepts associated 
with creativity are then reviewed and discussed as to how they relate to musical matters. 
A return to the role of intellectual frameworks or thought environments as dialectic is 
made in Chapter 7.0, and also seen in the form of paradigms or epistemes, when a search 
for essences is undertaken. 
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Figure 2.1 
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2.1 A Scientific and Computational Model 
Some researchers put forward a purely structural or statistical notion of musical 
composition. 9 By so doing, they rely upon discovering or inventing algorithmic 
approaches to making music that might be deemed creative by some. In the same way, 
Dean Simonton is known for his analytic approach to understanding music,10 where he 
looks at changes in creativity across intellectual domains.11 He puts two concepts 
together: a contemporary version of Auguste Comte’s12 hierarchy of the disciplines and 
the BSVR (blind-variation selective-retention) algorithm, the first published conception 
of which is normally attributed to Alexander Bain.13 These two concepts are brought 
together under the rubric of ‘domain-creator congruence’, a position arrived at by 
empirical integration. The integration attempts to differentiate between artistic and 
scientific creativity. In Simonton’s own words: 
Because artistic creativity is less constrained than scientific creativity, the former 
is more dependent on BSVR than the latter.14  
This distinction is embedded in the hierarchy by the contention that it is more ‘sighted 
variations’ that occur in science and more ‘blind variations’ that occur in art. Simonton 
                                                          
9 Damián Zanette, “Playing by Numbers,” Nature 453(2008): 988–989. Zanette refers to Zipf’s law that 
says it holds for musical elements within a piece, such that the number of occurrences of a note, pitch or 
duration is inversely proportional to its rank in frequency of use; i.e., the most frequent note (or other) 
will be used twice as often as the second ranked note, three times as often as the third ranked note, etc. 
Michael Bulmer, “Music from Fractal Noise,” Proceedings of the Mathematics 2000 Festival, 
Melbourne, Australia, 10–13 January, 2000. Kenneth Hsu and Andreas Hsu, “Fractal Geometry of 
Music,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 87 (1990): 938–941. Bill Manaris, Penousal 
Machado, Clayton McCauley, Juan Romero and Dwight Krehbeil, “Developing Fitness Functions for 
Pleasant Music. Zipf’s Law and Interactive Evolutionary Systems,” Applications of Evolutionary 
Computing, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3449 (2005): 498–507. Bill Manaris, Dallas Vaughan 
and Christopher Wagner, “Evolutionary Music and the Zipf-Mandelbrot Law: Developing Fitness 
functions for Pleasant Music,” Applications of Evolutionary Computing, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 2611 (2003): 522–534. Dmitri Kormann, see URL = http://bowerbird-
studios.com/aicaramba/page2.html where you can listen to some of Kormann’s works. See also URL = 
http://www.tursiops.cc/fm/ for more fractal music techniques. See also Richard Voss and John Clarke, 
“1/f Noise in Music and Speech,” Nature 258 (1975): 317–318, which suggests a ubiquitous 
algorithmic basis for music composition. 
10 Dean Simonton, “Computer Content Analysis of Melodic Structure: Classical Composers and Their 
Compositions,” Psychology of Music 22(1994): 31–43. 
11 Dean Simonton, “Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind Variation and 
Selective Retention …” 247–264, in Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy of Creativity, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Dean Simonton, “Computer Content Analysis of 
Melodic Structure: Classical Composers and Their Compositions,” 31–43. 
12 Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, (1855) trans. & condensed by Harriet 
Martineau, (Kitchener, Canada: Batoche Books, 2000), Volume 1, 42. 
13 Alexander Bain, The Senses and The Intellect (New York: Appleton & Company, 1855). See pages 488–
523, which are detailed explanations of an understanding of scientific method. 
14 Dean Simonton, “Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind Variation and 
Selective Retention …”, 258. 
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then says that artistic creativity can be explained by a process that is akin to Darwinian 
evolution, because of its blindness. 
As generic sources quoted by Simonton in support of his work, Auguste Comte’s 
philosophical approach proposes epistemology to be a three-stage process. The theologic 
is a search for absolute knowledge. The metaphysical substitutes supernatural causes with 
abstract forces and sources to phenomena. Thirdly, positive philosophy studies laws, 
invariable relationships and resemblance. Comte’s view is: 
There is no science which, having attained the positive stage, does not bear 
marks of having passed through the other two.15  
Comte grades the first two stages as transitory and inadequate bases for explanation on 
their own, but are explanatory, not just descriptive. Comte’s interests as the founder of 
positivism is to apply scientific principles to sociological scenarios. The presuppositions 
behind Comte’s viewpoint call for a subordination of imagination by observation. Comte 
is not known for addressing musical matters directly nor art in general. There is little or 
no room for him to be seen as using phenomenological approaches. 
Alexander Bain, on the other hand, differentiates art away from the sort of precepts 
and categorization he himself and Comte characterized to be good science, when saying: 
… nature is his standard and truth his chief end. … I believe these are 
precisely the conditions of the scientific man: … The artist’s standard is 
feeling, his end is refined pleasure … he is not even bound to adhere to 
nature. ... his own taste being the touchstone, he alters the originals at his 
will. …The amount of regard that the artist shows to truth … i[I]n the 
purely effusive arts, such as music or the dance, truth and nature are 
totally irrelevant; the artists feeling and the gratification of the senses … 
are the sole criterion of the effect.16 
Bain is close to saying that we should look to sensations and effects for answers as to 
what art is all about and, by implication, any creative content in it. Bain could be said to 
have favored the phenomenological approach to understanding creativity. 
The work of Comte and Bain, as sources, differ significantly; Comte desires truth 
which ipso facto must come from genuine scientific discovery in all matters including 
sociology, into which he would place an understanding of music. Bain does not even look 
for truth in the artistic context. Simonton relies on this dual heritage to justify an 
                                                          
15 Auguste. Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Volume 1, 28. 
16 Alexander Bain, The Senses and The Intellect, 507. 
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evolutionary explanation for musical creativity, but does not embrace Bain’s phenomenal 
artistic caveat that Bain suggests is appropriate to music. Consistency of classification 
and reproducible results are important to good science as precepts but, as Bain and others 
point out, they do not address the essence of creative art as exemplified through 
phenomena and by the properties brought under scrutiny in this thesis. 
Margaret Boden has addressed definitional and other issues concerning creativity, 
creating categories for use in scientific explication. Boden researches general creativity 
from a cognitive viewpoint.17 Her concepts of ‘P and H creativity’ are to help distinguish 
between creativity that is psychological, involving ideas that are not particularly new, and 
creativity that is historical, involving ideas that appear to be genuinely new. Recent 
offerings from her now refer to art, where her categories are linked to an interest in 
conceptual spaces.18 Here we have the use of combinatory, exploratory and 
transformational creativity and, as the title of her latest book reveals, in art she sees 
creativity giving rise to surprise.19 This causal connection could lead to weakening a 
position of being justified through rationality, one that seeks powers of predictability 
through discovering and applying universal laws and precepts. When trying to spread the 
basis for an understanding into the arts as well as in science, her interest has moved into 
surprise and the unexpected, issues under scrutiny in this thesis.20 Creativity, seen this 
                                                          
17 Margaret Boden, Creativity in Art: Three Roads to Surprise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
This is the latest in a long series of articles and books by Margaret Boden addressing creativity in 
general, where she has now moved her attention more to art in recent years. See also Margaret Boden, 
The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (London: Routledge, 2004), 1–10. See also Emery 
Schubert, “Spreading Activation and Dissociation: A Cognitive Mechanism for Creative Processing in 
Music,” in Musical Imaginations: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Creativity, Performance and 
Perception, David Hargreaves, Dorothy Miell and Raymond MacDonald eds., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 128. Schubert shows a simplified version of a semantic net but without 
activation transitions. Schubert’s approach to knowledge acquisition was pioneered by David 
Rummelhart and James McClelland in their seminal pair of volumes called Parallel Distributed 
Processing (1986) and is fully mechanistic in concept. Their technique opened up the possibility of 
there being no central repository of activity as a node. Schubert’s SAT (spreading activation theory) is a 
simplified version of their work. 
18 Margaret Boden, “Creativity and Conceptual Art,” in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, Peter Goldie and 
Elizabeth Schellekens eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). See also Paisley Livingstone, 
Review of Creativity and Art: Three Roads to Surprise, by Margaret Boden, 423. Livingstone reiterated 
Boden’s stance, in writing: “Briefly, for Boden a conceptual space is a system of constraints that form 
[in Boden’s language] ‘a mental landscape with a characteristic structure and potential.’ The constraints 
or rules of a conceptual space determine what is possible and impossible when reasoning within that 
space.” See also Peter Gärdenfors, Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2000). 
19 Margaret Boden, Creativity in Art: Three Roads to Surprise. Margaret Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths 
and Mechanisms (London: Routledge, 2004), 1–10. 
20 Margaret Boden, Dimensions of Creativity, (Cambridge: Bradford Books, MIT, 1994), 85. Boden writes: 
“Computational ideas can help us to understand how human creativity is possible. This does not mean 
creativity is predictable. … [Computation] helps us to specify generative processes clearly, … [what it] 
can and can’t do.” Boden relies to some extent upon Chomskian generative grammar for her version of 
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way, embraces generically disruptive properties that we have highlighted as of particular 
interest when they are present in music. Such properties in science are considered as 
transitory, on the way to plausible and consistent explanation. It would appear that Boden 
is embracing the possibility that the scientific precepts she has been working with now 
come into question when trying to take a cognitive approach to the arts and, in particular, 
account for what it is to be creative in the arts. 
In support of science being carried out true to its aims, computation offers a reliable 
platform for applying logical and reproducible method through enactment of algorithms. 
Computation already plays a significant role in the composition of contemporary music 
and therefore attracts attention as to what creative content may be generated this way. At 
present, the production and enjoyment of music via computation is expanding to the point 
that it is now possible to program21 a full musical score, through to also making a 
performance in the form of an MP3 or MIDI file for playback, as if it had issued as the 
product from a normal recording studio, but without any live artists performing it. The 
delivery of this music is expanding into many multimedia settings. The programming 
now includes the observance of all markings on a composer’s score as if fidelity was 
ensured. It would also not require bringing any human performing artists into a gig to 
record and make the file. In listening to the product, it would be potentially 
indistinguishable from one made from recording a live performance. The debate about 
where creativity enters in, to what now appears to be an algorithmic process, could center 
anywhere such as on creativity in the composer, in the computer-generated score, the 
original set of performers who may have provided the genotype MIDI pitch and timbre 
sets for the instruments and voices, the skill of the programmer and so on. 
The research of David Cope addresses issues about understanding art music 
compositional creativity in this computational context. His own viewpoint on creativity 
in general is contained in his definition: “The initializations of connections between two 
or more multifaceted things, ideas or phenomena hitherto not otherwise considered 
connected.”22 Here there is no mention of the context being from human effort and is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
creativity, which is thereby expressible as computation where intuition (without reason) is not a major 
constituent for resolution (see Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Language, New York: MIT 
Press, 1965). But in Philip Johnson-Laird, How We Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), in 
the context of jazz improvisation, Johnson-Laird shows that limits on short-term memory rule out the 
use of powerful generative grammars. 
21 Depending on views held, the term program (as a verb) could be rewritten as compose or create, or 
considered an act of combining all three. Since we normally ‘program’ computers, that term is used in 
this context. 
22 David Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity (Madison, A-R Editions Inc., 2005), 11. 
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consistent with him not ruling out that computation may produce musically creative 
product. Cope’s mixture of creativity issues shows there is an interplay between the 
desire to experience the humanly genuine and concomitantly give it creative value in 
music. Any suggestion of a non-human source might rule out the presence of creativity in 
what is experienced. 
Computation is enactment of algorithm. A musical composition produced this way 
can be regarded as one of a finite set of predictable solutions to meet chosen criteria. 
Deciding upon the criteria begs the question as to how that is to be done. This implies 
asking a further question as to whether computation could achieve this step too, when it 
is normally assumed the criteria are chosen by humans.23 Cope’s stance is to use his own 
ability to compose, but strongly conditioned by results obtained from computational 
analysis, which he also controls. In one estimation, it can be said that the whole exercise 
is all derivative upon Cope’s initial choices of criteria for selecting the significant from 
the rest. Computation helps only to speed up the subsequent complexity in 
mechanization. 
Cope draws out the significance of discussing the role of complexity itself in being 
creative by defining the word ‘comtivity’. This is a type of complexity with similar traits 
to creativity where the degree of complexity could be seen as a measure of value.24 
Finding the need to invent this new word, he then places value in music as coming from 
having an experience of complexity, one that machine-based computation carries out 
much better than humans. If complexity is made out to be closely associated with being 
creative, implications about subsequent value judgements also follow. Non-
anthropomorphic computation manipulates and explores complexity much faster than 
humans.25 If creativity is basically handling complexity, digital computation becomes 
creative and much better at it than humans.  
                                                          
23 To achieve the selection of criteria step offers a significant improvement in regarding the system as 
autonomous and maybe thinking for itself. 
24 Keith Potter, “Minimalism,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, URL = http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40603). Potter 
comments that complexity could be seen as diametrically opposite to minimalism in a musical setting, 
an analogy to contrasting Abstract Expressionist ‘painterly excess’ to minimalist structural and textural 
simplicity in the visual arts. Potter then claimed Abstract Expressionism “sought complexity as a 
necessary passage to truth.” 
25 Harry Lehmann, “Digitization and Concept: A Thought Experiment Concerning New Music,” Search 
Journal for New Music and Culture 7 (2010): 1–14. Lehmann writes of the computer (as algorithm 
enactor) achieving three tasks: notation facility, computer reproduction (as via MIDI files) and the use 
of the computer for “the compositional process itself, the possibilities of generating musical material 
and organizing it to form a piece of music.” See also Larson Powell, “The Experience of Complexity: 
The Critical Discussion Concerning Brian Ferneyhough (Review),” Search Journal for New Music and 
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Music that is reliant on computation can be seen in a number of different ways. 
Algorithmic synesthesia is a form of complexity and is both algorithmic and classifiable 
as a formal system. It is meant to demonstrate how, from wherever we derive the 
algorithm, it is ‘transferrable’, to be applied in other perhaps unrelated intellectual or 
sensory domains.26 Spectralism—the use of computerization to organize, analyze and 
project sound (like sonic rainbows)—is basically using the mathematical technique of 
taking a Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT) for analyzing and categorizing music, 
thence to ‘create’ more music. To be realistic with these examples, it is not practically 
possible to ‘algorithmically synaesthesize’ or process DFTs without using digital 
computation and the speed and complexity thereby made available. 
If music is brought into being essentially by the manipulation and recognition of 
algorithms and it thereby assumed that machines are creative in some way,27 the 
advancement of art music composition may be possible by exploiting computerization. In 
this case, anthropomorphic creativity, especially in music, might then be graded as much 
slower and perhaps rather dull. 
In the same way Cope has taken an interest in the role of complexity in being 
creative in music composition, Csikszentmihalyi has also linked being creative with 
handling complexity. He says: “Forty years of optimal experience literature has 
demonstrated that complexity is central to the lives of creative persons.”28 
Csikszentmihalyi defines creativity in terms of a ‘creative flow’ whereby there is a causal 
relationship between skill level, interpreted as being creative, and the degree of 
complexity or challenge in the task undertaken. The practitioner’s skill level and the 
complexity of the task are seen to increase both together, leading to ever increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Culture, 7 (2010): 1–7, where recognition of the work of Richard Toop and his knowledge about Brian 
Ferneyhough’s use of complexity is included. 
26 Roger Dean et al., “The Mirage of Algorithmic Synaesthesia: Some Compositional Mechanisms and 
Research Agendas in Computer Music and Sonification,” Contemporary Music Review 25 (2006): 311–
327. Dean and his colleagues have discussed the validity of what they term algorithmic synaesthesia in 
connection with music. See also Noam Sagiv, Freya Bailes and Roger Dean, The Oxford Handbook of 
Computer Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 294–311. In Dean’s compositional space, 
he makes a real-time causal link from the output of a performing human to then synaethsize this output 
using a computer to create (or complete) the whole performance. The debate on what is creative here 
stems from seeing at least three contributions at play: who or what is taking the initiative to be creative, 
how this faculty is described and who programmed the computer. 
27 Todd Lubart, “How Can Computers Be Part of the Creative Process? Classification and Commentary on 
the Special Issues,” International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 63 (2005): 365–369. 
28 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Systems Model of Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Volume 1, (Berlin: Springer, 2014), eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 63, 66. 
Originally published in Journal of New Ideas in Psychology 6 (1988): 315. 
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creative output as a kind of optimization.29 Csikszentmihalyi has revealed that, to him, 
optimization is a key issue in being creative, one supported by computation with 
algorithmic complexity. Optimization involves the selection of some para- or 
psychometric base on which to demonstrate what it is that has been optimized,30 and is 
teleologic. This type of involvement detracts from being able to experience aesthetic 
properties, important in our context, that need no such justification through being 
purposeful. 
Csikszentmihalyi, however, comments on where he thinks computing cannot play a 
role in being creative. He says: 
… computer models of the creative process do not include affect, 
motivation, and curiosity, and hence could not be said to replicate what goes 
on in the mind of a person confronting a problem creatively. Computers 
simulate some of the rational dimensions of cognition, leaving out the rest. 
… As long as they [other researchers of creativity] only model rational 
problem-solving, they may be better [at doing that] than we are, but they 
won’t be like us [those who include the human and social context]. 31 
Csikszentmihalyi shows he regards computation models of creativity as basically rational 
and logical problem solvers. He does not agree with creativity being limited to this 
facility alone. However, his search for rational answers to what creativity is persists and 
weakens the case for his systems approach being relevant for the quest in this thesis. 
                                                          
29 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention, (NewYork: 
Harper Collins, 1996). See also Charles Byrne, Raymond MacDonald and Lana Carlton, “Assessing 
Creativity in Musical Compositions: Flow as an Assessment Tool,” British Journal of Music Education 
20 (2003), 277–290, for the use of flow in the assessment of creativity in musical composition. In Arne 
Dietrich “Neurocognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Experience of Flow,” Consciousness and 
Cognition 12 (2004): 746–761, Dietrich hypothesized that in the brain there is a “hypofrontality that 
enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-conscious capacities of the explicit 
system,” leading possibly to a creativity based on an effortless information processing flow. A jazz 
musician’s ‘in the groove’ is a typically good manifestation of the phenomenon of ‘flow’. See also 
Eugene Montague “Phenomenology and the ‘Hard Problem’ of Consciousness and Music,” in Music 
and Consciousness, David Clarke and Edward Clark eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 31. 
Montague writes: “If all conscious experiences are temporal, then music most closely approximates this 
quality of flow, more so, for example, than literature and figurative art.” The suggestion here is that 
music, through its flow of temporality, has qualities more similar to consciousness—maybe as an 
instrument of it—than other analogies. See also Raymond Macdonald, Charles Byrne and Lana Carlton, 
“Creativity and Flow in Musical Composition: an Empirical Investigation,” Psychology of Music 3 
(2006): 292–306; and Lori Custodero, “The Call to Create: Flow Experience in Musical Learning and 
Teaching,” in Musical Imaginations: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Creativity, Performance and 
Perception, David Hargreaves, Dorothy Miell and Raymond MacDonald eds., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 369–384, for application to learning and teaching. 
30 Music never has to optimize. Its excursions are its delight. 
31 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Systems Model of Creativity : The Collected Works of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Volume 1, (Berlin: Springer, 2014), eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 63, 66. 
Originally published in Journal of New Ideas in Psychology 6 (1988): 183–186. 
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Computation can potentially take many forms in composing music creatively 
depending upon what is regarded as creative. A case in point comes from David Gunkel 
who addresses making music through remix. His Of Remixing: Ethics and Aesthetics 
after Remix 32 asks questions as to the creative content and value involved in re-working 
music. The sounds have already been created and offered by artists and composers as 
their original work. Remixing uses collage, sampling, bootlegging, mashup and pastiche, 
exercised mainly upon someone else’s original content. The process33 lends itself readily 
to computation—it is most often achieved by computational processing—as the means to 
choose, modify and put together the pieces that make a remix. 
For some, the ethics of remixing are questionable, who Gunkel groups together as 
follows: 
According to this group, the sampling and recombining of preexisting 
material is nothing more than a cheap and easy way of recycling the work of 
others, perpetrated by what are arguably talentless hacks who really have 
nothing new to say.34 
The sentiments of such objectors seem to be those of devaluing the remix product on the 
grounds that nothing new has been made and the effort was easy, requiring no expertise 
to do so. There is an implication that the work is not seen as creative in any way. On the 
other hand, Gunkel claims there is: 
… an unlikely but influential coalition [with] … a common interest in 
creative practices that not only generate innovative, useful, and entertaining 
media content but also open up new avenues and opportunities for its 
development.35 
Creativity is invoked in this quote to give the impression some new music has been 
produced, even though there is recognition that remix works with already-published 
product. 
The remixers meet strong opposition to their claim of being creative when seen as 
an ethical and legal debate about whether it is possible to defend the owning of 
                                                          
32 David Gunkel, Of Remixing: Ethics and Aesthetics after Remix (Cambridge, USA: MIT Press, 2016). 
33 I have used the word ‘process’ here as more appropriate than say music-making, composing, arranging, 
re-working or any of the remix terminology, because process gets closer to the algorithmic nature of 
what is done in remix. 
34 David Gunkel, Of Remixing: Ethics and Aesthetics after Remix (Cambridge, USA: MIT Press, 2016), 
xviii. 
35 David Gunkel, Of Remixing: Ethics and Aesthetics after Remix (Cambridge, USA: MIT Press, 2016), 
xviii. 
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intellectual property. The grounds for opposition come from their activity being viewed 
as plagiarism and intellectual theft. The remixers would claim to have produced original 
work when seen from an aesthetic viewpoint. The originality is defined as effectively 
more complex versions of what existed before to give new experiences, and thereby 
creative in content, i.e., their work is regarded as essentially newness defined as more 
complexity. Yet Gunkel wants to avoid making this divide between viewpoints on the 
grounds that both sides seek the same shared Platonic values of “originality, innovation, 
and creative expression”.36 Gunkel mentions he is influenced by Gilles Deleuze and 
Jacques Derrida. Both of these philosophers do not, by virtue of espousing 
deconstruction, recognize the significance of creative effort or it being attributable on a 
personal basis. This may help us understand Gunkel’s sentiment that remix is an “eternal 
recurrence that opens an abyss of terrifying but infinite possibilities.”37 
Remix, by its own admission, remains a derivative product, generated as more 
complex versions of what already exists. It shows little of the properties we are looking 
for in being creative. Computation, for the purposes of bringing more music into being, 
effectively becomes a means of enacting algorithms and complexity, albeit much more 
efficiently than humans, but ultimately under human guidance and precepts. If 
computation were to be embraced as the major means to being creative in music, then its 
significance may lie in the increased ability to handle complexity, including programmed 
heuristics.38 The human content of creativity would then, in conjunction with 
computation, reside more in devising heuristics and algorithms. Using and valuing 
computation may then lead to reducing the importance presently attached to live 
performances of canonical works on traditional instruments. At the extreme, using 
computation, through enactment of complex algorithms, can now ultimately reduce 
musical composition and performance down to a single press of a button, be that judged 
creative or not. 
 
2.2 Creativity as Process and System 
The generic link between process and system recognizes that a particular set of 
conditions and faculties gives rise to change, one which identifies a move to a desired 
objective or state. In regarding creativity as a process to be enacted, Graham Wallas, in 
                                                          
36 David Gunkel, Of Remixing: Ethics and Aesthetics after Remix (Cambridge, USA: MIT Press, 2016), 
xxxi. 
37 David Gunkel, Of Remixing: Ethics and Aesthetics after Remix, xxxi. 
38 This terminology can be seen as an oxymoron. 
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The Art of Thought,39 is an early exponent, offering four sequential steps: preparation, 
incubation, illumination and verification. Wallas’ summation is similar to three steps 
(preparation, incubation, illumination) previously advocated by Hermann von Helmholtz 
and then by Henri Poincaré.40 Csikszentmihalyi expands to five stages: preparation, 
incubation, insight, evaluation, elaboration.41 Extending the process concept further, 
Arthur Cropley thinks creativity passes through six stages: preparation, information, 
incubation, illumination, verification and validation.42 These stages are similar in what 
they describe, placing the focus on creativity in having some form of stepwise 
progression for success. In this way, Cropley regards creativity as specifically aimed at 
solving problems, limiting applicability if, contextually, creativity is not perceived as 
only for problem-solving. In the same form of process terminology, Frank Barron 
proposes a psychic creation model43 where a person conceives in their mind, gestates the 
ideas, and brings forth something and then ‘matures the product’. Here the focus has 
moved to be utilitarian but specifically recognizes the creativity as anthropomorphic. 
These themes are among the topics of the contributions made in The Act of Musical 
Composition: Studies in the Creative Process.44 As the title suggests, musical 
composition is regarded as the product of a creative process. There is a sense that 
cognition prevails, the results are to be truth-bounded, and consistency is sought.45 In the 
studies on a specific composer and work, such as for Phillippe Leroux, the results are 
presented as a consistent understanding of the methodology of Leroux with: “features 
that might apply to the activity of composition in general.”46 This phrase emphasizes how 
creativity is regarded by that writer as essential to composition in general, in their search 
                                                          
39 George Wallas, The Art of Thought (London: Jonathon Cape, 1926). 
40 Hermann von Helmholtz, Vorträge und Reden (Brunswick: Friedrich Viewig und Sohn, 1896). Henri 
Poincaré, The Foundations of Science (1904), available in the public domain via Worldcat, 1981. 
Poincaré identifies the four stages of preparation, incubation, illumination and verification or 
elaboration when dealing with invention and imagination in science. 
41 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1996). 
42 Arthur Cropley and Klaus Urban, “Programs and Strategies for Nurturing Creativity,” in K. Heller, F. 
Monks, R. Sternberg and R. Subotnik eds., International Handbook of Research and Development of 
Giftedness and Talent (Oxford, UK: Pergamon, 2000). 
43 Frank Barron, “Putting Creativity to Work,” in Richard Sternberg, ed., The Nature of Creativity 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 76–98. 
44 David Collins, ed. The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process (London: Ashgate, 
2012). 
45 Nicolas Donin, “Empirical and Historical Musicologies of Compositional Processes; Towards a Cross-
Fertilization,” 7, in David Collins, ed. The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process 
(London: Ashgate, 2012), 1–26. 
46 Nicolas Donin, “Empirical and Historical Musicologies of Compositional Processes; Towards a Cross-
fertilization,” in David Collins, ed. The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process 
(London: Ashgate, 2012), 11.  
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for: “a broader knowledge of composition that extends beyond individually documented 
cases.”47 An objectivity in some form of pedagogy is made important. To that end, 
Andrew Brown and Steve Dillon regard creativity in music as a process and devise a 
meaningful engagement matrix (MEM) to relate the composer’s state of mind to a 
particular context.48 They examine the activities of five diverse composers according to 
their MEM and conclude the attributes of meaningful engagement are motivation, 
challenge, involvement, sensitivity and virtuosity. They sum up meaningfulness with: 
“Managing motivation and appropriate challenges appears to be critical to meaningful 
engagement,”49 which focusses on these attributes as giving rise to meaning and creative 
success.  
David Collins studies the behavior and output of a single composer over a period of 
three years with a view to explaning their creativity via a process model. He distinguishes 
product from process (his interest) and finds:  
a generative process of problem proliferation and successive solution 
implementation, occurring not only in a linear manner but also recursively. 
Moments of creative insight were observed which related to Gestalt theory 
problem restructuring;50 
Composition and creativity are shown to be concomitant in the wording chosen by the 
writer in his text. His emphasis shows problem solving is important but concedes Gestalt 
thinking is probably in the mix and that recursion is inherent. Collins sees a composer’s 
method as a generative process as if creativity generates something, thereby making the 
emphasis ontological. 
In understanding compositional creativity as a processing ability that then generates 
product (it is then ontological), the goal of discovering and refining that process turns 
creativity into a learned experience with codified rules and technique.51 A study of the 
concepts that are part of these process models shows that each step is describing or 
implying a human activity which is relevant to reaching a goal. The nature of process is 
                                                          
47 Nicolas Donin, “Empirical and Historical Musicologies of Compositional Processes; Towards a Cross-
fertilization,” in David Collins, ed., The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process 
(London: Ashgate, 2012), 14. 
48 Andrew Brown and Steve Dillon, “Meaningful Engagement with Musical Composition,” in David 
Collins, ed. The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process (London: Ashgate, 2012), 
85. 
49 Andrew Brown and Steve Dillon, “Meaningful Engagement with Musical Composition,” 106. 
50 David Collins, “A Synthesis Process Model of Creative Thinking in Music Composition,” Psychology of 
Music, 33 (2005): 193–216. 
51 The ancient Greeks established this epistemic path through sophistry, thereby generating craft and 
techne. 
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to indicate that by following a route involving thought and action, success in achieving 
an objective, in our case to be creative in art music composition, will be assured. The 
sense of the surprising, unpredictable and new, properties of specific interest here, has 
been relegated to being an aberration. Whilst there are aspects of creative composition 
that lend themselves to some form of analysis to discover pattern and consistency, a 
process model of creativity, that specifies formulaic ways alone to reach a goal, does not 
address finding answers of interest here or coping with the inherent inconsistency of 
human involvement. 
Alternatively, the nature of the content of The Collected Works of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi,52 as the important residue of his work in the period 1964 to 2010, is 
one that believes creativity is best handled with a systems view. Process is change with 
some underlying objective in mind. System becomes an extension of process in having 
identifiable interacting parts that themselves could be processes. Like Margaret Boden, 
Pamela Burnard and Margaret Barrett, Csikszentmihalyi gives attention to what creativity 
means in the artistic context,53 but chooses the concept of shaping forces to do so: 
… what we call creative is never the result of individual action alone; it is 
the product of three main shaping forces: a set of social institutions, or field, 
that selects from the variations produced by individuals those that are worth 
preserving; a stable cultural domain that will preserve and transmit the 
selected new ideas or forms to the following generations; and finally the 
individual, who brings about some change in the domain, a change that the 
field, will consider to be creative.54 
The three main forces are considered to be in dynamic equilibrium.55 His systems 
approach is product-orientated to seek out ‘adaptive innovation’ where: 
It is impossible to tell whether or not an object or idea is creative by simply 
looking at it. Without a historical context, one lacks the reference points 
necessary to determine if the product is in fact an adaptive innovation. … 
                                                          
52 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Systems Model of Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Volume 1 (London: Springer, 2014). This is the first of several volumes, covering the 
period 1964 to 2010 of pre-published works. No record of subsequent volumes has yet been found. 
53 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, “The Artistic Personality”, Chapter 14: 227–237, in The Systems Model of 
Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Volume 1 (London: Springer, 2014). 
54 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Systems Model of Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Volume 1, (Berlin: Springer, 2014). eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 47. The italics 
have been added by me in line with a re-statement given by Csikszentmihalyi on page 229. 
55 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Systems Model of Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi, Volume 1, (Berlin: Springer, 2014), eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 51. 
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The systems model proposes that creativity can be observed only in the 
interrelations of a system made up of [the] three main elements.56 
Csikszentmihalyi has treated creativity as the product of forces that cause the individual 
to innovate with adaptation. The context is in a society that collectively works back upon 
the active individual, shaping what might be called progress through having social and 
cultural gate-keepers who maintain established historical standards. This collective 
attitude is also proposed by several other researchers.57 He recalls persons that had 
positions of influence, having disposable wealth and interest in the arts, playing their part 
in the historical flowering of creative times, such as in the Renaissance. Today, however, 
he thinks the goal has matured into placing the concept of creativity into an existing 
rationally understood epistemology. 58  
Csikszentmihalyi seeks rationality through a system that encourages adaptive 
innovation from an individual in a cultural and social context. The notion of system 
implies a chosen and refinable set of processes at work. They can be seen to optimize a 
person’s adaptive and innovative skills, honed by interaction with society and culture, a 
method that is purposeful or teleologic. Since this thesis does not limit creativity in the 
musical context to being innovative, rational and teleological, Csikszentmihalyi’s views 
are not seeking to address and explain why we reach for the descriptor ‘creative’ in our 
musical context when experiencing the unusual, unpredictable, unexpected and non-
contextual. 
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Csikszentmihalyi. Volume 1, Berlin: Springer, 2014, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), 53–56. 
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2.3 Psychology and the Normative in Music 
A study of the psychology of music may be deemed separate to that of the 
psychology of creativity. But how they then relate to each other depends on categories 
used. A focus on the psychology of creativity in art music composition could be then 
seen as moving a number of steps away from the psychology of creativity. However the 
presuppositions of psychology prevail over such delineations anyway, together with the 
way creativity unfolds in the social context. An overview of how psychological research 
approaches the topic of creativity is given before the musical context is then introduced. 
A new approach to understanding creativity, seen at the time as a major new 
initiative, came from Joy Guildford’s presidential address in 1950 to the American 
Psychological Association. It marked a milestone in reviving interest in creativity from a 
psychologist’s point of view. He states: 
… abilities of … creative people … to a noteworthy degree … depend on 
motivational and temperamental traits … [such that] the psychologist’s 
problem is that of creative personality.59 
The address identifies creativity as attributable to people through their 
personalities and connected in some way to their intelligence. Guildford extends 
the scope of Wallas’ approach by including humans, but then classifies a type of 
person as creative according to a statistical or psychological basis, rather than 
personal attributes. The approach is scientific but by virtue of being psychometric, 
it limits scope to creativity being based on things that can be measured. 
A number of volumes about creativity have been published, each attempting to give 
its own summative definition of creativity,60 many of which rely significantly upon the 
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psychological approach. Typical of summary statements made is one by Robert 
Sternberg, in Handbook of Creativity,61 who has brought together a range of perspectives 
on creativity and its elucidation. The emphasis is, as for Guildford, mainly on 
psychology. In the opening chapter, a general definition of creativity is given: 
Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, 
unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task 
constraints) [references inserted here].62 
Various other ways of arriving at definitions for creativity are suggested via the chapter 
headings such as pragmatism, psychodynamics, psychometrics, social via personality and 
with attribute confluence. Sternberg concludes his overview chapter on problems and 
paradigms with sentiments shared in other summative works. They are to avoid mystical, 
pragmatic and un-disciplinary approaches and, instead, to adopt the mainstream 
psychological research paradigms of science. The special case for creativity being an 
extraordinary result of ordinary processes and structures is regarded by Sternberg as an 
error of judgment that should be replaced by [consistent] study of creativity in its own 
right. 
In these summative works, the term creative is used as if it had identified an 
intellectual value. In that respect, psychological research into education and learning 
places value into creativity for its powers to enhance the learning process. Berys Gaut,63 
in support of a creative route to learning, addresses the question of educating for 
creativity and puts forward two points. Imitation is not necessarily incompatible with 
creativity, and there are lots of examples where taught creativity can be found. With 
respect to the second point, he uses mathematics and fiction writing as illustrative 
examples and emphasizes the role of heuristics. Recognition is given to heuristics as 
actually ungrounded epistemically and his analytics is not applied to mainstream arts. 
Similarly, David Elliot takes the praxis route to musical education,64 which is extended 
by Margaret Barrett into treating the subject matter as part of a formal system as in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Handbook of Research on Creativity, Book Review, Cambridge Journal of Education 7 (2015): 396–
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63 Berys Gaut, “Educating for Creativity”, 265–287, in Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy 
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research on creativity derived from Csikszentmihalyi’s work.65 Formal systems are 
predictable pedagogy. In the same vein, each of the approaches by Odena and Welch66 or 
Elliot and Barrett look for pedagogy, one that assumes creativity in musical composition 
can be effectively taught in a methodologically formal way. Eleni Lapadiki, a music 
educator, identifies issues at stake here when writing: 
While music creativity has been a component of music education 
research for decades, some of the themes arising from professional 
composers’ experiences of their creativity, such as the significance of 
the unconscious, the apprehension towards discovering one’s own 
musical language, or the personal and social tension between tradition 
and innovation, among others, have not been adequately recognized in 
the literature of music education. … By doing this, I strongly believe 
that musical creativity in general and composing in particular run the 
risk of becoming a predictable academic exercise, which merely 
demands problem solving skills on the part of the student composer. … 
[L]earning about the creative concerns of the composers chosen for 
examination … may help music educators imbue a new refreshing aura 
of boldness, surprise, and a sense of breaking through old rules and 
stepping into new territories in their music composition teaching.67 
This cautionary note again raises the significance of experiencing surprise and the 
breaking of rules in music. 
In support of Gaut, and typical of many educational approaches, Yu-Sie Lin has 
proposed a conceptual framework for the way creativity plays a role in education. The 
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42 
 
emphasis is stated to be two-fold: creativity can be developed,68 and all individuals have 
the potential to be creative.69 These premises are aligned with educational policy 
statements that assert we can all learn somehow and that creativity must be used as an 
inclusive, not an exclusive, term. This viewpoint downplays the consideration that policy 
could also be formed by reference to idealism rather than by rational argument. It is 
possible that creativity in educational settings could be selectively researched in support 
of pre-existing beliefs about how we learn. These inclusive educational premises do not 
align with the properties already identified as of interest in this thesis. They are the basis 
of pedagogy and ease of learning; pedagogy creates well-worn pathways to 
understanding, and ease of learning gives access to the many irrespective of personal 
ability. 
The general use of the word creativity in the musical context has been explored by 
Pamela Burnard.70 Burnard’s main thrust is to see musical creativity through the 
philosophical framework offered by Bourdieu.71 Bourdieu’s approach is three-fold 
involving phenomenology, objectivity and the theory of practice. Burnard attaches 
significance to Bourdieu using the categories of “… field, habitus, capital and practice to 
understand contemporary creative musical practices”. The main theme of her work is all 
about working collectively. Burnard’s emphasis on collective practice is to see musical 
creativity as a cooperative affair, with strong interaction between participants. In this 
way, Burnard then says that making music is possible only through being cooperatively 
or collectively creative, in accord with her interpretation of what musical creativity is.72 
However, and relevant to this thesis, Burnard claims that: “What is central, then, is to 
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understand how contemporary classical composers think about and practice their own 
forms of musical creativity.”73 
An understanding as to why Burnard sees contemporary art music composers from 
this point of view comes from her pluralistic viewpoint where no single creativity for all 
musics is expected to exist. A significant part of Burnard’s objections to present-day use 
of the term is based on what she calls the ‘power of personal myth-making’.74 Hence the 
concept identified by Lydia Goehr of an ‘Imaginary Museum of Musical Works’75 is 
described as “… a fetishisation of composition, mythologized as a fixed thing, deeply 
rooted in history.”76 For Lydia Goehr, musical works appear to have developed some 
form of ontology in the early nineteenth century that may not be justifiable when 
considering that it is only in performance and hearing the sounds time-dependently that 
any form of objectivity could be claimed as present. Burnard illustrates what she sees as 
the problem of myth-making with reference to Mozart’s alleged response to the unknown 
Baron when asked how Mozart composed.77 Much of the account concerning Mozart is 
seen by Burnard to be reported as in creating a myth rather than recording and preserving 
factual information. As pointed out by Burnard, caution about factual accuracy of these 
memoirs and biographies is important. However, an exaggerated caution can mask 
sentiment or intent in the writing, when we could detect the ideas about the creative spirit 
these writers had. Both Johann Friedrich Rochlitz and Edward Holmes reveal to us they 
had personal ideals about how composing took place, which are actually process-
orientated. The extension into what they would regard as creative as we understand the 
word today is more difficult to infer. 
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Burnard’s Chapter 6 on “Composed Musics” describes creativity in the diversity of 
composing all types of music. She tells of coming to grips with evidence from composers 
by saying:  
In my early attempts of such an analysis I ended up with a mountain of text 
after trying to present a comprehensive picture of 20 composers, using small 
chunks of dialogue. The result was a misrecognition of their practices and 
creativities. I have therefore settled for illustrative discussions of selected 
composers who share a ‘feel for the game’, using these as examples of 
professional composers endowed with demonstrable mastery and 
achievements in three distinct contexts.78 
Burnard selects three contemporary composers for scrutiny: Donnacha Dennehy, Liza 
Lim and Robert Davidson. Conclusions are drawn from verbatim quotes from each 
composer, usually in support of creativity permeating all aspects of composing, including 
co-operative efforts that are socially interactive. She draws attention to the difficulty of 
representing these composers comprehensively and treats their creativity as if it were 
another way of referring to them as active in composing. Her views on musical 
composition expand the use of the word to include a collective attitude to the diversity 
found in musical activity as a normal practice. Her reasoning thereby differentiates her 
goals from the aims of this thesis, which is to see creativity through the unusual and 
exceptional normally emanating from a single person and then try to understand the 
reasons for this. Nevertheless, Paul Feyerabend has raised his own objections to 
creativity being seen as existing as an attribute of only one single person,79 but he still 
gives it human connections. Feyerabend’s objections rest on the premise that culture does 
not need individual creativity. He refutes the following three assertions: developments of 
concepts result from the user’s conscious actions, abstract and unusual concepts are 
exclusively the results of individual creativity, and humans could be the start of a causal 
chain. 
Properties of creativity that are necessarily associated with learning methods 
become less appropriate for consideration in our context. As mentioned, in education, 
pedagogy is important for making an intellectual pathway that learners can follow. The 
use of the term creative in this context recognizes building intellectual progress or 
capital, but not as something necessarily unusual or surprising. If we are to agree with the 
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psychological researchers, such as in the tradition of Wallas through to Gaut, Feyerabend 
and Burnard, creativity would be an ordinary consistent property shared amongst a group 
of humans, and not necessarily embedded in one or even a few. It would be a consistent 
type or characteristic of persons (not of a person) including social and cooperative 
attitudes or pressures toward what is to be produced (product or action orientated), and 
how to relate to other human beings successfully in this context. We are, by their 
estimation, citizens more than individuals, showing creativity in ordinary ways, much 
more than being self-contained and maybe brilliant individuals, e.g. geniuses. 
Putting together the motivations of those involved in psychology and its extension 
into education and learning, we see that normativity is important coupled with well-
established pathways to success (howsoever success is defined), with some recognition 
that plurality plays a role in categorizing how humans behave. Those motivations form 
the basis for their research into creativity. This normative psychological modelling is 
close to process modelling, reviewed previously, in that some formula to guarantee 
success in recognizing creative manifestation is assumed to come from consistency of 
evidence. The search for consistency should then make research results particularly 
applicable to the learning environment, exemplified in the assumption that we could all 
be exceptionally creative by application of the same principles. This viewpoint 
downplays the consideration that policy might have been formed by idealism in the first 
place, rather than by rational argument. 
These inclusive educational premises do not align with the properties already 
identified as of interest in this thesis. The use of the word creative, as referring to a 
general categorizable attraction and judgement of an art work, is not what is looked for. 
In the musical context, the impact is seen more through the experience of phenomena 
described as unexpected, unusual, inexplicable, thought disrupting, surprising and new, 
breaking out of any prescribed way of explaining the appreciation of such a work or 
composer. A basis for assessing creative content cannot rely on a method that looks for 
consistency of effect which might then be further reified in being measurable. It is likely 
to employ aesthetic qualities, and refer us to concepts such as beauty, the sublime, value, 
taste and style, rather than any analytic measures where meaning depends upon 
consistency. Properties of creativity that are necessarily associated with learning methods 
are seen to be inappropriate for consideration in our context. 
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3 Conjunctive Concepts 
 
An initial discussion of what it means to talk of art music composition as creative 
started with considering creativity to be communicable and shared. In discerning how 
research has approached understanding creativity in general, special considerations 
applying to musical matters have also been noted. Discussion on how to make creativity 
communicable and shared took the form of involving concepts in making this possible. 
At root, concepts coopt words for communicability. In historical terms, the origins of the 
word creativity reach back to roots in muses and daemons, where the astounding and 
even the miraculous could be invoked by way of explanation. The On-Line Etymology 
Dictionary1 derives the original meaning of creativity from late fourteenth-century Latin, 
and the word creare meaning to make, bring forth, produce, beget or bring into existence. 
Creare also has meanings similar to crescere, which means to arise or grow.2 With these 
generic meanings in mind and in noting how music might call for specific ways in which 
creativity takes place, we turn now to consider how creativity can be related to other 
concepts. 
Using wording such as creative, creation and creativity does not rule out an overlap 
with the meaning of other concepts. Invention, innovation and discovery make cognition 
and practical outworking important. Insight, inspiration, intuition and imagination make 
links to being reasonable non-apparent. Genius and talent are types of extraordinary 
persons who might be assessed as creative. Invention speaks of bringing into being 
something that may not have existed previously, where teleology and utility can 
dominate when claims of achievement through legal rights are made. Innovation speaks 
of revealing or making something new but begs the question for whom it is new. 
Discovery speaks of finding something that already exists; it does not ‘bring into 
existence’ from nothing, i.e. from ex nihilo, for there is the presupposition that an ‘other’ 
has placed something that is now in existence to be discovered. Insight speaks of having 
the power to penetrate to the heart of the matter in whatever is trying to be understood as 
essential or axiomatic. Inspiration speaks of some near instantaneous realization of a way 
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forward as the Eureka moment, maybe attributable to a Muse-like influence. Intuition 
speaks of discovering (or is that inventing or creating?) a way forward without the need 
for rules or reasons. Imagination captures the possibility of conception in the mind before 
some objective manifestation takes place. 
All these words describe human conceptual modes of thought and action, noting 
also that genius or talent describe types of persons who may have exceptional abilities. 
Creativity includes instances of all the concepts, properties and types mentioned, e.g., 
genius is seen by some as the highest achievement of creativity.3 Creativity is recognized 
concomitantly as a finished product, a process and a human attribute, the manifestations 
and categorizations for each conception being disparate and potentially conflicting. The 
conflict may be resolved to some extent by differentiating between thought and action, 
but that is at root Cartesian and may not be sustainable. Some discussion about the 
relative significance of, and relationships between, these concepts is needed in the 
musical context. 
In an attempt to discern whether musical works are discovered, invented or created, 
Charles Nussbaum debates the efficacy of terms such as ‘kinds’, ‘types’ and ‘tokens’.4 
Nussbaum concentrates more on performance, not composition, as being the prime 
manifestation of music. The common link made between discovery, invention and 
creation is the sense of newness that is encountered from all of them. Nussbaum agrees 
that the term invention brings something new into existence but discovery does not. In a 
musical context, he sees invention differing from creation by virtue of kind.5 Inventing 
the incandescent light bulb is different in kind to composing (creating) a new symphony, 
whereby musical creativity breaks normative and predictive connections. Edison’s 
invention of the light bulb came out of a progression of understanding in science and 
Edison got there first, but others could also have done so. There is a developmental 
temporality attached to invention and also to discovery. In contradistinction, Beethoven’s 
Symphony No.5 (1808) or George Crumb’s Black Angels (1971) emerged from particular 
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Zeitgeists too, but there is scant plausibility in saying this means that someone else would 
logically and reasonably be expected to have written them at that time or even later on, 
on a basis that made it ‘bound to happen sometime’. They were new at the time and 
remain unique. 
Discovery is linked to what is meant by the concept of newness by an attachment to 
that of making progress in understanding. If we experience the new, there is an 
assumption that newness reveals the potential of gaining new knowledge. In that respect, 
we may have been taught and learnt from canon and forebears. If progress is defined in 
this way, it means little in creative terms because creativity does not make progress. The 
newness is for the person who might attribute human creativity to its manifestation, as a 
phenomenon attracting attention by being encountered for the first time. As for the 
creative person producing the new, the newness does not have to be substantiated as, or 
by reference to, a universal property. It is problematic to relate the newness to causal 
sources, for the act of perceiving the new automatically suggests that no connections with 
previous experience and knowledge is being made. The art music composer is someone 
who is capable of creating a ‘new’ world in each and every musical offering, one that 
needs no reference to previous music, though connections may be discerned as present in 
different ways. The musically creative is to some extent present in a newness of the 
world it has the power to invoke. 
Three contexts are now discussed where creativity is used in association with other 
concepts. They show how understanding can take place when creativity in music 
composition comes under scrutiny. Firstly, genius and inspiration are examined when 
seen as the epitome of creative behavior. Secondly, intuition coupled to expertise is 
examined as routes to possible (maybe structural) understanding. Thirdly, beauty and 
imagination are viewed as possible routes into the more aesthetic properties of creativity. 
Finally, seeing creativity in philosophical terms is reviewed. 
 
3.1 Creativity, Genius and Inspiration, as Behavior 
A commonly held conception of creativity depends upon the behavior and output 
of those, such as Mozart, appearing more gifted or able than others, often described as 
‘the inspired genius’. As already mentioned, Kant has a definitive role for a genius and is 
arguably the first philosopher to define what he thinks genius consists of: 
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… genius is (1) a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be 
given: … and that consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) 
Since there may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same 
time be models … and serve that purpose for others, i.e. as a standard or 
rule of judging. (3) It cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its 
product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where an author owes a 
product to his genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have 
entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at 
pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such 
precepts as would enable them to produce similar products. … (4) Nature 
prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only 
in so far as it is to be fine art.6 
The prescription asserts genius is talent to give rise to the original. It makes product in 
the form of ideas and models not brought into being by the application of rules, but finds 
the rule for doing so from the genius’ nature, in the sense of the power of production 
(both what and how) being inexplicable. Indeed genius must be active to give rise to fine 
art, not agreeable art that only gives rise to pleasure. There is no direct link made 
between genius and creativity in Kant’s text because the latter word, unlike for genius, is 
used imprecisely to indicate general activity. However, Bradley Murray, writing an 
Introduction to Kant’s work, thinks that Kant: “presents an account of artistic creativity 
or genius that has turned out to be very influential in the way in which we have come to 
think of the work of artists,” 7 automatically making genius co-existent with creativity. 
A commentary by Johann Friedrich Rochlitz on how Mozart practiced the art of 
composing, written soon after Mozart’s death, tells of him being able to conceive of a 
musical work in his mind before, almost in one go, pouring it out into a score ready for 
performance. The veracity of the report has been called into question yet is still widely 
published and relied upon in the literature.8 Doubts about this reporting rest in some way 
                                                          
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Volume 2, Analytic of the Sublime, 1790, translated by James 
Meredith, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911), accessed via Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial 4.0 International Licence, Section 46, 307. 
7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Volume 2, Analytic of the Sublime, 1790, 3. 
8 Maynard Solomon, “On Beethoven’s Creative Process: a Two-Part Invention,” Music & Letters 61(1980): 
272–283. Solomon writes: “There is an extensive pattern of fabrication in Rochlitz's contributions to the 
Mozart literature that would lead a prudent observer to reject the whole. Nevertheless, many of his 
characterizations and reports remain inextricably woven into the fabric of Mozart biography; even Jahn, 
despite his dismay at finding that Rochlitz was contributing to the formation of an 'unhistorical fantasy 
portrait' of Mozart, did not refrain from utilizing and accepting a good deal of his testimony. And it 
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on suspecting writers at that time portrayed their own version of how they thought 
musical composition took place ‘in’ Mozart. The phenomenon is reported as if it were 
some form of exceptional creative musical ability, perhaps based on a Platonic ideal the 
writer attributes to Mozart as a person. The writer seems to claim some knowledge of 
Mozart’s intentions, such as through personal interaction, listening to the music or 
interpretation of score and text. Rochlitz was actually present at events involving Mozart. 
The prose is adulatory as if this phenomenon is to be valued and revered, in trying to 
support a view that Mozart was a creative genius. In contrast, a reading of the 
correspondence between members of Mozart’s family at the time gives little or no 
indication that family members adulated Mozart to such an extent as Rochlitz. It is hard 
to find any references to Mozart being seen as creative, by using words such as genius, 
inspiration and so forth, even in an oblique way. 
Casting Mozart as a genius, exhibiting phenomena of exceptional human creative 
capability that is hard or impossible to explain, is a possible reasoning. However, 
Mozart’s abilities can also be seen as an extreme structural capability9 in producing 
music that is explicable within the possibilities of current musical understanding. This 
ability can be seen as able to handle complexity well and search out a wide range of 
possibilities. By this second reasoning, Mozart continued to work out more permutations 
of a given harmonic system and, in that way, his compositions are predictable in a finite 
search space, and potentially computable. Yet both abilities are judged creative and may 
even be said to be synergistic to each other. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
must surely give pause to the sceptic that crucial passages from Rochlitz's writings on Mozart-including 
his moving portrait of the composer's burning creativity and disturbed mental state in the months 
preceding his death-are reproduced in Nissen's Biographie W A. Mozart, issued under the supervision 
and apparently bearing the approval of Constanze Mozart. See Deutsch, Schubert: Memoirs, p. 331.  
Jahn, Mozart, i, p. xi, iii. 161-3. To his credit, Rochlitz never attempted to print this account, although 
several of its details were used in his anecdotes, e.g. Allgemeinem Musikalische Zeitung, i (1798-9), 
54.” 
9 The description here is in agreement with that proposed in Erich Hertzmann, “Mozart’s Creative 
Process,” The Musical Quarterly 43(1957):187-200. Hertzmann has significant doubts about the 
authenticity of Rochlitz’s reporting. Hertzmann describes Mozart’s creative abilities in terms of a 
process and, in citing many of Mozart’s autographs, notes Mozart’s exceptional gift for conceiving and 
remembering measures of melody and harmony in his head before committing them to score in a 
convincing finished form. Hertzmann also claims Mozart stays within conventional musical practice of 
his day by saying: “He was, as we know, no revolutionary; he spoke the musical language of his time. 
He made liberal use of musical ideas of others, the urge for originality being as alien to him as to any 
composer of his time. The creeds of the Enlightenment are reflected in his formal designs, which never 
overstep conventional boundaries, and his graceful and charming melodies are late flowers of the style 
galant.” (page 199) In addition to use of autographed scores, Hertzmann relies on the translation by 
Emily Anderson of Mozart’s correspondence with his family: see Emily Anderson, The Letters of 
Mozart and His Family (London: MacMillan, 1938). 
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Aaron Kozbelt has attempted a scientific assessment of Mozart’s creative and 
aesthetic success throughout Mozart’s lifetime. Kozbelt writes:  
… results suggest Mozart became more creative and perspicacious as his career 
progressed, even after the onset of compositional maturity.10 
By way of a simple example, Mozart’s music continues to be described as creative using 
instances such as the switch to the key of Eb Major for just a few bars in the last 
movement of the G Minor Piano Quartet K478, whence to then revert to G Major to end 
in strict harmonic convention. Eb Major and G Major are remote from one another 
harmonically, although Eb Major is the relative minor of the stated key of the whole 
work. Here we have a ‘creative’ move that would have been a rare permutation of keys in 
a Zeitgeist that didn’t yet recognize its validity. It hits us as being disobedient to the then 
current harmonic practice, but systematically findable in the finite possibilities of 
evolving 18th century harmony rules. In that sense, the work lends itself well to analytic 
scrutiny, but the harmonic move is still rated provocative today.11 
In a way a paradox has been set up. A rational and analytic explanation as to why a 
Mozart composition could be called creative through reflection as analysis, is feasible by 
making this harmonic move preferred as one possibility amongst many-but-finite moves, 
i.e., part of a formal system. Any such move is predictable and not new to the initiated. 
But it is also tenuous to claim such a specific harmonic move should be preferred over 
and above so many other similar possibilities. Analytic predictive powers to select other 
harmonic moves as ‘just as’ creative in the same way are not evident. No principle or rule 
has been found to make that prediction possible on the grounds of logic and reason, but 
maybe by convention. The impact of hearing the music for the first time and appreciating 
Mozartian creativity (should it be deemed to exist) as newness or as disruption in 
suspending the final cadences, comes from listening to it unfold live in performance. It is 
the immediate effect upon us in real time, not even as reflection, that is important. How 
can musical creativity be seen as both logical, predictable and thereby learnable in 
                                                          
10 Aaron Kozbelt, “Factors Affecting Aesthetic Success and Improvement in Creativity: a Case Study of 
the Musical Genres of Mozart,” Psychology of Music 33 (2005): 235. 
11 Kevin LaVine, Program note, Concerts from the Library of Congress, The Elizabeth Sprague Coolidge 
Foundation, USA, Friday, November 4, 2011. LeVine describes this episode in K478 as follows: “… 
but not before making a musical “detour” into an unprepared cadence on E-flat Major instead of the 
expected tonic of B-flat Major – a moment when one has the distinct impression that Mozart is enjoying 
a sly joke at our expense! – before the music regains its senses and proceeds directly to its high-spirited 
conclusion.” The reviewer may have had in mind the works of Shostakovich where political correctness 
governed his scope for composing. Yet Shostakovich’s music is creative in still managing to express his 
personal views about composing, free of political control in a system so rigorously enforcing it. 
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reflection, yet not so in hearing it for the first time and subsequently when trying to form 
(universal) rules for its production? 
This paradox is present in all music by virtue of the fact that ‘new’ music demands 
an adjustment to its impact upon us in which we often try to rationalize our 
understanding of it as a performer or listener. As the composer, a double adjustment has 
to be made, in bringing forth something tangible in the recognition that no precedents are 
mandatory for doing so and, as already mentioned, the sound itself being new even to the 
composer at a first hearing, notwithstanding claims of being able to audiate well. Does 
that then make Kant’s genius the precursor to a present-day understanding of why and 
how we use the word creative musically? 
In partly answering such a question, Peter Kivy thinks genius is creativity at the 
highest level.12 Kivy reflects upon what the dialogue in Plato’s Ion means for 
understanding genius and being inspired within the culture of mousike.13 For Kivy, 
genius could be an extreme form of craft or techne, Platonic words used to indicate 
specialist knowledge about our subject matter. In Greek classic texts, the word mousike is 
prominent as the art of the Muse, a combination of poetry, dance and music, and 
embracing all cultural activities.14 For Plato, poetry is perhaps the major constituent of 
his mousike and the context in which he places his reasoning. 
From Plato, we learn that to have ‘art’ is to be a specialist, practicing by rational 
method where art underpins the culture of mousike. To have non-art is to be irrational and 
inspired. Ion speaks rationally about Homer but cannot do so about other poets because 
Ion is inspired by Homer alone and is taken over by him (possessed). Being able to know 
by rational means is seen to conflict with being inspired which defies rational 
explanation. In order to resolve the conflict, Kivy takes an interest in bright ideas 15 that 
he thinks: 
                                                          
12 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed (London: Yale University press, 2001), 243.  
13 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed (London: Yale University press, 2001), 2. Kivy reminds us 
that the “inspiration theory of creativity is a very old idea in Western thought,” an idea based on 
suppositions such as bright ideas which themselves suggest that a theory is not possible. 
14 Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson. 2004. Music and the Muses: the culture of 'mousikē' in the classical 
Athenian city. Oxford: OUP. In the Abstract, we read: “ … mousike lay at the heart of Greek culture, 
and was often indeed synonymous with culture. In its commonest form, it represented for the Greeks a 
seamless complex of music, poetic word, and physical movement, encompassing a vast array of 
performances - from small-scale entertainment in the private home to elaborate performances involving 
the entire community.” See also: Babette Babich, "Mousike techne: The Philosophical Practice of 
Music in Plato, Nietzsche, and Heidegger" (2005). Articles and Chapters in Academic Book 
Collections. Paper 23. 
15 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 11. ‘Bright Ideas’ 
becomes the substance of Inspiration. 
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are not generated by acts of will through the application of some method. 
Bright ideas just happen to people. People who get them are patients [the 
inspired], not agents [of the philosophical type].16 
‘Act of will through the application of method’ is called into question as if a rule base or 
pedagogy is not important. The patient has no choice in the matter nor can explain what 
is happening through some rational explanation. 
Plato, interpreted by Kivy, infers that the act of creating music, by analogy with 
poetry, has properties that could involve inspiration and irrationality as prime 
constituents. But then Kivy mentions that Plato did not think all this activity to be in any 
way special but simply a form of the magnetic ring metaphor.17 To then use the word 
inspiration as Plato chooses, to describe creative properties, gives creativity a role limited 
to mimesis and ordinariness. Plato’s concept of inspiration contradicts a current use that 
describes someone who has a near instantaneous bright idea that nobody has apparently 
ever thought of before. 
Andrew Bowie calls for caution about making assumptions on these word 
meanings: 
The failure to see that the history of a philosophical problem [in this case 
reliance on the rational or the irrational] is itself part of what that problem is 
vitiates significant amounts of contemporary philosophy. The assumption 
that what Plato meant by art is the same as what we, in the light of 
modernism, Dada, and so on, mean is, for example, simply untenable, 
though some analytic aestheticians seem unaware of this. There is however, 
a further important twist here, on which Adorno repeatedly insists18: if there 
were no continuity at all between Plato’s concerns and ours, even the claim 
                                                          
16 Much confusion can arise in using the terms patient and agent. In present-day parlance, normal patients 
must help themselves to carry out physician instructions well, and agents are always deemed to act on 
behalf of the other (not themselves) in providing service and information. These two definitions are 
opposed to those inferred in Platonic texts where the patient is wholly mesmerized by the Muse, and in 
philosophy where the agent acts on her own initiative. 
17 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed (London: Yale University press, 2001), 10. The magnetic 
ring metaphor emphasizes that attachment to and proximity with the Muse is the way that knowledge is 
passed on or dispensed, and mentioned in Plato’s Euthyphro.  
18 Adorno, Theodor. Philosophy of New Music. Translated, edited with an Introduction by Robert Hullot-
Kentor.  (London: University of Minneapolis Press, 2006), 78. Adorno comments on the continuity of 
form this way: “To date, official music theory has made no effort to clarify precisely the concept of 
“continuation” as a category of form, even though without the contrast between “event’ and 
“continuation”, the major forms of traditional music – including Schoenberg’s – cannot be understood.” 
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that what he meant by art differed from what we mean would be 
incomprehensible.19 
Bowie insists that we should look for continuity and consistency of understanding 
through the ages. The consistency problem that we are then faced with is that, all in the 
same breath, the word creativity can speak of generating something ex nihilo, of being 
inspired by the other as the source, or self-generated as in: “I created that”. These 
concepts as root causes or essences of creativity are mutually contradictory seen through 
modernist rational analytic eyes. 
In the context of creativity in musical composition, Geraint Wiggins20 questions 
whether inspiration can be defined. He argues for a psychological approach yet highlights 
that composing (which is creating by implication for him) involves a combination of 
abilities—from inspiration through to hard graft. He links into Boden’s conceptual spaces 
to propose two cognitive mechanisms at work. One relies on experiential (implicit) input, 
the other upon explicit theoretical learning. He then develops a computerized model he 
regards as having a close relationship with perception. The aims are to “see the truth” and 
to move “towards an objective account of spontaneous creativity,”21 where he sees 
inspiration at work as part of a mechanistic cognitive framework. He proposes that 
technique and inspiration are not to be seen in opposition, so that: “biased random 
sampling, followed by selection, is precisely the cognitive mechanism proposed,” and 
within which they cohabit.22 These preceptual points of view are discussed further on in 
the thesis. 
However Kivy sees inspiration as a Platonic view of a genius, possessed by some 
external divine power, requiring the subject to be child-like in attitude and openly 
interested and investigating of all possibilities: the ‘bright ideas’ syndrome. We know 
Mozart, marked out as a genius by Kivy, seems to be a vexatious mix of both child-like 
and childish properties, a mix Mozart retains for his whole life. The child-like view of 
                                                          
19 Andrew Bowie, Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy, (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2013), 7. 
20 Geraint Wiggins, “Defining Inspiration? Modelling the Non-conscious Creative Process,” in Dave 
Collins, ed. SEMPRE Studies in The Psychology of Music: The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in 
the Creative Process, (London, GB: Routledge, 2016), 232–252. 
21 Geraint Wiggins, “Defining Inspiration? Modelling the Non-conscious Creative Process,” 250, in Dave 
Collins, ed. SEMPRE Studies in The Psychology of Music: The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in 
the Creative Process, (London, GB: Routledge, 2016), 232–252. 
22 Geraint Wiggins, “Defining Inspiration? Modelling the Non-conscious Creative Process,” 250, in Dave 
Collins, ed. SEMPRE Studies in The Psychology of Music: The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in 
the Creative Process, (London, GB: Routledge, 2016), 232–252. 
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genius is set by Kivy in contrast to one of Longinus,23 where genius is endowed by nature 
and not nurture. Longinus bestows on the recipient extraordinary powers of achievement, 
but largely achieved by the breaking of rules.24 These rules are those abided to by other 
aspirants in the same discipline. A third explanatory view of genius is also given by Kivy 
and set in contrast to Plato’s ‘being inspired’ and Longinus’ ‘breaking of rules’. The 
‘sheer grunt’ view suggests genius could be achieved simply by much hard work. It is 
widely accepted that to achieve professional status in any art or science, at least ten 
thousand hours of practice seems to be required. 
Kivy says he does not understand genius by any logical and reasonable method. 
Even in the more logically plausible explanation for genius, attributable to Longinus, it is 
important to note the achievement is made possible largely by flouting the very rule-and-
regulation system put in place to guide the novice through to expert. Some form of step 
functional break away from that methodical path is necessary for genius to both flourish 
and then be evident. Put another way, it may be futile to think of genius as a property that 
can be described by rational and logical methods. 
Insofar as genius is connected to being creative, we have here support for our initial 
choice of properties that make art music creativity different and interesting, such that 
extraordinary and high achievement resists explanation by logical and rational means. 
This choice stands in contrast to many explanations which attempt to see creativity as 
rational expertise and potentially present in most human activity. 
Kivy actually supports a traditional view of genius too whereby “Fine art is the art 
of genius.”25 His views about genius have settled upon, as Kant puts it:  
Every art presupposes rules which are laid down as the foundation which 
first enables a product, if it is to be called one of art, to be represented as 
possible. The concept of fine art, however, does not permit of the judgment 
of beauty of its product being derived from any rule that has a concept for 
its determining ground, and that depends, consequently, on a concept of the 
way in which the product is possible,26 
                                                          
23 Longinus was the first writer of a treatise on the sublime: Dionysius Longinus, On The Sublime, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907). 
24 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 14. Longinus’ view 
also includes “ability to achieve sublimity in writing. And it is power, not skill, …” 
25 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed (London: Yale University press, 2001), 248, 249.  (Kant, 
Critique of Judgment, Section 46). 
26 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 46. Quoted by Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the 
Possessed (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 249. 
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as mentioned previously, putting the fine arts27 at the highest level of achievement and 
not rule-bounded. 
Kivy identifies with Kant when choosing to try and bridge the gap between rational 
thought and an understanding of creativity and genius, one where concepts such as bright 
ideas or inexplicable rule creation are used. In so doing, he defers to rational 
understanding of the relationship between creativity, genius and inspiration. But then 
Kivy concludes in believing that the achievement of genius is a matter of degree and that 
such inspired people move and breathe amongst the ‘less endowed’ and are somehow 
separate from them.28 It is hard not to see Kivy’s conclusion as supporting a view that 
creativity, insofar as it involves genius, is a preserve of an elite and actually quite 
mystical in concept. In this context, genius is creativity in extremis and epistemically 
beyond us. At the same time, by implication, Kivy gives weight to the significance of 
experiencing creativity through the properties highlighted in this thesis, for bright ideas 
are both disruptive and new, but he does not expand upon this point. 
 
3.2 Creativity, Expertise and Intuition, as Understanding 
David Cope is a contemporary composer who has used computation to try to 
understand expertise by way of form and essence in classical musical works. Cope has 
composed works based on characteristics and idioms thereby discovered. He would claim 
his works are genuinely indicative of his own creativity, expressed as expertise of how to 
compose in a way linked to a particular composer. He identifies what he is doing as 
trying to understand the creativity of the composers under scrutiny. He calls his own 
efforts to compose, in the light of what he discovers, creative. In his research, 
concentrating more on tonal music, he tries to discover what makes music composed by 
such as J. S. Bach and Frederick Chopin readily identifiable.29 Cope’s studies extend into 
trying to compose music based on what these studies, aided by computation, bring to 
                                                          
27 Kivy actually makes a case for music not being one of the fine arts, specifically claiming that absolute 
music is much better described as decorative than meaningful; see Peter Kivy, “Is Music an Art?”, The 
Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 544-554. We could then say, in reverting to the older understanding 
of music as not Art (but decorative accompaniment to words), he is not intending music to be included 
in what he is talking about when explaining genius. He is intending us to view music as a pure 
decorative art such that it means only in a non-semantic way. 
28 Peter Kivy, The Possessor and the Possessed, (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 252. 
29 David Cope, The Algorithmic Composer, (Madison, USA: A-R Editions, 2000), 26. 
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light.30 In this context, the issue of fraud or plagiarism has to be dealt with. The help 
received from computation, a method he conceived of and put into practice by himself, 
does not in his terms render his efforts in any way fraudulent or imitative. 
In wishing to give due recognition to the creativity of a composer, mimicry, 
pastiche and other forms of artificiality can generally be identified by good scholarship. 
This can reduce doubts about a work such that it was, say Mozart, who composed it and 
thereby exhibited what might be seen as prolific creative ability. In examining his output, 
it could be said that Mozart built up an expertise throughout his composing of the 
hundreds of works attributed to him. Identifying how that expertize is linked to or 
accumulates into being creative in ways other than by analytic comparisons, such as of 
scores and performances using 21st century ‘eyes’, is difficult. 
Performances of Cope’s compositions have met with an ambivalent reception. Even 
before some works were performed, one critic expressed ‘horror about the very idea of 
the event.’31 The critique appeared in print before the concert took place and must have 
made some expert prejudgment as to what he would experience as an effect on him, and 
then imagined it to be horrific. The critic made no claim to have been present at the 
concert; it is known the critic did not come.32 David Cope openly declares that, as 
composer of some works, the compositions are significantly aided by computational 
analysis whereby it is the computer algorithm that has supplied some analytic essence for 
the new work. Reactions by composers to Cope’s music are recorded on YouTube33 in a 
guessing game as to whether one could tell which works were aided by computer 
algorithmic analysis. The context is set up as an experiment to test whether a computer 
could exhibit creativity, a context relevant to how we judge the value and authenticity of 
musical offerings. Some participants are adamant that creativity, by definition, cannot 
emanate from computers. The axiomatic position is that creativity is an exclusive human 
property and no computer could have creative, or any other, intentionality. Participants in 
the test could put their judgment, by whatever means, into practice. However, they often 
choose wrongly as to which works performed had been composed by or with 
computerization. In one way, this is an exercise in seeing whether a particular expertise 
                                                          
30 David Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity. See also David Cope, “Rules, Tactics and 
Strategies for Composing Music,” in David Collins, ed. The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the 
Creative Process, (London: Ashgate, 2012), 255-280. 
31 David Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity, 345. The concert was advertised to be one where 
Cope’s works were played and clearly identified as to how they had been composed. 
32 David Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity’ 345. 
33 See URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rm1-yGIA6Is 
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or essence of the composer’s works has been captured and could be reproduced or 
simulated. If it is possible to then compose using expertise that is attributed to a particular 
composer, some form of algorithmic ability figures in the composition of both the new 
work and the ‘original’ works analyzed. In that sense, it becomes predictable,34 learnable 
and derivative. That this conjecture is possible comes from composers developing 
methods of composing, which are then detectable by Cope as recurring patterns in the 
music. The use of a dominant thirteenth harmonic cadence is well-known to be 
Chopinesque. It is the derivative nature of somehow capturing and using such expertise 
musically that intimates this expression of expertise is rational in nature, imitative and 
perhaps fraudulent. 
Cope emphasizes that the source of the creativity in art as music is important for 
some listeners to the point that, without it being human, the creative authenticity is 
suspect and thereby the music is devalued. He also refers to his programs ‘creating’ 
output and it looks like he has used the word in its colloquial sense, alluding to the 
possibility that machines can be creative in some way. But lastly he refers to music being 
valued on the basis of who created it, not what. For Cope, the issue is one of 
prejudgment, as to whether there are conditions under which we believe it is not possible 
for the offering to be creative. Such a belief seems to be based on a definition that says 
only humans can be the generic source of the creative.  
Margaret Boden conducted a similar exercise on testing for creativity when 
assessing paintings, relying upon the use of a Turing Test.35 In her case, computer-
generated visual art was judged as passing the test in being indistinguishable from human 
effort. Her conclusion is that it is not possible to classify art as being creative by whether 
or not it was humanly generated. Cope says:  
Given this need to know [about the source of the music], the music my 
programs create is often seriously disadvantaged, once the manner of its 
creation is known. Created or simply produced as output, this music will 
never have lasting value for such listeners …36 
                                                          
34 This is a classic case of a computer algorithm, searching a finite space of possibilities according to set 
criteria devised by a human, and then returning predictable musical solutions that satisfy chosen 
criteria. 
35 Margaret Boden, “The Turing Test and Artistic Creativity,” Kybernetes 39 (2010): 409–413. See also 
Margaret Boden, “Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: A Contradiction in terms?” 224-246, in Eliot 
Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), where she debates whether machines can be creative and assumedly have intelligence too. 
36 David Cope, Musical Creativity (Madison, USA: A-R Editions, 2005), 345. 
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Whatever is perceived in the music and the paintings could not be claimed as human in 
origin, if described as computer generated unless, causally speaking, the argument is put 
differently. We might choose to recognize it was human ability that preset all the 
conditions in place for how the computer analyses took place. In discussing the source of 
creativity in the compositions produced by David Cope, albeit aided by computerization, 
the disclosure of non-human origins to the product actually made people change their 
judgment, some even feeling tricked. 
The creativity that is judged to be present may not rely upon the validity of its 
source but upon the effect it has upon us as an aesthetic phenomenon. If this were the 
case, experiencing the ‘genuine’ effect upon us is all that would matter.37 But genuine in 
the musical context may rely on verifying that it comes from human origin anyway, as 
found in Cope’s research. For Cope is also examining the validity of the notion of 
artificial creativity in the context of music composition. The persons taking part in his 
experiments, along with his own proclivities in deciding upon what are to be creative 
traits to find and highlight, makes his context one of what we ‘think’ is creative in music. 
His participants have shown that the authenticity (genuineness) of having a human 
composer38 is important but susceptible to deception. Rationally, participants who could 
not distinguish between musical works of pure human origin and those significantly 
aided by computational analysis should have admitted to their inability. But they would 
rather change their opinion to rationalize their judgment. As already mentioned, Cope 
says this is a matter of prejudgment39 and becomes for the listener more a philosophic 
challenge about conformity rather than an aesthetic experience. 
Cope offers a view that, when judging music composition for its creative content, 
both the source and the effect are taken into consideration. We hear a Chopinesque work 
and, in hearing it and our minds working upon the sonic features in live performance, we 
still decline to give it credence until satisfied as to its origins and provenance. A generic 
characteristic of the properties we look for is to find human origins so that authenticity or 
sincerity can be established. 
                                                          
37 Stanley Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” in Must We Mean What We Say? (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 189. 
38 James Parsons, “When is a Work of Music Real?” 143-163, in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The 
Aesthetic Discourse of The Arts: Breaking the Barriers,” Analecta Husserliana (London: Kluwer, 
2000), Volume LXI: xiii. Parsons quotes Rousseau who says:” … music is dependent on the human 
heart.” and claims music relates man to man and “authorship impinges on value given to a work.”(155-
156) 
39 David Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity (Madison, USA: A-R Editions, 2005), 351. 
60 
 
If music that is creative is to be of human origin, intuition, as a property distinct 
from calculative or algorithmic reason (which are computable) comes under scrutiny.40 
Intuition is neither algorithmic nor thereby machine-like. If humans who are intuitive are 
not functioning like machines, questions necessarily follow as to how intuition can build 
towards and become part of an expertise that appears consistent and thereby regarded as 
creative. 
The Dreyfus’s line of argument claims intuition is an acquired skill as humans learn 
and transition from being novices to experts. This is a variant on the earlier work of 
Benedetto Croce in the early twentieth century who treated intuition as a distinct and 
fundamental form of cognition.41 According to the Dreyfuses, the novice learns rule-
based behavior and even context-free learning.42 The advanced beginner relates what has 
been learned to be applied situationally. The competent person ranks chosen ways 
forward into a hierarchy to prioritize effort. These first three stages are seen as slow, 
detached problem-solving with conscious choices of both goals and decisions.43 In the 
final two stages of proficiency and expertise, they point more to unconscious thought, 
using words such as ‘effortlessly’ and ‘notice’.44 The final stage, called expertise, is said 
to come from arational behavior, which implies it could be unpredictable and of human 
origin.45 For the Dreyfuses, it is “intuitive play that characterizes expertise.”46 The full 
transition from novice to expert, seen as a form of progress, is given anthropomorphic 
properties in that only humans can play,47 a state of mind that is both non-teleologic and 
non-reasonable.48 There is room here for spontaneity and unpredictability. The opposite, 
the application of rules and logic, is well-known to be the heart of calculative reason, 
employing agreed language constructs.49 
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43 Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus, Mind over Machine, 27, 28. 
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There is a sense in which to be conscious of something means the subject matter is 
actively being dealt with in a move towards to the next goal as a form of progress. The 
attitude of play comes more into its own in the final two stages, for the Dreyfuses only to 
re-emphasize how creativity that includes intuition as expertise takes us more towards an 
unconscious and uncontrollable human activity. To play is to abandon a sense of 
provocation or purposeful progress and aligns well with taking an aesthetic viewpoint. To 
some extent in support of the Drefuses’ proposal, Roy Bauminster, Branden Schmeichel 
and Nathan Dewall try to understand where creativity enters in by saying: “creative 
impulses originate in the unconscious but require conscious effort to edit and integrate 
them into a creative product.”50 
An inherent assumption about expertise that appears reasonable is one that, given 
the right training, we can all learn to become experts. If so, any use of expertise in being 
creative must be regarded as reasonable too. The Dreyfuses’ explanation casts doubt 
upon this reasonable route by saying it is intuition that leads to expertise and that 
intuition does not lend itself to rational explanation. The Dreyfus’ argument is made from 
an aesthesis point of view, one of thinking about the role of an expert, not actually acting 
it out or being poietic. If a mind-body (Cartesian) dualism is upheld, then there may be 
no common apologetics for the validity of poietic and aesthetic views on expertise. 
However, the views of Merleau-Ponty, discussed in section 4.5, puts the case that there is 
no real separation between mind and body. We then have a body-subject or ‘lived-body’ 
experience that does not differentiate them apart.  
In adopting the Dreyfus’ stance, we see that Plato’s Euthyphro51 also highlights the 
problem of the nature of expertise, one that undermines rational principles being the 
source of expertise. But here it is making sense of actions, not thoughts, that is important. 
In discussing piety, Socrates asks Euthyphro for the principles by which experts carry out 
their work only to have Euthyphro cite situations in which he detects pious acts but not 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Listening”, in Current Musicology, ed. Daniel Thompson “Special Issue Composers” 67, 68 (1999): 
501, Thompson quotes Jonathan Harvey as saying: “The experience of music affords a person the 
chance to think without language, without snipping the experience into discrete ‘segments’ wrapped up 
into ‘signifiers’ and free of the consequent machinery of negation, polar oppositions such as 
subject/object”; the source of the quotation is Jonathan Harvey, In Quest of Spirit: Thoughts on Music 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 48. This work is based on his thesis: Jonathan Harvey, 
“The Composer’s Idea of His Inspiration,” PhD dissertation, University of Glasgow, 1965. In Michael 
Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical Thought, 54, Spitzer lays out his own understanding of the strong 
connection between music and metaphor. 
50 Roy Bauminster, Branden Schmeichel and Nathan Dewall, “Creativity and Consciousness: Evidence 
from Psychological Experiments”, 185-199, in Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy of 
Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
51 Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus, Mind over Machine, 105. 
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the rules used. Euthyphro keeps insisting that Socrates should observe him in action to 
understand what a pious act is.52 In the absence of being given principles, Socrates’ 
rejoinder to Euthyphro is to conclude no knowledge of expertise has been found, except 
knowledge of ignorance. It is Socrates who then proposes that Euthyphro had once 
known the rules, simply forgotten them, and needs philosophical help to recall them. 
Socrates’ proposal carries with it the assumption that what takes place is governed by 
rules, but no form of substantiation for this view is on offer. Socrates does not mention 
that his means of building knowledge has been narrowed down into a rule-based method 
alone. Experience of observation and osmotic learning within which intuition can play a 
role do not get mentioned. 
Edward Feigenbaum, a leader in artificial intelligence research attempts to embody 
intelligence as expertise in machines. He studies expertise with a view to creating 
computer-based expert systems.53 He has become frustrated when being told by experts 
that the rules he suggests to build expert systems do not work in practice. He then 
concludes: “At this point, knowledge threatens to become ten thousand special cases.”54 
Feigenbaum also narrows his conception of expertise down into a rule-based facility 
necessarily when trying to encapsulate the essence of expertise into computation as an 
expert system. His concept of knowledge is exclusively limited to a formal system. If 
expertise is encapsulated in this way, its role in being creative may no longer exist. For if, 
as Euthyphro suggests, experiencing another person in action intuitively is the way (the 
method) to convey the essence of expertise, reflection upon the experience becomes a 
key part of communicating concepts, rather than acquiring the knowledge through 
applying rules and principles. The Euthyphro method of learning about expertise moves 
the epistemic dialectic from objective reason to immanent experience. Euthyphro’s 
‘method’ sits well with a view that having a musical mentor under which the novice is 
guided and influenced is a successful way for expertise to be passed on from one 
generation to the next. 
Euthyphro, the Dreyfuses and Feigenbaum are all highlighting the way the concept 
of creativity can be seen to involve expertise and intuition. Feigenbaum considers the 
only route to encapsulating expertise is through rule-based methods where heuristics are 
                                                          
52 Plato, Ion, trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Essential Plato (The Softback Preview, 1871, 1999), 473–502. 
53 Edward Feigenbaum has been an early leader in the scientific push to encapsulate expertise in 
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54 The original source of the comment is in: Edward Feigenbaum and Pamela McCorduck, The Fifth 
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themselves turned into rules. The Dreyfuses are more circumspect and admit to the route 
to becoming an expert disappears into unconscious motivation inaccessible to further 
investigation, and unreasonable (non-rational). They base the later stages of the route on 
the freedom to play rather than be purposeful, giving a link between intuition, creativity 
and the properties of interest in this thesis. But their aim is process orientated so that 
some form of pedagogy becomes the ‘correct’ platform from which to enable being an 
expert. The Dreyfus’ explanation of expertise is seen only in terms of being relevant to 
solving problems. This emphasis differentiates their ideas away from creativity in music 
composition that does not limit itself to just solving problems. But Cavell’s notion of 
problem solving can also be seen as part of a composer creatively setting his/her own 
boundary conditions within which to work. Euthyphro takes a view in contrast to 
Feigenbaum and the Dreyfuses. There is a transfer of expertise with no defined learning 
mechanism other than to come alongside the expert to experience what is going on as 
action. This syndrome is put into practice in many musical scenarios and differentiates 
action from knowing. 
If creativity is to be linked to expertise and also to intuition, the role of humans as 
the source of creativity could be tacitly acknowledged along with the properties of 
originality and authenticity as also part of being creative. Cope’s research shows that, in 
music (and maybe in other arts), human generation has to be verified even before 
considering whether creativity is present. Once intuition is invoked as the means for 
understanding expertize, that link into being an expert is not rational. The extension, into 
considering that to be musically creative necessarily involves being expert, requires 
firstly that intuition epitomizes expertise at its highest levels as claimed by the Dreyfus’ 
and then that such expertise plays a significant role in being musically creative, not just 
creative in a general sense. 
 
3.3 Creativity, Beauty and Imagination, as Aesthetics 
Stanley Cavell makes some observations about what modern art music reveals to 
him. In an essay called “Music Discomposed,”55 written in the late 1960s at a time when 
debate over the validity of avant garde art was prominent, he claims the avant garde of 
the 1960s was out of touch with their audience in that: 
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the procedures and problems it now seems necessary for composers to 
employ and confront to make a work of art at all themselves insure that 
their work will not be comprehensible to an audience.56 
The formality that modernism espoused is also its undoing in removing its human 
intentionality, rendering irrelevant such critical questions as “What did they mean by 
that?” because the human element has been removed. Cavell believes the causal 
connection between human artists, as intentional beings, and their work is broken by 
adopting the tenets of modernism. His own version of intentionality in humans is not one 
of making statements and achieving goals as in the teleology of modernism. He thinks it 
is celebrating the human ability to be intentional. Cavell’s essay also mentions that he 
thinks art objects move us like people do because we give to them value as if we detect 
that a human agent gives rise to them; “They are felt as made by someone.”57 In his 
explanation, they—art objects and particularly music—become intentional into art, and 
unlike Kant’s claim, not of nature.58 However, being art, he regards their primary 
assessment as aesthetic and, according to Kant, involves beauty and the sublime. 
In one sense, Cavell is suggesting that as human beings we thrive on an uncertainty 
derived from evolution to survive. It is our innate attention to the unexpected and 
unpredictable that excites us as the risk of being human so that we can detect human 
creative intentionality59 in this way too. To embrace the Kantian ‘purposiveness without 
purpose’ of an aesthetic viewpoint, Cavell differentiates art (as reflective) from nature 
and just the survival instinct (largely reflexive) in the following way. Art comes from 
being forced—or free60—to choose our own dangers and threats to exploit. He sees the 
source of our inventiveness, Cavell’s word for creativity, as in the way we fashion 
solutions, ‘taking one’s own chances’ to overcome the self-made dangers. Success is now 
seen in how well we do that. The opposite, failure, then becomes the lack of coherence in 
how we do this, not the usual ‘rule-breaking followed by remorse or recompense’.61 
Inventiveness in art, seen from this perspective in Cavell’s terms, has actually taken 
on a form of creativity. Success in being creative now involves validating some form of 
human authenticity but with risk. For him, modern art lays bare the condition of art 
altogether because it:  
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forces out into the open [albeit unwittingly] the issue of sincerity, depriving 
the artist and his audience of every measure except absolute attention to 
one’s experience and absolute honesty in expressing it.62 
There is, phenomenologically speaking, risk of a lack of authenticity or honesty being 
present in what we perceive. Call it fraud or no-art. This risk implies two properties 
[essences] are being tested for validation. The first is one of sincere human origin [the 
artist] to the instance we experience. The second is that the recipient [the audience] of art 
becomes just as accountable as the producer for experiencing art creatively with 
authenticity. 
Cavell concludes that art is assessed specifically for having built-in human sincere 
intentionality. To find these properties would rule out fraud as a form of failure. The 
causal connection is made between art as humanly genuine, opening the way to 
assessment that might call the art creative, and no-art, which is fraud and a failure to even 
merit its assessment in terms of creative content. The effect of authenticity is not that we 
can necessarily name the composer or form or genre. It is that we come away with the 
perception that someone created this artwork sincerely, a sincerity that is palpable to the 
performer and listener. Cavell’s human involvement as artistic creativity is meant to be 
understood phenomenologically. He says:  
The emphasis [in being creative] is not on copying a particular object, as 
in forgery and counterfeit, but on producing the effect of the genuine, or 
having some of its properties.63 [original italics] 
A recursive argument is invoked where: “Describing one’s experience of art is itself a 
form of art.”64 This viewpoint puts subsequent description almost on a par as evidence 
with art (in our case, music) itself. 
In agreement with Cavell, I see that detecting creativity requires a creative act to do 
so. The importance of Cavell’s position is in its conclusion that points directly at 
modernism’s inadequacy to provide what modernism purports to achieve, i.e., a 
reasonable basis for experiencing creativity in art. Put another way, the reasoning 
methods underpinning modernism, firstly derived from the Enlightenment, and 
continuing in the analytic method, are unlikely to help us understand our desire to call art 
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(in our context, music as composition) creative. Of course this conclusion leaves open as 
to what does help us understand such matters. 
Cavell suggests that the aesthetic standpoint is much preferred, one in which the 
phenomenal effect of the given is readily embraced. He also says that artistic endeavor is 
actually circumscribed clearly by the setting of constraints, whether they be self-imposed 
or externally imposed. The judgment that might follow could then use such constraint 
references as a means to assess the success or otherwise of the artistic work as creative. 
Another writer whose views on creativity link in to artistic endeavor that 
emphasizes the identification of constraints is Jerrold Levinson.65 He quotes from Jon 
Elster’s book Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Pre-commitment and 
Constraint.66 The book addresses a number of creativity issues of interest to music. 
Levinson quotes Elster’s interest in dividing up creative constraints in the arts into types 
of chosen, invented and imposed. He quotes the example of Georges Perec using a self-
imposed constraint to write a novel in which the letter e is never used, similar to 
committing to say Rondo or twelve-tone form in music. These sentiments about how 
creativity might operate in the arts are close to those of Cavell. The musical composer 
exercises a creativity that both chooses and has to then submit to boundary conditions on 
how the artistic work is conceived. This aspect of creativity is close to the role of genius 
as portrayed by Kant. Levinson does not completely identify with Elster’s stance. Elster 
thinks the artist, by being able to choose, benefits from such constraints,67 i.e., there is a 
kind of optimization. Elster’s maximizing of artistic and aesthetic value is similar to 
system optimization as proposed by Csikszentmihalyi. Elster also regards the constraints 
as divisible into pre-constraints and those determined throughout the work’s conception, 
which can interact with one another. Levinson admits to there being a ‘ring of truth’ in 
this but finds the link can be made too constraining, a pre-commitment that is 
‘unnecessarily inflexible’.68 When Elster does not include originality in creative activity 
or aesthetic value, Levinson parts company. However, both are in general agreement with 
the notion that artistic creativity operates within constraints, some of which are self-
imposed, and that artistic value derives from these choices of boundary conditions. 
Levinson says that not to include originality is not to recognize achievement. Levinson is 
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more restrained than Elster about highlighting constraints and would rather any 
constraints be perceived independently by others. For, unlike Elster, Levinson concedes 
we have no way of knowing which constraints lead on to artistic value and which do not. 
Hence Levinson expresses the constraints of twelve-tone music to be an “indirect prod … 
an orthodoxy against which to rebel,” and not just “constraint(s) that fetter[s] rather than 
abet[s] creativity.”69 He makes his point with respect to the ‘original’ visual art work but 
does not expand his version of originality into the musical context, where each 
performance and critique can be regarded as an original. Musically, the composer’s 
‘original’ creativity has given rise to the opportunity for an indefinite number of original 
performances and linguistic critiques, simply by the changes in artistic constraints 
adopted as composers, performers or listener/critics. 
Cavell’s interest in the aesthetic as a preferred way to understand creativity in the 
arts, enables beauty and imagination to play major roles as criteria for aesthetic 
judgment. They also become indicators of any quest for human authenticity. The founder 
of aesthetics, Alexander Baumgarten, talks of a doctrine of sensible or sensuous 
cognition, as opposed to intellectual cognition, as a way to understand the arts. He calls 
aesthetics: “the science of the beautiful” as his way of distinguishing the properties of the 
senses and logic apart, but does so within Enlightenment principles.70 In his era, all 
sensible cognition is regarded as indistinct and formless. Both Kant and Herder accede to 
Baumgarten’s cognitive distinction but develop it differently. They develop their ideas 
from those of Leibnitz’ concept of beauty, taken over by Baumgarten who, through 
sensible cognition, recognized beauty as being sensible perfection. Angelica Nuzzo, who 
supports Cavell’s views on the limitations of modernism, examines the commentary that 
both Kant and Herder make on Aesthetica,71 Baumgarten’s seminal work with which the 
discipline of aesthetics is normally agreed to begin.72 Nuzzo encapsulates the different 
way each of them tries to resolve the distinction: 
It is … a methodological difference. For Kant, the human body as the site of 
sensibility plays a pivotal role in a transcendental foundation of aesthetics: 
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aesthetics differs not only from logic but also from psychology and from 
anthropology. This is precisely the point that Herder cannot accept. … 
Aesthetics is, for Herder, the true foundation of a philosophical 
anthropology.73 
Kant is transcendental whereas Herder is historical, but both of them accentuate that we 
are dealing with embodiment that is human and subject to the critique of authenticity and 
genuineness. Yet, as Paul Bruno would put it, “Kant could not abide a detached, free-
floating expressive individual that Herder so adored.”74 Kant’s reliance on extending 
reason, not abandoning it, prevails. Herder’s practical approach to aesthetic judgement is 
addressed later on in the thesis. 
We now concentrate upon the beautiful, Kant’s main gatekeeper to having aesthetic 
experience and (for him) judgment, in our context of musical creativity. Kant’s notion of 
aesthetics is one of the pleasure of experiencing the beautiful and the sublime. In his 
Observations,75 the essential difference between the two is captured in the sentence: “The 
sublime touches, the beautiful charms.”76 Kant’s ideas rest upon an imagination that leads 
to understanding the beautiful, and an imagination that detects the sublime by way of a 
reasonable conclusion, all the while favoring reason leading to universality. In the 
Critique of Judgment, he says: 
… aesthetic judgement in its estimate of the beautiful refers the 
imagination in its free play to the understanding, to bring out its 
agreement with [understanding], … so in its estimate of a thing as 
sublime it refers that faculty to reason to bring out its subjective 
accord with ideas of reason …77 
We take from Kant that he thinks imagination is doing the work of forming concepts in 
the mind as to what is being experienced. Once concepts have formed, they are, in a 
manner of speaking, communicable to others and have form, even though Kant is 
interested in cognition rather than form under the remit of being able to judge. Kant does 
not think beauty can be conceived from cognition by reason, for it is the ‘free play of 
imagination’ that helps us to understand beauty. 
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In a similar light, in Chapter III of his On The Musically Beautiful, when trying to 
describe what is beautiful about music, Hanslick claims:  
Music simply requires to be taken in as music, and can only be 
comprehended on its own terms, enjoyed in its own right. 78 
Hanslick’s tönend bewegte Formen (musical forms set in motion by sound) concentrates 
attention on the immediacy of experiencing the music. He forges a link between the 
experience of beauty and Geist, the untranslatable term from German Idealist Philosophy 
mainly attributed to Hegel, in which something of a mind type79 is present and without 
which no experience of beauty is possible, according to Hanslick. However, Hegel’s 
Geist is searching for what is termed absolute knowledge which implies understanding 
beauty has a Universalist content. 
Hanslick, through Lippman’s translation, appears lucid and direct on his views 
about music as an aesthetic experience, and thereby finds beauty in musical ideas: 
Melody … is pre-eminently the source of musical beauty. Harmony, with 
its countless modes of transforming, inverting and intensifying, offers the 
material for constantly new developments; while rhythm, the main artery 
of the musical organism, is the regulator of both,  … What is to be 
expressed with all this material? … Musical ideas … [which are] not only 
an object of intrinsic beauty but also an end in itself, not a means for 
representing feelings and thoughts.80 
This quote encapsulates Hanslick’s philosophical views about music and what he might 
regard as creative in musical composition. It steers away from emotion being 
representative of any musical essence or representation. It embodies expression in ideas 
that have some objectivity in aesthetic beauty as per Kant. It functionally relates the 
triune properties of melody, harmony and rhythm to each other, using concepts that are 
central to musical debate at that time. Hanslick makes us aware of what he thinks is 
creative composition by referring to “musical material in the hands of a creative genius 
[being] as plastic and pliable as it is profuse.”81 The text at this point is full of creative 
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allusions, with wording such as ‘free imagination’, ‘the invention of some definite theme’ 
and so forth, but he uses the term creativity more in a colloquial sense than a technical 
one. He proposes that:  
The manner in which a creative act takes place in the mind of a composer of 
instrumental music gives us a very clear insight into the peculiar nature of 
musical beauty.82 
It is at this point his focus on instrumental music emphasizes how he thinks its structure 
reveals the essence of musical beauty, one that identifies the creativity present in the 
music. 
He proposes that ‘a philosophical foundation of music’ requires the concepts 
associated with musical elements (that he regards as significant) to be determined 
(defined), which he openly declares to be ‘a strictly scientific framework’ within which 
to work.83 The concepts are then later to be designated the source of laws of musical 
construction as well as of beauty,84 without mention of a conceptual incompatibility 
between beauty being aesthetic and laws of musical construction being scientific.85 
However, Hanslick naturally refers, like Baumgarten, to the ‘science of aesthetics’ as it is 
understood by him to be a scientific discipline in an Enlightenment Zeitgeist. But whilst 
relying on his view that aesthetics can be handled scientifically, Hanslick then downplays 
mathematical structure within music by saying: 
Creations of inventive genius are not arithmetical sums … Mathematics 
merely controls the intellectual manipulation of the primary elements of 
music … [which are outside the domain of aesthetics].86 
From both Kant and Hanslick we might conclude that the perception of beauty in 
music, from Kant, requires imagination of a particular type, and, from Hanslick, to be 
solely dependent on what the form of the sound takes.87 The concept of imagination 
admits to itself (imagination) having freedoms that cannot be circumscribed by types. 
The Hanslick concept of music, being solely dependent on the form of the sound, is 
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actually translated by him into little room for anything but physics-like explanations as 
being valid. This means both Kant and Hanslick’s contributions to understanding 
creativity in musical composition via beauty and imagination are contained within 
scientific and rational bounds. 
Kant stresses that we require imagination to experience the beautiful. Dustin 
Stokes88 explores the links that can be made between the two and says imagination is 
always necessary for, but different from, creativity. This position is based on a definition 
for truth-boundedness that stems from adopting Kantian precepts in the Critique of 
Judgment, which also involves defining genius (Kantian creativity).89 Here imagination is 
free in aestheticism to wander in an unstudied way, almost play-like as for Kivy, away 
from the initial concept that provoked imaginative thought in the first place. If 
information coming to mind is truth-bounded, then cognitive states can accurately and 
eventually represent it and its use in the world. If not so, then Stokes thinks that the 
information can be manipulated (Stokes’ word for changeable). Thus imagination as it 
plays a role in judging the presence of beauty is judged manipulative by Stokes and non-
truth-bounded. 
Stokes own theory rests on imagination’s ability to cognitively manipulate. Whilst 
he explains, then uses, many recognized arguments for the choice of categories, e.g., non-
truth-bound cognition is needed for creativity since creativity involves novelty, the 
arguments seem to sit independently of one another rather than be part of a unifying 
standpoint. Stokes says, in defense of this cumulative, but not necessarily integrated, 
approach: 
Taken together, this provides a powerful explanation … imagination is 
important if not necessary for creative thought.90 
At one point, he voices worries in admitting, with one, that: “the present account misses 
the core of creativity; the non-deliberate and unconscious stuff is where the action is!”91 
                                                          
88 Dustin Stokes, “The Role of Imagination in Creativity”, 157–184, in Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., 
The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 157. 
89 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Book 2: On the Sublime, translated by James Meredith, 
(Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 4.0 International Licence), Section 49, 316. 
We read: “The mental powers whose union in a certain relation constitute genius are imagination 
and understanding. Now, since the imagination, in its employment on behalf of cognition, is 
subjected to the constraint of the understanding and the restriction of having to be conformable 
to the concept belonging thereto, whereas aesthetically it is free to furnish its own accord, over 
and above that agreement with the concept, a wealth of undeveloped material for the 
understanding, to which the latter paid no regard in its concept, but which it can make use of, not 
so much objectively for cognition, as subjectively for quickening the cognitive faculties, … ” 
90 Dustin Stokes, “The Role of Imagination in Creativity,” in Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The 
Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 179. 
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These final points indicate some acceptance of the challenge to being definitive in this 
arena. Derek Matravers notes Stokes’ cautious conclusions by saying: 
[this essay] is a welcome addition to the rather scarce philosophical 
literature on the subject (the scarcity is pointed out by Stokes). One thing 
that is striking about this essay is how little Stokes is prepared to assert 
about creativity. He argues convincingly that our best bet is to treat 
creativity as a process …. Even setting his ambitions low, Stokes has 
difficulty in finding anything substantial to say. Agency is a necessary 
condition for being a creative process. Is novelty? Yes, in some degree and 
in some respects. (I can here state that I do not think there is any chance at 
all of specifying the respect in which novelty is relevant to creativity in a 
non-circular manner. I am baffled by those theorists who accept the 
implications of their theories that Haydn was a more creative composer than 
Mozart …).92 Stokes goes on to say that some conception of value might be 
useful, and that incorporating a criterion involving cognitive change “looks 
promising”. None of this is to criticise Stokes; in fact, just the opposite. My 
strong suspicion is that his severely limited conclusions are a feature of the 
debate: there simply might not be much that is philosophically interesting to 
say about creativity, which is an interesting conclusion in itself. 93 
If Stokes and Matravers are deemed credible, this still renders the philosophical debate 
surrounding the nature of creativity nascent or ill-formed. The rational link between 
creativity and imagination is not well established by them (and admitted), even when 
quoting from musical contexts. They both eventually return to relying upon a process-
orientated view of creativity, albeit aided by agency, novelty, value and cognitive change. 
Yet their arguments are put in a way that wants to recognize the role of the unconscious, 
a freedom of imagination to wander (or to play) and the presence of the aesthetic, all of 
which undermine a rational approach. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
91 Dustin Stokes, “The Role of Imagination in Creativity,” 177. 
92 Matravers is effectively saying creativity and optimization are incompatible concepts. 
93 Derek Matravers, Review of Dustin Stokes, “The Role of Imagination in Creativity”, 157-184, in Eliot 
Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), to 
be found at URL: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24239-new-waves-in-aesthetics/ (2009). 
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Berys Gaut also discusses the links between imagination and creativity in the remit 
of looking for a Philosophy of Creativity.94 Kantian ideas, especially those linking into 
concepts are quoted: 
For Kant imagination is the faculty to intuit even when an object is not 
present, and he distinguishes between reproductive imagination (for 
instance, memory images) and productive imagination, ‘the authoress of 
voluntary forms of possible intuitions’, which is a free use of the 
imagination (Ak 5: 240). 
Gaut notes that Kant only illustrated via poetry and the like, and then concludes: 
While richly suggestive, Kant’s claims about the connection between 
creativity and imagination are frustratingly elusive. 
Gaut questions the accuracy of Picciuto and Carruthers’s95 assertion that creativity and 
imagination are conjoined to start in child pretend play, on the grounds that this link 
could also be present in kittens pretend playing with a ball of wool; yet kittens may know 
nothing of creativity. He considers empirical evidence from autism that shows a causal 
connection between pretend play and creativity. No such roots to being creative are 
assumed by Gaut. He gives other examples such as: “the vehicular claim, has argued for 
a connection model of creative imagination: creativity consists in making connections by 
the use of imagination between disparate domains.”96 This positive allusion is to the 
literature on connectionist theories. Our brains are deemed to work at the neuronal level 
on the principle of parallel distributed processing.97 For these arguments to be valid, 
intelligence and consciousness must consist completely within a mechanistic view of 
what creativity might be. 
Gaut tries to answer two questions: is a traditional linking of creativity to 
imagination correct and can anything be said about how it works?98 His traditional view 
                                                          
94 Berys Gaut. “Creativity and Rationality.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 70(2012): 259–
270. 
95 Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers, “The Origins of Creativity,” in The Philosophy of Creativity, 
Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
96 Berys Gaut. “Creativity and Rationality.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 70 (2012): 259–
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Rummelhart and James McClelland, Parallel Distributed Processing. Volumes I and II. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1986). 
98 Berys Gaut. “Creativity and Imagination,” in Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston, eds., The Creation of 
Art  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 148. 
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is that creativity requires originality, to be regarded as valuable, and involves flair.99 His 
conception of imagination is not always truth-bounded, does not always require imagery, 
and can be propositional, experiential or dramatic. Gaut wishes to distinguish between 
imagination as a source or as a vehicle for creativity. In so doing, he opens up the 
possibility that metaphor-making is a creative activity, one aided by vehicular 
imagination. Source imagination, he claims, may have no connection with being creative 
at all. If this were so, there would be no case to be made for creativity ex nihilo. 
Gaut’s views eventually settle upon thinking traditional views of the links between 
creativity and imagination are correct, but he recognizes there is more work to be done 
with the sentiment that he hopes he has ‘at least shown that there is a rich and interesting 
set of issues to be investigated here.’ In then proposing: “metaphor-making … displays 
… imagination in being creative, in bringing together previously disparate domains … 
The creative product here illuminates the creative process,” 100 Gaut relies on the product, 
process, behavior categorization of creativity already mentioned, where an abstract 
definition of creativity—not a description or an experience—is sought. He does not say 
how originality, value and flair are arbitrated if used as evidence of creative content. 
So with respect to art music composition, Cavell supports the human-ness of being 
creative and actually celebrates the intentionality that thereby flows. In reaching back to 
Leibnitz, Baumgarten, Kant and Herder, a thread of belief in the human authenticity built 
into aesthetics remains, but tinged with a scientific Zeitgeist from which these writers 
project their views. Creativity in the musical context has to be inferred from mention of 
words like genius and imagination. Cavell, Levinson and Elster all emphasize that this 
human connection gives rise to a paradoxical freedom of constraint in the artistic context. 
Kant’s claim that such involvement needs to be judged (not assessed, described or other 
means), using imagination in terms of the beautiful and the sublime, is modified by 
Hanslick. Hanslick chooses instrumental music as the epitome of music, which can be 
aesthetically beautiful but should be assessed on a quasi-scientific basis. Stokes, like 
Kivy, reminds us of the play-like nature of imagination and the way it is not truth 
bounded and probably rooted in the unconscious. Matravers detects that making links 
between creativity, beauty and imagination is ill-formed philosophically at present but a 
worthwhile pursuit. Finally, Gaut accedes to the Kantian method of aesthetic judgement 
                                                          
99 Gaut, in reaching for the word flair, has brought us back to intuition, in that the dictionary definition of 
flair is intuitive discernment. Flair speaks of the uniquely attractive, or a special ability. 
100 Berys Gaut. “Creativity and Imagination,” 170. 
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via beauty and imagination . But he tends to handle creativity in a categorizable way, 
ending up in objective definitions that require more definitions to make any advancement 
of understanding, such as in defining flair. 
Whilst these reflections on links between creativity, beauty and imagination could 
appear disparate in emphasis, the researchers have continued the debate on how 
experience of and attitudes to music composition as creative have tried to be categorized. 
The desire for an understanding of creativity as part of human authenticity forms part of 
that debate. It also links in to the way aesthetics enables addressing this human condition 
without a constraining Enlightenment reason prevailing,. 
 
3.4 A Philosophical Approach 
In order to address aspects of creativity that seem to require a wider remit than 
science and psychology, philosophical thinking about creativity, as a more persuasive yet 
focused approach, has determined recent literature. The previous discussions looked at 
how creativity has been handled as a concept in its own right and then in conjunction 
with other concepts. They have shown that the unexpected, unusual, and like effects, are 
treated as peripheral by the writers and not normally taken into consideration as offering 
insight into the subject matter, except by Margaret Boden. 
However, Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingstone observe that study of creativity in 
the philosophical aesthetics of art is neglected due to the dominance of formalism and 
structuralism. The critic has become the arbiter of creative content, focusing almost 
entirely on ends as product.101 They give a philosophical summary of creativity as editors 
to their book and note that the effect of acceding to this viewpoint is to remove human 
intentionality from art. This is close to Cavell claiming the dehumanizing of art by 
modernism. In focusing on the ‘state of debate’, they pick out issues of interest to be to 
find a correct (truth-bounded) interpretation of an art work, where that may be derived 
from, and what type of thing an art work is. In discussing whether Kivy’s contention that 
discovery and selection might prevail over creative notions they point to the middle way 
of Levinson: 
… Jerrold Levinson’s contention [is] that musical works are initiated types, that 
is, they are sound structures (or more precisely sound/performing means 
structures) that are indicated by a composer at a time or in a specific cultural 
                                                          
101 Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingstone, eds., The Creation of Art, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 4. 
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context. There is little agreement, however, as to whether such a position allows 
for artistic creation in a suitably robust sense: Levinson contends that it does, 
while Kivy, Predilli, Currie, and others contest the point.102 
They run through and mainly depend upon definitional arguments, aesthetic values, 
creativity as process, along with the place of rules and tradition, but there is no 
significance given to the disruptive. 
Elliot Paul and Scott Kaufman have gathered together research on the topic under 
the rubric of ‘integrating philosophical insight with empirical research’.103 The 
contributions range over topics such as aesthetics, art, science, ethics, mind and 
education. The editors have chosen not to incorporate creativity research as a topic in its 
own right. Their attempt to demonstrate some form of integration via philosophy 
presupposes in some way the task is possible. We may recall, musically, Schopenhauer 
suggests that art music composers can be seen as philosophers in their own right.104 Paul 
and Kaufman’s editorial efforts, calling upon a range of experts, are helpful in seeing 
what the challenges in treating general creativity philosophically might be. Each expert 
applies philosophy to creativity in a specific context but shows there are few integrating 
factors. The Introduction is probably the most telling part of the book where the editors 
declare their intentions. They highlight, to them, the key issue. Philosophers tend to 
ignore what the scientific literature offers. The first few pages are compendiums of 
scientific research already done, where Paul and Kaufmann support the view that 
creativity is, as has already been mentioned, essentially having the triune properties of 
product, process and personal behavior. They add that creative product must have both 
newness and value105 as properties. 
If the remit for taking a philosophical approach to understanding creativity is 
widened, Christopher Peacocke addresses the creative musical scene by focusing on the 
word style.106 He says that a discernment of style is for him the necessary precondition 
for understanding music composers’ outputs. Nominating style as important makes the 
                                                          
102 Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingstone, eds., The Creation of Art, 8. 
103 Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
104 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, (London: Everyman, J. M. Dent, 1995), 163, where 
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whereby the mind does not know it is counting”, and reworks it into: “music is the unconscious 
exercise in metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is philosophizing.” 
105 Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, eds., The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 6. 
106 Christopher Peacocke, “Musical Style and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Eliot Paul and Scott Kaufman, 
eds., The Philosophy of Creativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
77 
 
aesthetic properties of phenomena the key to understanding. Yet he wants empiricism to 
form the basis of his solution. This is summed up in the phrase: “It also seems to me that 
the expressive-perceptual account is explanatorally and teleologically fundamental.”107 
His theory about the importance of style in determining the creativity in a musical 
composition is picked up through the expressive-perceptual duality. This is then reduced 
to saying it is the critic, not the composer or performer, who has the vantage point for 
determining the creativity present. He claims that vantage point is justified through the 
perceived consistency with which style in music can be defined. Carman and Taylor also 
point out how the philosophical treatment of style, via phenomenology, could render 
style ubiquitous, naturally making style a candidate for an essence.108 
Style has the properties of being intangible and, in potentially not being reducible 
to anything else, could be regarded as an essence. Peacocke thinks few have ventured 
into the topic of musical style as being philosophical in nature. Peacocke likens the task 
to one of computer vision analysis where “it makes no sense to address the question of 
how the content of a perception [of musical style?] is computed without a specification of 
what it is that is computed.”109 This empirical approach is taken as if one were applying 
an algorithm, but he has also made the significance of perceiving music through 
phenomena an important consideration. His focus invokes creativity as product by him 
saying: “But we know we should not be satisfied with a theory that fails to explain the 
distinctive aspects of the products of creative activity.”110 Peacocke’s viewpoint takes us 
away from recognizing the significance of the properties of creativity declared of interest 
in this thesis, if style is to be defined in some strong consistent manner. 
Bence Nanay claims his own philosophical approach is advantageous because there 
is then no privileged recipe for creativity but a rudimentary necessary-and-sufficient 
condition, given as: 
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a mental process is creative if and only if it produces an idea that is 
ver[i]dically experienced and something we have not thought to be possible 
before … and not learned from someone else.111 
The selection of some already-discussed characteristics of creativity appears to make the 
approach part phenomenological. He wishes creativity to be a process in the mind and 
subjective yet he makes an ‘idea’ into a product. That idea, according to Nanay, is 
veridical, i.e., real, actual and truthful. The condition also seeks newness in an almost 
absolute sense without discussing the challenge of how, and by whom, the newness is 
produced or perceived. Nanay’s approach is truth-bounded, limiting scope for the 
properties of interest in this thesis to become credible. Whilst mental processes as some 
form of genesis to creativity are claimed to have merit, Nanay does not develop this 
phenomenological argument further. 
Margaret Boden has already been mentioned in connection with a scientific model 
of creativity. Her later research112 summarizes previous published work and broadens her 
approach to creativity to encompass philosophical views. Boden defines creativity here 
as: “the ability to generate creative ideas … where a creative idea is one that is novel, 
surprising and valuable,”113 which moves her views about creativity nearer to those 
under consideration in this thesis. This definition is given support from her previous 
thoughts on P and H creativity and notions of combination, exploration and 
transformation in being creative. Boden debates the necessity of consciousness and 
intentionality playing a role in being creative and claims this question must remain open. 
She states:  
the question of whether a computer [for her a non-human embodiment of 
intelligence] could ever be creative is currently unanswerable, because it 
involves several highly contentious philosophical questions.114  
Boden picks out properties of interest to this thesis but does not extend her consideration 
further into their creative properties. 
Berys Gaut offers his own philosophical view on creativity, where he thinks the 
neglected ‘rich psychological literature’ should be consulted.115 This view relies upon 
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Plato’s Ion to argue that inspiration is a kind of madness, and upon Kant in Critique of 
Judgment (in Sections 43–50) to link creativity to imagination. Gaut’s historicity calls 
first on Poincaré, then Wallas, then Ward (with the GENEPLORE algorithm). He is in 
effect seeing creativity as mainly process and social-science orientated. He questions 
whether creativity is a virtue, rational, opposed to tradition, and fully Darwinian in a 
similar manner to propositions from Dean Simonton about the BSVR process. He 
attempts to include all walks of life, not just the arts. By so doing, issues then arise, such 
as the roles of inspiration and discovery, rules, predictability and computability, many of 
which are under discussion in this thesis. Originality and value get scrutinized as 
insufficient grounds for recognizing creativity on their own because creativity is deemed 
the property of agents. Philosophically speaking, this renders this type of agent with the 
capacity and the ability to choose. In this scenario, creativity, seen as emanating from the 
agent, could be ex nihilo. Gaut picks on these issues to show the relevance of a 
psychological approach to them. His definition for creativity is: 
Putting this together, creativity is the capacity to produce original and 
valuable items by flair [Gaut’s special word – it is defined as intuitive 
discernment in the Chambers dictionary]. So creativity requires a three-part, 
not the standard two-part definition; and it is a particular exercise of agency. 
As such it is open to agents, whether human or not, that have the requisite 
capacities. 
In this definition, Gaut tries to provide a universal philosophical approach, one that he 
thinks can have roots in psychology, but not limited to humans. However, he has also 
shown how such an attempt is difficult to make plausible. Creative activity, described by 
the word flair gives us yet another word to add to the number trying to describe 
constituent or essential properties. Flair is like a catalytic agent as the third and missing 
ingredient to bind the properties of ‘original’ to ‘valuable’ together. Invoking the agency 
component can begin to explain how an agent embodies intentionality, and maybe 
consciousness, to enable being creative. But agency can also be non-human in his context 
without addressing whether creativity is essentially a human capacity or not. For Gaut, 
product is important such that invention is linked to a utility that dominates teleology, 
i.e., the product has to be purposefully useful. When using the word valuable, it is not 
explained whether the value comes from utility or aesthetics. Yet Gaut says creativity 
cannot be teleological by saying: “we cannot know the end in advance,” as if aesthetics 
might dominate all discussion of creativity or that knowledge of creativity is ineffable 
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(unknowable in this context). But later Gaut uses architectural examples to weaken this 
position, e.g., an architect can imagine the whole before getting immersed in the parts, as 
if the building as a known structure determined all else that follows. As with other 
creativity definitions quoted, applicability is focused on trying to be universal. But the 
definition does not identify clearly what is being looked for as manifestations of 
creativity.  
Creativity research as a topic in its own right is process orientated. Christian Julmi 
and Ewald Scherm review the specific interface between creativity research and 
phenomenology and come to conclusions in saying: 
The phenomenological method is suited in general for researching into the 
creative process, because this represents a significant and unique human 
experience (Bindeman, 1998; Nelson, 2011) and it is the task of 
phenomenology to deal with people’s subjective experience: 
phenomenology seeks to make explicit the implicit structure and meaning 
of human experiences. It is the search for ‘essences’ that cannot be 
revealed by ordinary observation. Phenomenology is the science of 
essential structures of consciousness or experience. (Sanders, 1982, p. 
354).116 
Julmi and Scherm’s statement brings out their choice of salient points. Phenomenology is 
deemed suitable for creativity research as expressed through a ‘process’ model but no 
mention of other possible manifestations of creativity are made. Unique human 
experience, which is largely subjective, figures significantly as evidence for them. Since 
they see phenomenology as the science of essential structures of experience, they are 
actually advocating that phenomenology is a science. However, they broach a three-fold 
view of creativity of interest to art music composition that weakens the assumption that 
phenomenology is necessarily science. Corporeal creativity has properties of being felt, 
stimulated and atmospheric. Hermeneutic creativity has properties of adapting and 
arranging. Analytical creativity is supposed to reduce situations to their essence from a 
constellation of individual significances. All three ideas about the nature of creativity as 
phenomenological can be applied to art music composition. Corporeal (of the body, 
senses) addresses effects we experience when listening to or playing music. Hermeneutic 
(meaning) addresses the interpretive nature of how we make sense of what we hear. 
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Analytic (algorithm) addresses the notion that we are trying to find the reasonable, 
logical and coherent that, if seen as phenomenological, could be eidetically reduced into 
essences. The last type of creativity has to reconcile essences, that are intuited without 
reason, with analytic and thereby reasonable grounds for any conclusions arrived at. 
As with reviewing conceptual models of creativity, discussion here notes how 
creativity is handled philosophically but again shows diversity in what aspect of 
creativity is regarded as central to understanding it. The ways and means noted could 
help us understand what it means to be moved to call an art music composer’s role and 
portfolio creative but would still largely depend upon rational and logical grounds. 
 
3.5 An Integration via Disruption  
The discussions, on how creativity relates to other concepts in a musical context 
and how it can be understood philosophically, contain evidence which can be interpreted 
to see disruption as an integrating factor that links them all together. That disruption 
reveals there is minimal rational explanation available for the stances taken. When 
considering genius and inspiration, Kivy reaches for bright ideas as a kind of essence to 
being creative. He notes that Longinus explains genius as the ability to break (pedagogic) 
rules—far from abiding by them—and then concludes genius is creativity in extremis, 
mystical and epistemically beyond us. As already mentioned, bright ideas, rule breaking 
and the mystical are seen as disruptive and new. Since creativity has links to intuition and 
expertise, Feigenbaum’s expert systems give the impression that creativity could be 
reduced to ‘rules used by experts in problem solving’, rules that lend themselves readily 
to rational resolutions in computability. But rule-based methods are often only useful 
heuristics that have stood the test of time in being tried out and eventually regarded as 
rules. This is inductive (not deductive) rule validation. Even the Dreyfuses’ route to 
becoming an expert disappears into playfulness at its most sophisticated levels, making 
further investigation, using logic and reason, inexplicable. They also regard all 
knowledge building as only for solving problems. Cavell might say that solving a 
problem is part of a composer creatively setting his/her own boundary conditions within 
which to work. But that situation is plausible only if composers ‘disrupt’ their thought 
patterns to find a new way of prescribing their compositions. Euthyphro’s view of an 
osmotic transfer of expertise lends itself well to many learning scenarios in performance. 
It is highly intuitive, rationally inexplicable and most probably disruptive of the novice’s 
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pre-conceived notions. Cope shows that originality and authenticity emanating from 
being human are also part of being creative in music, but with the fickleness and 
fallibility of being human disrupting consistent judgment of evidence. When beauty and 
imagination are linked to creativity, aesthetics enables addressing this human condition 
without Enlightenment reason prevailing, notwithstanding Kant always trying to relate 
understanding to a judgmental power. Philosophically, the concept of creativity is seen as 
diverse in what could be regarded as central to its understanding. But philosophy would 
still rely upon rational and logical grounds for validation. 
We see that there is a significant integrating connectivity evident between creativity 
and other concepts through the perception of disruption. This points to the need of further 
examination of how phenomenology and aesthetics may provide another approach to 
understanding musical creativity. This may then shed light upon finding a better way of 
describing creativity in musical composition, and is addressed next. 
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4 Creativity through Phenomenology 
 
The earlier chapters have brought to light that creativity in music is often 
understood in a way that communicates and shares conceptually. In so doing the presence 
of the intellectually disruptive, encountering the unusual, unreasonable, illogical, 
unexpected, surprising, bright ideas, ineffable, paradoxical, newness and provocative, is 
often regarded as aberrations. There is a general bifurcation into two approaches to 
current understanding. In searches for explanation, a reliance upon pre-determined 
boundary conditions such as truth, consistency, optimization, predictability (problem 
solving), and authentication (absolutism) are brought into play by ways of determinate 
presuppositions or axioms.1 In searches for description, the emphasis changes in relaxing 
those constraints by using aesthetic concepts such as style, taste, form, genre, value and 
context. Musically speaking, boundary conditions can be self-imposed, truth about what 
the music means is often indeterminate, and perception coupled to intuition are 
significant in giving rise to evidence and understanding, but not necessarily to 
knowledge. 
Plausible forms of explanation and description, involving interpretation, rely upon 
evidence, in the main, as well as other means. Aesthetic interpretations tend to weaken 
this reliance when the difference between reason and intuition is recognized. An 
approach to understanding creativity in art music composition needs to be plausible. To 
that end, two observations about linguistic evidence are considered important, as 
conjunctive to prima facie evidence in hearing music being performed live. Pamela 
Burnard has already pointed out in her research that composers are articulate in what they 
wish to say in providing information about composing music creatively. That evidence is 
suffused with their own judgment, description and interpretation and often expressed 
aesthetically. As becomes clear when asked, composers are continually referring to the 
effect their music may have on others and themselves. In addition, composers’ thoughts 
may not be rational or expressible in the normal way via spoken language. The way 
composers express themselves extra-musically can appear obtuse or hard to follow. If 
considered as description, their thoughts need not give rise to expressions bounded by 
truth or reason. When discussing phrases from interviews with composers, some of them 
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matter via explanation alone. 
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(the phrases) can be unintelligible on a first hearing, or may even remain so. This type of 
evidence neither creates ‘problems to be fixed’, nor the need to optimize or be truth-
bounded, aesthetically speaking. Art music composers are thus articulate but potentially 
unintelligible when using standard modes of interrogation. 
There is an immediacy to creating music2 that demands it being experienced 
aesthetically in the moment. At root, immediacy concentrates on the front end of 
interacting with the world, making phenomenology a good candidate for handling 
musical creative affairs as both performed music and through speech or writing.3 In a 
response to the music, a quest to understand creativity in this context, relies on that 
moment of capture, not only as a sound impact, as for Johann Herder, but in speaking 
about that musical impact as well. To grasp essential content, at some point we choose to 
revert to spoken language as the working dialectic in reflection, and accept that the 
immediacy of perception lives on in the choice of words to describe it. As mentioned at 
the start of this thesis, there is an interplay between experiencing music as performed and 
talking or writing about it in reflection.4 If coming to grips with composers’ creativity is 
asserted as readily possible with expression through words alone, there would be no need 
of the music in the first place. However describing music and its effect upon us verbally 
is an essential communicative step.5 
Because of the immediacy with which music is experienced, there is a distinction to 
be made between what is evident (as noticed by us or we surmise by others) and evidence 
(what is perceived, from which inference and intuition are made). The former has not 
reached the stage of a general acceptance but still has a realness to the observer, whereas 
the latter is part of a proposed objectivity (maybe as mind objects or concepts) from 
which the inference or intuition is made. Put another way, evidence has reached the stage 
of being absorbable by interpretation into part of a theory, whereas ‘it’ may be evident to 
                                                          
2 The phrase ‘creating music’ cannot but be ambiguous as to what is referred to. The distinction between a 
composer’s creativity and that of the performer who ‘realizes’ the music in sound is not being debated 
here. 
3 Judy Lochhead, “Can We Say What We Hear? Jankélévitch and the Bergsonian Ineffable,”in Journal of 
The American Musicological Society, 65(2005): 235, where Lochhead says: “… words are implicated in 
a broader notion of how music affects us as listeners, performers and creators.” 
4Judy Lockhead, “Can We Say What We Hear? Jankélévitch and the Bergsonian Ineffable,” 231–241, links 
two philosophers together in their approaches to understanding music. Bergson bases his metaphysics 
on dualities such as absolute and relative knowledge, to then regard some knowledge as ineffable. For 
Jankélévitch (page 231), Lochhead then claims: “music listening and performing engage a form of 
absolute knowledge through intuition.” 
5 James Hepokoski, “Ineffable Immersion: Contextualizing The Call for Silence”, in “Colloquy: Vladimir 
Jankélévitch’s Philosophy of Music”, Journal of The American Musicological Society, 65(2005): 215–
256, on page 230, where he says: “In the final assessment, the disparaging of interpretive conversation 
about music—that wondrous art—must be regarded as a rearguard, regressive posture.” 
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one person but not evident to others, preventing any claim to common ground or 
universality being made at this stage of encounter. Some transfer from being evident into 
evidence has to take place in the discourse to make matters communicable. 
This chapter explores understanding creativity in art music composition through 
perceptive and aesthetic properties, provoked by the immediacy of experiencing live 
music. Firstly Kantian views about aesthetic judgment shows it to be overtly judgmental 
requiring rational conclusions. The significance of perception and interpretation are then 
brought to the fore when the immediacy of the impact of sound is recognized and how 
irrational the context becomes. A phenomenological view of musical creativity is taken 
into consideration that reaches back to Herder and Hanslick in that it is the sound(s) of 
music which affect us. Musical evidence is then considered to be both vague and 
incomplete by reference to themes explored by Bergson and Jankélévitch. This then leads 
to a scrutiny of how the work of Merleau-Ponty and his body-subject is relevant to 
musical creativity studies. 
 
4.1 Aesthetic Judgement and Experience 
In Contemporary Music: Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives,6 
Helmut Lachenmann meets with composers to discuss just what composing 
consists of. In his reflections on what he learns, he says: 
Composing as a way of fabricating magic in music is rather easy. There are 
a lot of composers whom I wouldn’t call real composers but more or less 
talented arrangers of magical situations. … This is the quandary: magic as a 
medium of familiar safety, even of irrational collective ecstasy, or magic as 
a medium of reflection, dominated and ‘suspended’ by a creative spirit? At 
any rate, in what we call ‘art’ in music, the composer, with his creative and 
innovative energy, has to evoke and dominate the magic.7 
A creative composer evokes and then dominates the property of magic, unlike a talented 
arranger who ‘fabricat[es] magic in music’. This speaks, according to Lachenmann, of 
‘suspending’ or interrupting a normative line of thought as a disruptive act; this is 
achieved by a creative spirit. Lachenmann’s music is well known in creating (inventing) 
                                                          
6 Max Paddison and Irène Deliège, eds., Contemporary Music: Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010). 
7 Abigail Heathcote, “Sound Structures, Transformations, and Broken Magic: An Interview with Helmut 
Lachenmann,” in Contemporary Music, eds. Max Paddison and Irène Deliège (Farnham, UK: Ashgate 
2010), 343. 
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all manner of different ways of making sound on instruments. The sounds provoke, 
disturb and generally disrupt all notions of what, conventionally speaking, is heard from 
these instruments as art music. He is saying it is magical in defying explanation of its 
achievement, but a creative spirit can control it somehow. 
From a different point of view, John Hospers includes and grapples with the 
philosophical problems surrounding creativity, as part of an address to a meeting of The 
American Society for Aesthetics. After contemplating numerous ways to explain 
creativity, he then discards them all. He returns to making emotion and feeling of 
particular significance in art but also casts the significance as a form of magic, 
concluding:  
But the source of the magic cannot be encapsulated into any general set 
of rules, nor anything whatever that could be seized upon by other artists 
to guide them in the creation of something of enduring value. Dare we 
say that any and all general rules for creating good art must be relegated 
to the trash-heap of aesthetic theory?8 
Hospers is attacking all forms of rule-based methods as inadequate to give a theoretical 
basis to aesthetic aspects of creativity. He says his view on what is magical, as it is 
encountered in art, is that its aesthetic content cannot be fully grasped. Both Lachenmann 
and Hospers have used the word magic differently but ended up highlighting the need to 
rethink how we understand creativity in art music composition when aesthetic judgment 
is invoked. Even using judgment may need substituting through intuited or similar terms. 
Later in the thesis (section 4.5), the ideas of Merleau-Ponty are reviewed in connection 
with removing a mind-body dualism to creative manifestation. He refers to the magical, 
in his case, to be the inexplicable transformation between things and spectacles9 as if 
some inexplicable link had been forged between perception and substance. 
The essence of art music composers being creative resides somewhere in the 
context of an experience of the music. In a positive sense, we find our expectation 
provoked in ways we could not have imagined or anticipated (it is called magical above), 
even if reflection might try to later, perhaps successfully, rationalize our thoughts. If we 
employ a spatial metaphor, we have to get to the creative places the composers wish to 
encourage us into. This may well be for the first time, taking us as performers and 
                                                          
8 John Hospers, “Artistic Creativity,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43 (1985): 254. 
9 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L’Oeil et L’Esprit, (Paris Galimard, 1964) 33–34, or “Eye and Mind” trans. 
Carleton Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception, James Edie ed., (Evanston, USA: North Western 
University Press, 1964), 162. 
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listeners with them, to be positioned as insiders or co-creators, more than just detached 
spectators. Unless some commodification argument has to intervene, this positioning 
comes from being invited in by an aesthetic experience as much as for any other form of 
appreciation. Once there, both performers and audience can (dialogically) have a 
significant effect upon how a composer’s musical work happens in performance; they are 
all related. 
Kant makes a major attempt to define aesthetic judgment, an interest taken up in his 
third critique and linked to his desire to see order in our experience that could be then be 
the basis of a rational approach to knowledge. Kantian objectives are not as for Plato. 
Platonic Ideas are necessarily outside of experience as ideals but Kantian notions of 
understanding are transcendental extensions to experience on the basis that we grasp 
what the conditions are for how we understand in the first place, i.e., the rules or 
conditions are a priori of our subjective experience and, in a way, objective. 
Kant’s transcendental idealism provides a grounding principle in self-
consciousness for all experience and knowledge in asserting that human reason itself is 
capable of finding ‘unity in diversity’ in knowledge.10 The three major critiques are 
related. The Critique of Pure Reason attempts to show we can have objective knowledge 
even when it is conditioned by subjective experience. The Critique of Practical Reason 
shows as a fact that we can exercise ‘moral reasoning’ to make moral judgments even 
though we are bound by natural laws. The Critique of Judgment aims to unite the first 
two critiques as theoretical and practical parts to reason that ground the aesthetic 
experience in perceiving beauty and the sublime. There are but a few references to music 
in this last critique. 
Kant, in wanting to judge an aesthetic experience through beauty and the sublime, 
distinguishes between two types of beauty: purposeless pure beauty, and conditional 
teleological beauty. The subject matter is only understood in the latter.11 In making this 
delineation,12 Kant is incidentally debating the meaning attributable to instrumental 
                                                          
10 Robart Sinnerbrink, Understanding Hegelianism (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2007), 7. 
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 16. 
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Book 2: On the Sublime (Creative Commons Attribution Non-
Commercial 4.0 International Licence), Section 16, 229, where he claims:“ There are two kinds of 
beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga), or beauty which is merely dependent (pulchritudo adhaerens) 
The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second does presuppose such a 
concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object.… they [designs of no intrinsic meaning 
attached to ‘free beauty’] represent nothing—no object under a definite concept—and are free beauties. 
We may also rank in the same class what in music are called fantasias (without a theme), and, indeed, 
all music that is not set to words.” 
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music. The two different types of beauty contrast non-conceptual thought to a conceptual 
thought that has form or ideals to aim for. It would appear Kant regards instrumental 
music or any music without a theme as non-conceptual and thence exhibiting free or 
purposeless beauty. As free beauty, music would then have powers of expression yet to 
be decided or different from the usual language-based means of communicating, i.e., 
music is literally inexplicable if judged to exhibit free beauty. 
In the Critique of Judgment, in order to justify his own view concerning aesthetic 
properties, Kant notes that music has an aesthetic effect (charm) far distant from 
explanation via the rigour of formal science. He says: “But mathematics, certainly, does 
not play the smallest part in the charm and movement of the mind produced by music.”13 
He also talks about attaching value to musical endeavours through the ‘agreeableness’ we 
experience from it.14 He proposes instrumental music is most probably non-conceptual 
and exhibiting free beauty, according to his categories. Therefore, epistemically it cannot, 
for him, be anything but the lowest form of art, i.e., it has little or no knowledge 
embedded in it. Yet music’s agreeableness to Kant means music is still to be valued in 
producing that effect. 
Nominating (intuiting) properties can attach value to aesthetic experience. Their 
presence is then assumed to indicate value is present. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka searches 
for what is to be valued in aesthetic experience. She refers to an ‘aesthetic discourse’ of 
the arts that automatically suggests there is a sharing and communication aspect to 
artistic endeavor anyway. In describing some arts as plastic, Tymieniecka draws attention 
to experience as both spatial and temporal, subjective and objective. She points to Roman 
Ingarden’s attempts to find foundation in being, similar to Heidegger’s Dasein. 
Ingarden’s aesthetic experience and judgment is derived from each layer of the structure 
of an aesthetic object. Tymieniecka’s concern is that Ingarden seems to dwell more on 
ontological matters rather than phenomenological ones. Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to 
overcome the limitations of Cartesian duality will bring this bias under further 
consideration later. 
The Geneva School is noted to address two issues at once with a linguistics 
approach. The issues are to try and ground experience in both the work of art and the 
                                                          
13 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Book 2: On the Sublime, 329. 
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Book 2: On the Sublime, 329 where he says: “music, then, since it 
plays merely with sensations, has the lowest place among the fine arts–just as it has perhaps the highest 
among those valued at the same time for their agreeableness.” 
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mind of the perceiver. Tymieniecka sees Ingarden and the Geneva School as at the 
forefront of aesthetic discourse, yet she also sees limitations and concludes: 
In our times … Not only may no consensus on aesthetic criteria be 
expected, but in this disarray of values, no objective horizon of reference for 
criticism is possible. 
In agreement with Tymieniecka, I am not wanting to establish or codify the objectivity 
(ontology) of what we experience, or to circumscribe how value in art is determined. The 
source of whatever gives rise to an experience for us can be bracketed out as per Husserl, 
if desired. With this emphasis in mind and seeking to portray it adequately, Tymieniecka 
describes aesthetic experience of art in architecture as to: 
go around it, inside and out, and it is only in the temporal succession of our 
perceptions and their coming together in an aesthetic object as the artistic 
work that we ‘perceive it’ aesthetically.15  
Tymieniecka’s imagery can be co-opted into the musical scene where we can say it is the 
performers in conjunction with the composer who take listeners on a semi-guided tour 
through a musical sound structure, for all to perceive aesthetically. We might not be 
aware of the structure (form, genre) but only the effect it has had on us. It is somewhere 
on this semi-guided tour that the music’s effect provokes us to reach for the word 
creative through the properties we have highlighted. This imagery specifically recognizes 
the serial moment-by-moment context of musical experience (not necessarily a 
judgement) made ostensibly within frameworks of taste and style. The frameworks may 
be well known to us but are (maybe unconsciously) bracketed out, to use Husserl’s 
notion. The effect is to experience the music in a way that invariably contains thoughts 
indicating the unexpected, the new, and surprising, as highlighted of interest in this 
thesis. 
In so doing, there is an Enlightenment pressure to then conclude we might have 
missed something or not properly understood that which we are experiencing and trying 
to interpret. To do that would then be a case of not seeing the wood (the pleasure of the 
beauty of our experience now seen as an intuited essence that even description cannot 
completely account for) for the trees (the individual and multiple structural formalities 
we logically infer and might expect to ‘explain all’). But there is really a change of 
dialectic taking place almost like a Kuhnian paradigm shift, one that moves the focus 
                                                          
15 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Aesthetic Discourse of The Arts: Breaking the Barriers,” Analecta 
Husserliana (London: Kluwer, 2000), Volume LXI: xiii. 
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onto evidence as phenomenology, not ontological substance. We are provoked to move 
directly onto perception in a search for essences of creativity in art music composition 
aided by intuition. Perceptions may now be playing a significant evidential role when 
trying to understand what to work with. 
 
4.2 A Phenomenalist Viewpoint 
Herman Parret touches upon why a phenomenalist approach to understanding 
creativity associated with music could be important when he says: 
The musician more than any other artist “provokes perception” and, in so 
doing, he provokes “dreaming/reflecting.” Therein lies the creativity of the 
musical artist.16 
For Parret, a distillation that can be extracted from perception appears to be initiated in 
dreaming and reflection, two properties distant from any fact or principle. Parret also 
claims that the creativity of the art music composer normally has to be perceived through 
the filter of the performer, not directly, an issue already discussed. This perception points 
to music engendering an integrating effect upon our understanding, i.e. it is the 
composer, performer and listener/critic who all contribute something to agreed views of 
what is meant by the music being called creative. 
Johann Gottfried Herder opens up a phenomenalist way of describing art music 
composition as creative, yet he is known more for anthropological, empirical and 
utilitarian ways of philosophizing; he is a practical man. According to Friedrich 
Osterman, as interpreted by Frank Shaw, Herder: 
sees “Erkenntnis” (cognition) as a creative act, thus blurring the distinction 
between man as the 'cognizer' of reality and the reality which is 'cognized'. Man, 
for Herder, perceives reality just as God first perceived it, namely in the act of 
creating it. It is this creative ("schopferisch") element of Herder that forms the 
subject of Ostermann's study,17 
integrating man with reality. Kant is seen as keeping the cognitive subject and reality 
apart in a dualism such that cognition does not give access to the thing in itself. However 
Merleau-Ponty will be seen to continue with Herder’s unifying theme. Herder’s writing 
comes at a time when Baroque precepts of imitation and the theory of affections are 
                                                          
16 Herman Parret, “Kant on Music and the Heirarchy of the Arts,” 260. 
17 Friedrich Osterman, The Idea of Creativity in Herder's Kalligone ["Die Idee des Schopferischen in 
Herders Kalligone"] Munchen: A. Francke Verlag, 1968). Frank Shaw, Review of: Fredrich Osterman, 
The Idea of Creativity in Herder’s Kalligone. , Philosophy and History, 4 (1971): 34. 
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giving way to Romanticism. Argument on whether it is at all possible to have access to 
the thing itself remains active.18 In contrast to the formalism of the Baroque, the feelings 
invoked by music are now regarded as vague, unfulfilled (infinite longing), personal and 
maybe uncategorizable; the creative in music speaks in untranslatable ways yet 
communicates somehow. Herder’s empirical (practical) approach is portrayed in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy so as to make: 
lexical straightjacketing of language … inimical, not only to lexical 
creativity and inventiveness, but thought itself because thought is essentially 
dependent on and confined in its scope by language, thereby to creativity 
and inventiveness in thought itself.19 
This view by Michel Forster has constrained Herder’s views into classifying thoughts 
about music and its meaning as only expressible ‘essentially’ through linguistic terms as 
a Derridian dependence of thought upon transactions via language constructs. But 
musical creativity is not limited by such a presupposition. 
When Kant explains what he thinks the essence of music to be as: 
a beautiful play of sensations that are externally produced, and yet must 
also be generally communicable; which fine art then can be nothing other 
than the proportion of the various degrees of the attunement (tension) of 
the sense to which the sensation belongs, [similar to] that of vision, that 
is, into music and the art of color,20 
he does it by making musical tone analogous with color, in a desire to find universal 
explanations external (objectively) to ourselves. Kant does not concern himself with 
feelings because the basis of cognition is some extension of the rational when forming an 
understanding. For Kant, knowledge is literally and only built outwards from a start in 
rational thought. Herder then takes issue with Kant. Herder’s dislike of the color analogy 
and Kant’s ‘play with sensations’ provokes him to say: 
                                                          
18 Timothy Sprigge, “Arthur Schopenhauer,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Edward Honderich, 
ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 804. Sprigge writes that Arthur Schopenhauer’s 
distinction of only having access to representation rather than the thing itself meant that: “music alone 
depicts the Will in its various grades as it is in itself rather that as manifested in the phenomenal world.” 
19 Michael Forster, “Johann Gottfried von Herder”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2015 Edition), Edward Zalta, ed., URL http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/herder/, 
Section 2. 
20 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Para. 53, Section 3. 
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Miserable music that does this; toneless heart that in all music hears only a 
play with sensations,21 
This is regarded by Michael Forster as a caricature of distracting public polemics.22 The 
analogy, with the sensations that lead to us understanding color, is not apt according to 
Herder. He declares the musical evidence is least of all susceptible to being generally 
communicable because of its vagueness and incompleteness.23 As such it may not be 
reducible to Kant’s conception of knowledge. He also takes issue with Kant’s remarks 
that rate music as the lowest of the fine arts. Kant reduces music to a ‘pleasurable art’ in 
being dismissed by the claim: “Hence it [music] demands, like every enjoyment, frequent 
change, and does not endure repeated repetition without creating boredom.”24 For Herder 
it is precisely the effect or sensation sound has upon us that puts him on a course to 
understand music through aesthetic eyes, turning his back on the inherent sterility of any 
scientific approach. 
At the heart of Herder’s understanding of music is the proposition that the tone (the 
sound itself) is powerful, affecting us in a way independent of word and gesture to the 
point of experiencing reverence and love.25  
Herder counters Kant’s objective and cognitive stance by reaching back to the 
debate between Rameau and Rousseau, in the tension that exists between them as they 
deal with the reason-versus-experience debate of the Enlightenment. Jean Philippe 
Rameau, as music theorist, thinks musical expression and poetics are important and seeks 
to understand the fundamentals of music, such as through relating musical intervals to 
partial harmonic ratios.26 When trying to align experience with reason, he validates his 
understanding of music through science. In his Traite de l’harmonie (1722),27 music is 
                                                          
21 Johann Gottfried Herder, “On Music,” Kalligone: On the Beautiful in Art, Part II Section 2 Chapter IV, 
trans. Edward Lippman in Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader, Volume 2, The Nineteenth 
Century, (New York; Pendragon Press, 1988), 42. 
22 Michael Forster, "Johann Gottfried von Herder", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., URL http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/herder/, 
Section 2. 
23 Johann Gottfried Herder Kalligone: On the Beautiful in Art, 34. 
24 Johann Gottfried Herder Kalligone: On the Beautiful in Art, 41, referencing Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, paras. 52 and 53. 
25 Johann Gottfried Herder Kalligone: On the Beautiful in Art, 38. 
26 Thomas Christensen. Rameau and Musical Thought in the Enlightenment. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). On page 34, we read: “Rameau insisted that raw emotions that are the product 
of unmediated experience need to be filtered through reason in order to be effectually captured and 
expressed by the artist.” 
27 Jean-Philippe Rameau, Treatise on Harmony, trans. Phillip Gossett, (New York; 1971) xxxiii xxxv. See 
Simon Miller, “Towards a Hermeneutics of Music,” 5–26, in The Last Post: Music after Modernism, 
Simon Miller, ed., (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993), 10 for detail on 
Enlightenment thinking including Kant. 
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mainly understood through the harmonic line. In him being known as both theoretical and 
argumentative, sadly: “ … the people would not believe that someone who discoursed so 
learnedly on intervals, scales, chords—a savant, a philosophe—could write music that 
they would want to hear.”28  
On the other hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau concentrates on the importance of the 
melodic line, not the harmony, and regards conveying emotion as the functional root of 
music.29 Rameau and Rousseau are diametrically opposed to each other and on opposite 
sides of the debate in the War of the Buffonists (querelle des bouffons).30 Rousseau 
writes disparagingly: “… the French have no music and cannot have any: …”31 
Rousseau’s Music Dictionary (1767–68) definition of imitation32 is cited by Julia Simon 
as showing Rousseau believed that: 
music has the ability to tap the emotions of listeners through a kind of 
mimesis. … Rousseau claims this is accomplished through a number of 
features in music, but especially by accent and melody.33  
Kathleen Hirt discusses the opposition between emotion and mechanization in 
music in the nineteenth century.34 She draws attention to the way the Rameau-Rousseau 
rift can be seen as efforts to separate emotion and passions away from reason, through the 
work of August Wilhelm Schlegel that tried to stop the Enlightenment subsuming 
feelings into its mechanistic universe.35 The rift, Hirt says, is healed somewhat by Johann 
                                                          
28 Donald Grout and Claude Paliska, A History of Western Music, Sixth Edition, (New York: Norton & 
Company, 2001), 381. 
29 Tracy Strong, Jean Jacques Rousseau (Lanham, USA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 92. Strong says: 
“Rousseau argues that in the theater we (as audience) may have “pure” emotions at the spectacle in 
front of us, from which we are kept by the fourth wall of the stage, but that is only because the emotions 
do not really affect us. In an important sense, they are not really ours.” See also Clifford Orwin and 
Nathan Tarcov, eds., The Legacy of Rousseau (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 25, where 
they comment: “As for music, he [Rousseau] argues that it gains in scope to the extent that it abandons 
direct imitation. … his very brief discussion of music consists of an exhortation to composers and 
critics to perfect the poorly cultivated resource of music, which can stimulate passions and even 
sensations in the absence of the objects that usually produce them.” 
30 A war-of-words between the French and Italian musical intelligencia championed by Rameau and 
Rousseau respectively. It was brought to head on the occasion of an Italian opera company visit to 
Paris. The debate pitted the merits of ‘old fashioned French opera’ against Italian ‘opera comique’. 
31 Donald Grout and Claude Paliska, A History of Western Music, Sixth Edition, (New York: Norton & 
Company, 2001), 442. Grout and Paliska quote Rousseau form his “Lettre sur la musique francaise” 
(1753), trans. in SRev, p908; 5: 174.  
32 Jean Jacques Rousseau, B. Gagnebin, ed., Oevres Complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1959–1995).  
33 Julia Simon, “Rousseau,” in Theodore Graycik and Andrew Kania, eds., The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy and Music (London: Routledge, 2011), 327. 
34 Katherine Hirt, When Machines Play Chopin: Musical Spirit and Automation in the Nineteenth Century, 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 2. 
35 Katia Hay, “August Wilhelm von Schlegel”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 
Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/schlegel-aw/. 
Hay says: “Schlegel’s aim is not to conceptualize a particular canon of beauty, but much more, as a 
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Forkel’s insistence that music must imitate emotions but by elevating nature first so that 
emotions are part of nature.36 Hirt pinpoints the end of the eighteenth century as the time 
when the separation of mind from body causes problems in developing an understanding 
of music. However we need to note that music requires a reconciliation between aesthetic 
understanding of its links to emotion and passion and the mechanistic techniques of 
instruments upon which to make sound. 
At this time, Herder favors the importance of melody over harmony as a 
phenomenological effect where his interest is in how each tone, sometimes seen as a 
timbre, affects the listener. Herder tries to fixate upon what true music is in declaring 
that: 
a mere decomposition of the tones, that is, harmony, tires … because it is 
always the same thing … [but] true music, however, that is melody, the 
buoyant line of the whole course of tones, becomes precisely through its 
repetition more enjoyable; ... to the point of rapture.37 
The Enlightenment disputation as to whether harmony as reason (Rameau) or 
melody as experience (Rousseau) is the more important for carrying the sense of musical 
argument, is changed by Herder. In a re-interpretation of Kantian ‘tones’ that border on 
formal definition via objective physics, Herder then makes a phenomenalist acclamation: 
“[music] exceeds in charm all dreamed of beautiful forms.”38 Here Herder holds onto the 
notion of the beautiful, through Kant’s currency of charm, experienced aesthetically in 
melody made up of tones, as the most important aspect of appreciating music. It is 
‘rapture’-ous, notwithstanding his views being influenced by the Romantic Zeitgeist of 
his time. He embellishes beauty with the property of charm as if charm is the effect we 
experience and beauty could be the essence we subsequently intuit. Herder positions the 
debate as one of understanding music and its creativity (albeit seen as the product of 
genius) through aesthetic properties such as beauty and charm with an incomplete 
rapturous comprehension. Admitting to having an incomplete understanding could be 
seen as temporary inexplicability. But it is more likely to be ineffability of our subject 
matter, and is dealt with next. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
means of elevating oneself above all partial views, to find an approach that may enable the 
comprehension and enjoyment of the different ways in which art is manifested throughout history.” 
36 Katherine Hirt, When Machines Play Chopin: Musical Spirit and Automation in the Nineteenth Century, 
8. 
37 Johann Gottfried Herder Kalligone: On the Beautiful in Art, 42. 
38 Johann Gottfried Herder Kalligone: On the Beautiful in Art, 43. 
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4.3  Dealing with the Ineffable 
For Kant and Parret, an understanding of creativity in art music composition rests 
upon a search for consistency or universality. Their knowledge seeks a form of authority, 
the grounds for which make it reliant upon being self-evident and truth-bounded. If 
knowledge is made this way and is causal, it forces into the intellectual open the presence 
of what is seen to be ineffable39 and thence what to do with it. Herder’s point of view 
prepares the way for Henri Bergson and Vladimir Jankélévitch as they call upon words 
such as ineffability and charm in trying to understand music. These words indicate the 
need to come to terms with the paradox of expressing the inexpressible as we transform 
musical experience into communicable concepts.40 The ineffable, often confused with 
aberration, is now to be regarded as musically significant. I propose that the ineffable 
remainder is a prime source of what is creative in music41 simply because, in its 
ineffability, it is inexhaustibly re-interpretable.42 
Ted Cohen, addresses the ineffable nature of creativity with respect to Kant’s 
views. For Kant, beautiful objects (and maybe other entities) are the product of a genius’ 
capacity for generating aesthetic ideas. Cohen identifies with Kant in saying that how we 
judge something beautiful (as free beauty) is inexplicable. But to be inexplicable is not 
                                                          
39 The ineffable remainder is mentioned in many diverse ways. In Michael Spitzer, Music as Philosophy: 
Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style, 272, Spitzer concurs with and quotes Theodor Adorno saying that: 
“Objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder.” In Max Paddison, Adorno, 
Modernism and Mass Culture: Essays on Critical Theory and Music, 75, Paddison writes: “Arising out 
of the tension between mimesis and rationality, between expression and construction—the dialectic of 
Subject and Object within the work—is the ‘remainder’ (das Mehr), the riddle of the [musical] work.” 
In Pierre Boulez, Orientations: Collected Writings, 83, André Breton is cited by Pierre Boulez as 
referring to the work of art resisting interpretation by having an “indestructible kernel of darkness.” In 
Beverly Lanzetta, The Other Side of Nothingness: Towards a Theology of Radical Openness (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2001), 118, Lanzetta employs this phrase theologically in a search 
for open solutions. In Herbert Simon, “Explaining the Ineffable: AI on the Topics of Intuition, Insight 
and Inspiration,” Proc.14th Int. Joint Conf. On Artificial Intelligence 1 (1995): 939–948, Simon debates 
the role and place of a ‘remainder’ in science. 
40 The question as to whether music is itself conceptual or non-conceptual is put aside (almost bracketed) in 
the exploration of what, by way of conceptual communication, takes place as we share about creativity 
in music. 
41 David Walters, “Artistic Orientations, Aesthetic Concepts, and the Limits of Explanation: An Interview 
with Pierre Boulez,” In Contemporary Music, eds. Max Paddison and Irène Deliège (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2010), 311. Walters recorded Boulez as saying: “Yes. It is very difficult to explain music; if 
you explore really deeply into the composition, you have to describe it in terms of technique—there is 
no other way. … The how [beyond knowing practically how the work is constructed] you cannot 
discover; you can give some intuitive reasons, but you cannot give any explanation any more.” 
42 Lois Fitch and John Hailes, “Failed Time, Successful Time, Shadowtime: An Interview with Brian 
Ferneyhough,” in Contemporary Music, eds. Max Paddison and Irène Deliège (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 
2010), 328. Ferneyhough said: “No concrete work, in whatever medium, can ever aspire to fulfilling the 
totality of demands that philosophical abstractification imposes simply because it is part of its definition 
as art work that it is particular, its character carved out of the numinous mass of the possible. It would 
be a very deluded composer who, persuaded by agenda-laden philosophical rhetoric, set out to compose 
according to such precepts. Alas poor Yorick; dead on arrival!” 
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necessarily to be ineffable, for perhaps later in time that inexplicability may be overcome 
with further knowledge. Cohen then reaches for metaphor as one way to overcome the 
inexplicability and thereby links his thoughts to those of Michael Spitzer in Metaphor 
and Musical Thought.43 Experiencing the music itself is substituted with relying upon 
metaphor as a figure of speech.  
Cohen doubts whether induction can be claimed to work under ineffable or 
paradoxical circumstances. For if any part of a concept is ineffable, induction could not 
be invoked to support understanding of that part. Kant claims aesthetic ideas are 
uncontainable in concepts and cannot be used to judge the presence of beauty anyway. In 
aesthetic terms, I am in agreement with Cohen concerning induction, for when I say this 
particular flower is beautiful, it is not meant to infer that all of this type of flower or even 
flowers in general are beautiful.44 Neither is such a claim inductively refutable by finding 
a flower which is not regarded as beautiful. Cohen ends his essay with the sentiments of 
Pamela Burnard. He broadens Kant’s concept of genius to claim inductively that there 
must be a little of this (genius) in all of us, thereby making us all creative in some way. 
In trying to seek any measure of explanation of facts, not just description in the 
context of aesthetic judgment, we cannot then do experiments on watching composers 
compose and thereby be creative. It would change the behavior that we examine and turn 
them into animals in an observational zoo, along with all the artificiality that zoos 
promote. An understanding of what we experience (as phenomena) in music is invariably 
descriptive, from which value judgments are formed as to why we might value that 
experience. A focus on the phenomenal rather than the factual relies more on 
indeterminate description than determinate explanation of fact (truth). The ineffable is 
thereby not eliminated but readily embraced under these circumstances. 
With that focus, Henri Bergson and Vladimir Jankélévitch explore the significance 
of the ineffable and its connection to knowledge about music. Ineffability for Bergson 
comes from the possible infinitude of meanings that absolute knowledge affords, not 
ignorance. Ineffability is then contextualized as not that we can’t know but that there is 
too much to know. Bergson goes on to differentiate relative from absolute knowledge in 
that the former is created from analysis and the latter from intuition. Relative knowledge 
does not allow for any knowledge becoming by ex nihilo, i.e., it is causal in some way. In 
                                                          
43 Spitzer, Michael. Metaphor and Musical Thought, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004. 
44 Ted Cohen, “The Inexplicable,” in Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston, The Creation of Art  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 139, and Note 2, 146. 
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the same way, Jankélévitch says: “Music does not allow the discursive, reciprocal 
communication of meaning [relative knowledge] but rather an immediate and ineffable 
communication; [absolute knowledge] …”45 Bergson then goes on to use intuition to talk 
of creation by life forces as his concept of creative evolution,46 a view that is anti-
Darwinian47 and supports creativity being seen as ex nihilo. In addition, Jankélévitch 
actually emphasizes creativity being ex nihilo, so that pedagogy need play no role in 
being creative, when he says:  
To create, one must create: … not just that creation always begins with itself 
but also, and as a consequence, that there is no recipe for learning to create. 
The creator sets down essence conjointly with existence, possibility at the 
same time as reality.48  
Jankélévitch then expands upon what it means to create ex nihilo by saying essence and 
existence co-habit one another. His extension into this claim is that to ‘be’ is to live with 
possibilities all around us when adding: “… the states of mind and feelings, are as 
innumerable in the process of creation as are the musics to which they could give rise.”49 
It is interesting to note Jankélévitch resorts to referring to creativity as a process at this 
point. Judy Lochhead sums up Jankélévitch’s viewpoint as: 
… the reality of life is creative—not mechanistic—and these forces of 
creativity are actively producing continuous novelty (the new). It is only 
through creative activity that living beings can realize the absolute 
knowledge of intuition.50 
Bergson and Jankélévitch infer that creativity produces the new coming via 
intuition, not analysis, and most importantly, it can have the character of being absolute 
knowledge. This stance actually admits to the possibility of knowledge being arrived at 
ex nihilo. In the musical context, Jankélévitch then says:  
                                                          
45 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans. Carolyn Abbate, (Princeton University Press, 
2003), 8. See also page 61 where he says: “Music is then neither a ‘language,’ nor an instrumental 
means to convey concepts, nor a utilitarian mode of expression … is not purely and simply expressive 
… independent of all ideation: music is not emotionally ‘moving’ except in that it is literally ‘moving’.” 
46 Keith Pearson, John Mullarkey, Melissa McMahon, eds. Henri Bergson: Key Writings, (London: 
Continuum, 2002). 
47 The major tenet of Bergson (he received a Nobel Prize for it) was that Darwinism does not have any 
explanation as to how, mechanically speaking, fit new species are generated. Bergson uses life forces 
(élan vitale), the presence of which do not have any explanation attached as to how they operate, 
essentially opening the door to facing up to dealing with the ineffable. 
48 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 29. 
49 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 63. 
50 See Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, (New York: Henry Holt, 1913), Chapter 
3, and Judy Lochhead, “Can We Say What We Hear? Jankélévitch and the Bergsonian Ineffable,” in 
Journal of The American Musicological Society, 65 (2005): 232. 
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Music ignores such concerns [as coherence and reduction that should lead 
to relative knowledge via analytics] since it does not have ideas to line up 
logically with one another. Harmony itself is less the rational synthesis of 
opposites than the irrational symbiosis of the heterogeneous.51 
Jankélévitch’s ‘symbiosis of the heterogeneous’ directly downplays thoughts of seeing 
(reaching for) structure and pre-determined form in music. Instead, it seems he looks for 
synergy between the constituents a composer might choose to work with, a kind of 
abandonment of the strictures of structural thought. As part of an exploration of feelings, 
Jankélévitch also invokes the concept of charme (French spelling) with a recognition 
that: 
Technical analysis is a means of refusing to abandon oneself spontaneously 
to grace which is the request the musical Charm [Jankélévitch’s spelling at 
this point!] is making.52 
Charm is linked to beauty, Kant’s criterion for aesthetic content, by Jankélévitch when he 
says: “is charme not the very operation of beauty [?]… charme makes beauty not only 
actual but efficacious.”53 [original italics] This rhetorical question is reinforced by 
Carolyn Abbate saying in her ‘Jankélévitch’s Singularity’ Introduction:  
… charme … is an aesthetic phenomenon to which we react not passively 
but actively, by being changed, changing ourselves.54 
Jankélévitch thus ties together the ineffable, inspiration and charme in saying: 
… the musical mystery is not what cannot be spoken of, the untellable, but 
the ineffable. … [it] cannot be explained because there are infinite and 
interminable things to be said of it: … the ineffable, thanks to its properties 
of fecundity and inspiration, acts like a form of enchantment: …55 
from which the basis of understanding has now been changed to one of experience, not 
fact. 
James Hepokoski responds to Jankélévitch’s insistence on music being ineffable 
and his subsequent call for silence56 rather than critique. Performing music is to affect us 
                                                          
51 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 19. 
52 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 102. 
53 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Le Je Ne Sais Quoi et Le Presque Rien, (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 113. 
54 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, xviii. 
55 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 72. 
56 Edward Pearsall, “Anti-Teleological Art: Articulating Meaning through Silence,” in Approaches to 
Meaning in Music, Byron Almen and Edward Pearsall eds., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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through charme to convey absolute knowledge as a direct cause-and-effect argument. 
Hepokoski accedes to modernism failing to recognize the significance of 
incommensurability. Modernism has no ability to circumscribe charm or represent the 
immediate, or any, human experience. He then regards Jankélévitch’s call for silence as 
excessive. He answers the question “… [does] one ever approach the captivating force of 
music in an unmediated way [?]” negatively, and therefore says, in agreement with Carl 
Dahlhaus: 
… the meaning accumulated by music in its secondary, literary mode of 
existence, does not leave untouched its primary mode, the realm of 
composition.57 
Discussion on trying to decide where and how creativity manifests in music is now 
seen as giving some importance to meaning derived from linguistic description coupled 
with experiencing live music. Such a stance necessarily involves embracing (not 
discarding) any ineffability that might be heard when listening to music and read into the 
words and phrases used to describe it. That ineffability is fecundity not ignorance. Whilst 
we can take in the words off the page at leisure, live music relies upon temporality for its 
reality and is the subject of the next section. 
 
4.4 Lived Time 
Temporal aspects of how we experience music are central to our perception of it 
and form part of a phenomenal approach to its meaning and understanding. With respect 
to how time works, Bergson differentiates lived time away from time as measured. 
Bergson’s lived time is the immediacy of experience. He calls this durée such that music 
unfolds in durée, not necessarily in measured time. Jankélévitch adds that: “Music, like 
movement, or duration, is a continuous miracle that with every step accomplishes the 
impossible.”58 The significance of durée in our quest to understand creativity in art music 
composition is then summed up by Michael Gallop in saying: 
The instant of creativity—the coming of the creator’s pure event—cannot be 
witnessed in the ordinary flow of time; put otherwise, the pure creativity of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
2006), 41–61. Pearsall proposes that silence is not absolute silence. For him, silence is actually an anti-
teleological event that suspends time, similar to Bergson’s durée. 
57 James Hepokoski, “Ineffable Immersion: Contextualizing The Call for Silence,” 230, in Journal of The 
American Musicological Society, 65(2005): 215–256. Found in Carl Dahlhaus, Esthetics of Music, 
trans. William Austin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 62. 
58 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 18. 
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the instant never appears as a product of factual experience, in a simple 
empirical present.59 [original italics] 
Bergson’s durée, lived time as opposed to analytic time, where time, especially musical 
time, is not linear, is described thus: 
Pure duration (durée) is the form which the succession of our conscious 
states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating 
its present state from its former states. … [it] forms both the past and the 
present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of 
a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. … even if these notes succeed 
one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may 
be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one 
another just because they are so closely connected? … think of it as a 
mutual penetration …60 
This passage talks about musical notes blending together in time, a theme to be continued 
by Merleau-Ponty when he talks about mind and body blending, and then body-subjects 
infecting or blending their effects with body-subjects. This attitude continually favors 
understanding through the continuous (co-penetration to blur separate entities) over the 
discrete (the exclusivity required by difference) and is Gestalt-like. Jankélévitch extends 
this continuous theme into a musical context when saying: 
… music creates a unique state of mind, … ambivalent and always 
indefinable. Music is … inexpressive … in that it implies innumerable 
possibilities of interpretation, because it allows us to choose between them. 
These possibilities co-penetrate one another instead of precluding [as with] 
impenetrable bodies [that] exclude one another …61 
Jankélévitch is anticipating Merleau-Ponty’s formation of the body-subject that invades 
and penetrates. Bergson, in agreeing with Hanslick, says it is the sound itself that affects 
or penetrates or infects us, but: 
                                                          
59 Michael Gallope, “Jankélévitch’s Fidelity to Inconsistency,” in Journal of The American Musicological 
Society, 65(2005): 237. 
60 Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, trans. F. Pogson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1910), 100–
101.” In Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, found in Henri Bergson: Key Writings, Keith Pearson and 
John Mullarkey, eds. (London: Continuum, 2002), 60, Bergson also perceives of musical time as a 
qualitative experience of succession rather than a quantitative knowledge measurement of time, by 
saying: “if we interrupt the rhythm by dwelling longer than is right on one note of the tune, it is not its 
exaggerated length, as length, which will warn us of our mistake, but the qualitative change thereby 
caused in the whole of the musical phrase” Quoted from Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, trans. F. 
Pogson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1910), 101. 
61 Vladimir Jankélévitch Music and the Ineffable, 74. 
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If musical sounds affect us more powerfully than the sounds of nature, the 
reason is that nature confines itself to expressing feelings, whereas music 
suggests them [feelings] to us.62  
Then later, he amplifies this by saying: 
It follows from this analysis that the feeling of the beautiful is no specific 
feeling, but that every feeling experienced by us will assume an aesthetic 
character, provided that it has been suggested, and not caused.63 
from which, according to Bergson, music only suggests feelings of beauty, not expresses 
them, because music is experienced aesthetically. To express feelings of beauty requires 
some explanatory connection between feelings and expression but, aesthetically 
speaking, we can do no more than describe with imprecision. 
In contemplating if it is more appropriate to use lived time than measured time in 
this musical context, Carolyn Abbate first chooses live performance as the real way to 
experience music.64 She then discusses how musical performance and language 
description are both used to understand creativity in the musical context. Her two states, 
drastic (the act and the doing) and gnostic (the reflective and knowledge-building) speak 
of Jankélévitch insisting that: 
… real music is music that exists in time, the material acoustic phenomenon. … 
Yet, as he [Jankélévitch] wrote, ‘composing music, playing it, and singing it; or 
even hearing it in recreating it—are these not three modes of doing, three attitudes 
that are drastic, not gnostic, not of the hermeneutic order of knowledge?’65 
Both Abbate and Jankélévitch pinpoint the way the drastic in performance can give rise 
to a knowledge distant from that expressed in the analytic and hermeneutic. Yet the 
composer sits at the front end of all of this and has to ask for her (the creative 
composer’s) gnostic (intellectual and semiotic) offering to be energized into some form 
of drastic (physical) reality and then assessed as creative. In this scenario, there is a 
definitional divide created between the demands of the drastic and the gnostic, one which 
suggests a reliance upon Cartesian duality. In addition, discussion of the drastic and 
gnostic raises yet again the issue whether there is any difference in approaching an 
                                                          
62 Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, 15. 
63 Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill, 17. 
64 Carolyn Abbate, “Music—Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004): 505–536. 
65 Carolyn Abbate, “Music—Drastic or Gnostic?” 505, quoting from Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the 
Ineffable, 77. 
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understanding of musical creativity from a poietic or aesthetic point of view. We will see 
that Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject can overcome such a need to differentiate. 
In expressing views about music as it includes thoughts about creativity, a move to 
understanding it has to face up to inescapable conditioning. We are trying to express the 
inexpressible, deal with the ineffable (as too much choice, not ignorance), the ambivalent 
and the undefinable, and must put aside a search for ‘discovering the universal’ as 
pertains for rational and logical thought. Instead, we need to treat musical sound as 
something that penetrates our very existence to the extent that it blurs the discrete 
ontological boundaries (including temporal ones) that normally help us chart our 
epistemic way. We are thus faced with accepting that music works in lived time, 
expanding and contracting to allow our sense of immediacy to last as long as our 
consciousness chooses. To do so allows existence and essence to cohabit: for the real to 
exist alongside the possible. This line of thought feeds directly into relying on immediate 
perception as the ‘front end’ of coming to understand creativity in the musical context. 
Experience as evidence is seen to take place in lived time, not measured time, and with 
ineffability endemic to understanding. Forms of knowledge abstraction, disinterestedness 
or detachment as the product of reflection are subsumed into what it means to be a 
creative musical human being. We turn now to the work of Merleau-Ponty to see if it can 
provide more insight into the presence of creativity in art music composition when 
dispensing with Cartesian duality of mind and body. 
 
4.5  Merleau-Ponty and the Creative ‘Body-Subject’ 
There is a holistic nature to our encounter with music; it can take us over, it can 
change our moods and emotions, it ‘speaks’ in ways normal language has no way of 
saying. Thinking of music as holistic is in some ways Gestalt-like if it also recognizes 
that we are unable to show how the parts make up the whole in a reasoned explanation. 
Description in its inherent incompleteness is often more appropriate. To think of musical 
creativity as an experience that we perceive (irrespective of the role played as composer, 
performer, listener or critic), is to say there is an experience within embodiment taking 
place. 
As the previous chapters have been trying to show, many precepts adhered to by 
both scientific and philosophical disciplines seem unhelpful or irrelevant when 
contemplating what we think is creative in music. Concepts, categories and structures can 
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impede in the forth-telling of what is experienced, and what is then conceived creatively 
in music. They actually force into exclusivity the sensory from the cognitive as if some 
Cartesian dualism prevails. 
Making a deliberate division between body and soul (Cartesianism) renders the 
soul (mind, intellect, and psyche) axiomatically separate from the body (soma) that has 
been stripped of any power to be a source of knowledge. Merleau-Ponty’s views about 
phenomenology address problems he sees that arise from such exclusivity. Thoughts on 
creativity are woven into his views, although he does not concern himself with the 
concept openly. His focus on Cartesian dualism makes epistemological headway in 
understanding creativity, but only as an implicit adjunct to that focus. Brentano, 
Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre could also be called upon to shed light on coming to 
terms with ‘being’ in the musical world as a practical issue concerning creativity, as well 
as experiencing it, but this is put aside for the moment. 
There are a number of views on what Merleau-Ponty intended in his writing which 
are embraced in my choice of description of how he addresses creativity issues. The 
views that follow on what Merleau-Ponty puts forward come mainly from The Structure 
of Behavior66 and The Phenomenology of Perception,67 views that are regarded as 
relevant to musical creativity and composition. 
Phenomenology’s two reductions are normally invoked as a two-step method that 
is hoped will intuit essences. Phenomenal reflection, by bracketing out the world, reduces 
the quest for understanding to one of relying only upon the given-ness of what we 
perceive: how things appear to us or show themselves. Eidetic reduction then takes us 
from facts and experiences to essences by a free play of our imagination in intuition. We 
must intuit essences.68 This intuition cannot be exhaustive; it will only get us so far in 
understanding. Whereas Husserlian intuition takes the form of idealism that tries to 
complete, Merleau-Ponty insists incompleteness69 prevails and is similar to agreeing with 
                                                          
66 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Fischer, (London: Metheun, 1965). 
67 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1962). 
 
68 A helpful way of checking the efficacy of intuiting essences is to recognize that if it is inconceivable that 
A is not a feature of B (an awkward double negative), then A is an essence of B. 
69 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 6, says: “We must recognize the 
indeterminate as a positive phenomenon. It is in this atmosphere that quality arises. Its meaning is an 
equivocal meaning; we are concerned with an expressive value rather than with logical signification. 
The determinate quality by which empiricism tried to define sensation is an object, not an element, of 
consciousness, indeed it is the very lately developed object of scientific consciousness. For these two 
reasons, it conceals rather than reveals subjectivity.” See also the description by Taylor Carmen and 
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Bergson and Jankélévitch, where incompleteness shows itself as the ineffable. It is 
important to see the ineffable not as a problem but as a potential source of possibilities. 
With regard to the first step, Merleau-Ponty posits that pre-reflectivity—full of 
affects of the body, pre-subjective and with possibilities—must precede reflectivity in 
any attempt to reconcile the subjective (intellectual and internal) with the objective 
(distinct and external). As already mentioned, Merleau-Ponty calls it magical to perceive 
capabilities, this time of the pre-reflective body. This impersonal body-subject exists in 
the world but does nothing but ‘be’ prior to thought and reflection taking place. So the 
body (not as a physical body in the Cartesian sense) becomes a platform from which a 
personalized “I can” is launched,70 thence to think (reflect), to experience, to play, to 
move. Any discussion of creativity is deemed as human in origin. The pre-reflective body 
grounds creativity in the body’s ambiguity of what “I can” may give rise to. Using the 
word creative in this context is to imply production to be ex nihilo because the pre-
reflective state comes before anything else is. For the musical context, musical pre-
reflectivity shows the body and the world in a relationship, depending on one another for 
existence (interpenetration, invasion, infection) or as one of interrogation and resonance 
with the other. That dependence is worked out as if music becomes the dialectic medium 
for the interaction, one that is riddled with indeterminacy, unlike a Derridian exchange 
through the significance of defined language constructs. 
The need of the pre-reflective state is to ground a one-ness in and with others, but 
not at a purely intellectual or subjective level, where empathy and understanding come 
from explanation via similar brain states and the like. The grounding is at a body-
subjective level in a world full of possibilities. This sets up a dialogue, between this 
body-subject and the world in which it finds itself and impinges with, such that 
localization of effect is fuzzy or ambiguous. It is the relationship between body-subject 
and world that gives credence or essence or validity to both. It does not come from some 
independent existence of either as for science, where each is external to the other. The 
possibilities now consist of a spreading of self, the I, into other entities to affect them. 
They recognize spreading effects invading or infecting them, rather than thinking of the I 
as a distinct entity that affects and influences other Is. For this to be possible, the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Mark Hansen, The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 10, where they summarize: “phenomenological inquiry instead finds embodied agents immersed 
in worldly situations in virtue of perceptual and affective attitudes whose contents are themselves often 
conceptually indeterminate.” 
70 As to whether there is any recursive and cyclic content to pre-reflection, this is not explored in this 
thesis. 
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concepts of communication and relationship could be considered a priori or essences 
underlying such facility of the body-subject. Merleau-Ponty leaves unresolved how it 
might be possible, if at all, to reflect upon the pre-reflective state and other such 
conundrums but they will not be central to the discussion that follows. 
Humans now have an existence, an ontological being, in which no division between 
bodily and non-bodily notions can be entertained. We are by virtue of being body-
subjects not body-objects, and are that particular combination that is called human. The 
concept of Cartesian mind-body dualism is nullified. Merleau-Ponty then pushes the 
integrated body-subject concept forward to the point that bodies can take on all former 
subjective properties such as consciousness, intentionality and knowledge repository. 
This extension personalizes creativity, should it be regarded as present. He uses the word 
praktognosia 71 in which motility (physicality) becomes intentional (intellectual), the 
motility being something habitual (reflexive and inherent).72 Habituation has the 
properties of sedimentation such that it remains when all else has drifted away. 
This conflating to indivisibility of mind and body has application in looking at both 
the intent and the ontological substance of a composer and her output. Light is cast upon 
idiomatic characteristics of a composer that become some form of motivic sedimentation, 
i.e., the body now takes a part in compositional creativity. The perception of a 
composer’s creativity is seen in every aspect of her being, such that embodiment 
describes how the composer’s intellectual motivation is inextricably bound to him or her 
as a physical and motivic (skill-capable) entity. 
Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to overcome Cartesian duality addresses its two states as 
forms of Gestalt73 (forming a global whole with self-organizing tendencies). 
Conceptually, Gestalt is important for creativity because it talks of the perceived whole, 
not a reductive attitude that looks to defining all the parts first for it to make sense 
(bottom-up intellectualization). He then proposes a third state to complete a dialectic. He 
borrows the Hegelian term ‘work’74 to represent the connection between biological 
perception (stimulus) and vital (intellectual) cognition, seen also as a gap between nature 
and consciousness, if re-formulated as a Cartesian duality. Work can thus be where 
                                                          
71 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 161. 
72 Russell Keat, “Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenology of the Body,” in Understanding Phenomenology, 
Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat, eds., (Basil Blackwell, 1991).  
73 Bernard Flynn, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), 
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culture and the like now enter in, as an integrating part of the former separate body and 
mind. 
Merleau-Ponty says that the relationship of these three Gestalt entities (sometimes 
called physical, vital and human form) is not for each to be external and causal of the 
others, but fully integrated.75 When we dis-integrate them, then “This is the truth of 
dualism.” 76 i.e., this dualism becomes true for us. So physical and vital are embodied in 
each other (inseparable) to the point that we can no longer talk of an intellectual 
consciousness, but only of a perceptual consciousness. The change is that nature (seen as 
the externality or embodiment of concept77) is integrated into our person-ship to the point 
that all we are must involve perception through a body-subject (body-mind, body-vital, 
body-spirit, body-intellect) combinatorial viewpoint. It now becomes possible to see 
creativity as present in both action and reception (poiesis and aesthesis) concomitantly 
because they have been made indistinguishable. The body-subject is both active and 
sensorial at the same time. 
Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology directly addresses the question as to 
how creativity can be both an attribute of an active body-subject, as a creative person 
whilst perceived apparently from a passive position. Perceiving the creative behavior of a 
person is to find oneself infected or invaded by such behavior. On this basis, creative 
product is perceived by recognizing sedimentation and habitus in the creative person 
from whom it flowed. This provides a basis for understanding such words as idiom, 
authentication and style as different types of product. Bridging between the activity of a 
creative body-subject and a more passive listener/critic body-subject is a performer (also 
as a body-subject) who sees infection and invasion from both flow directions. She is 
affected by the musical score (or like semiotic) and also affects the listener through the 
sound invasion thereby induced. The performer and listener are thereby creative in their 
roles too. Affection is now concomitant with infection. 
For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenal reduction and analytic reflection are not meant to 
reduce the experience of the world exclusively into thoughts alone (intellectualism), nor 
to analytically objectify it as external to ourselves. There is an element of wonder and 
surprise built-in to exercising this perception: 
                                                          
75 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 203: Merleau-Ponty’s phrase is: “body and soul are 
no longer distinguished.” 
76 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 209. 
77 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 210. 
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Reduction does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of 
consciousness as the world’s basis: it steps back to watch the forms of 
transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional 
threads which attach us to the world, and thus brings them to our notice. 
It alone is consciousness of the world, because it reveals the world as 
strange and paradoxical.78 
Merleau-Ponty’s statements here are important in the way they capture and draw together 
observations that have already been made about creativity. To talk of ‘forms of 
transcendence’ is an impossibility if the former form bears any relationship to the latter 
form. Some ex nihilo activity has to have taken place, otherwise there is no 
transcendence. To watch forms of transcendence is paradoxical and suggests a 
metamorphosis, if seen ontologically, but of what? To slacken the intentional threads is 
to weaken the need for the categorical imperative built into definition and explanation. 
Seeing the world as strange and paradoxical is precisely the effect that is often perceived 
as we latterly and eventually get used to music that at a first hearing or encounter we call 
creative in its disruptive and perhaps attractive strangeness. 
The degree to which we can view our own perception this way then becomes the 
enabling basis to using the concept of creativity in describing our own actions, and in the 
reception of what we and others do and say in music. Normative reasoning now has no 
place in this form of phenomenal reduction because this reduction is always open to 
being disturbed or disrupted—even to be seen as one of creativity’s main characteristics 
or essences. This is where the unexpected, the unusual, the surprise, the non-reasonable, 
come into play, that were mentioned in the opening chapter. The notion of disruption79 
could now be intuited as an essence of creativity, one that contains some understanding 
of ex nihilo perceptions as newness. 
Merleau-Ponty thinks perception is a behavior exercised by the body as a living 
body not just as consciousness.80 This living body, brought into being by the introduction 
of the third dialectic, work, does not ‘think’ (as for Descartes and Kant) but shows “I 
can” with the inclusion of action. An integrated synergy, of the former duality of body 
                                                          
78 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, xii. 
79 The word disruption is often used such that pejorative implications are assumed to automatically follow. 
Its use here is not in any way intended to support that connotation. Disruption is seen as an alteration to 
normalcy, a break with predicted flow, an abrupt change of intellectual direction, an unexpected 
outcome and so forth. As to whether what then follows is for the good or ill is open to ethical debate 
and persuasion. 
80 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 206. 
108 
 
and mind, now becomes body-subject as a single entity. The openness of the notion that 
we (inextricably) do-think speaks of possibilities rather than factual delineation and 
opens the door to viewing creativity in another new light. That new light no longer talks 
of creativity as some causally provoked manifestation, a position that underpins much of 
the categorization brought to light in the review of the approaches to creativity in the 
literature. The pre-reflective state, long before analysis or even experience comes into 
play, is one where, musically, we can form whatever thoughts we like about how music 
as part of us: as a composer who has something to say or as a performer/listener who tries 
to make sense of the composer’s instructions or notation. Ineluctably, our bodies are an 
integral part of the affair as an experienced life with musical influences. Composers’ 
inspiration, performers’ skills or techniques or listeners’ reception and reflection as 
critics; they all play their part. 
Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to overcome perceived philosophical rifts caused by 
mind-body dualism are also present in other researchers work such as Richard 
Schusterman, who is establishing a new discipline of Somaesthetics.81 Schusterman 
identifies with Baumgarten saying: 
Aesthetics (as the theory of the liberal arts, science of lower cognition, the 
art of beautiful thinking, and art of analogical thought) is the science of 
sensory cognition.82 
As such there is a sense in which Schusterman’s research is scientific. However, he 
thinks of each of us as “The Self as a Work of Art.”83 We are: “… a locus of sensory 
aesthetic appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-fashioning.”84 He claims: “Concerned 
not simply with the body’s external form or representation but also with its lived 
experience, somaesthetics works at improving awareness of our bodily states and 
feelings,…”85 Here Schusterman brings out an optimizing theme which persists 
throughout his proposal, and applied to a living body type, emphasizing lived embodied 
experience. When talking about body consciousness, lived experience, and embodiment, 
                                                          
81 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 57 (1999): 299–313. 
82 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, (1999) 57(3): 300. This is cited as para 1 in Baumgartner’s Aesthetica (1750) for which there 
is at present no English translation. 
83 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 313 endnote 35, which refers to 
Richard Schusterman, “The Self as a Work of Art,” The Nation, June 1997, 25–28. 
84 Richard Schusterman, Thinking Through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
85 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 302. 
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such writing aligns his aims to those of phenomenology, focusing on perception more 
than fact. However, Schusterman’s purpose in his proposal is: “to show its potential 
utility, not its radical novelty.”86 These preferences by Schusterman make the enterprise 
utilitarian and teleological and thereby less relevant to creativity, which is not 
constrained in this way. 
However, Schusterman proposes three fundamental dimensions to somaesthetics.87 
As analytics, in wanting a more Universalist approach, he allows mind/body duality to 
creep back in, whereas Merleau-Ponty does not. Pragmatics88 shows his desire to 
optimize all aspects of somaesthetic research as forms of somatic improvement. 
Schusterman’s background as a pragmatic philosopher draws him to the significance of 
both representational [external appearance] and experiential [inner feelings with 
embodiment] forms. Here he favors the experiential side, claiming: 
They [the standardized representational norms] ignore the body’s subject 
role as the living locus of beautiful, personal experience. But 
somaesthetics, in its experiential dimension, clearly refuses to exteriorize 
the body as an alienated thing distinct from the active spirit of human 
experience.89 
Practicalities, the third fundamental, brings one back to optimization with: “… practicing 
such care through intelligent disciplinary body work aimed at somatic self-improvement 
… ”.90 This is the closest Schusterman gets to the sedimentation and habitus themes of 
Merleau-Ponty. In his later book Body Consciousness, he reflects upon Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy in a chapter entitled: “The Silent, Limping Body of Philosophy: Somatic 
Attention Deficit in Merleau-Ponty.”91 He is critical of Merleau-Ponty’s reach for the 
magical (mystical, unexplainable) as a response to the perceived capabilities of the pre-
reflective body, arguing instead for effort to find explanations. Schusterman also 
criticizes Merleau-Ponty’s concept of sedimentation. By way of example, Schusterman is 
disquieted in there being no explanation for how we can correct bad habits and make 
                                                          
86 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 299. 
87 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 304. 
88 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 305. Philosophically, to be pragmatic 
is to make the practical consequences the test of truth and thereby links all of Schusterman’s work to a 
scientific orientation. 
89 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 306. 
90 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 307. 
91 Richard Schusterman, Body Consciousness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 49–76. 
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them good.92 However such a stance has to involve explanation (but no other means), has 
to be ethical in its judgmental orientation, and come down firmly on the side of nurture in 
the nature/nurture debate of human cognition origin. Schusterman’s aim is to form a 
pedagogy that encourages:  
… the search for basic common principles and differentiating criteria in 
terms of which these diverse practices [all sorts of somatic improvement 
guides] can be classified and related,93 
again showing a bias to the theme of optimization. Yet Foucault’s exploration of gay 
sadomasochism is included as a matter of course, seen by Schusterman as simply 
‘different strokes for different folks’, or a type of pluralism, and just an extreme 
somaesthetic experience.94 
In Schusterman’s Body Consciousness, Fred Maus regards Schusterman’s initiative 
as a fresh attempt to reconcile mind and body, in effect restoring the soma to 
significance.95 Maus actually explores what a somaesthetics of music might mean.96 He 
concentrates on classical music, favors the Anglo-American analytic tradition in looking 
at the significance of embodiment for performers and listeners, but does not consider the 
composer’s role, nor mention creativity.  
Nicolas Cook has also noted how much Cartesian duality causes embodiment 
problems when understanding creativity in music. Cook finds there to be an irresolvable 
tension between: 
the sociocultural and ecological approaches that understand creativity to be 
socially produced [and] “those physical and biological approaches which 
locate musical creativity in the musician’s brain. 
But he also writes: 
The appropriate response is not to attempt to resolve it ... [but to find] an 
approach [that] delimits the scope of creativity … [thereby] representing one 
out of an indefinite number of creativities. 97 
                                                          
92 Richard Schusterman, Body Consciousness, 62. 
93 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 307. 
94 Richard Schusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” 309. 
95 Richard Schusterman, Body Consciousness, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
96 Fred Maus, “Somaesthetics of Music,” Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 9 (2010): 10–
25.  
97 Nicholas Cook, “Beyond Creativity,” in Musical Imaginations: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on 
Creativity, Performance and Perception, David Hargreaves, Dorothy Miell and Raymond MacDonald 
eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 455. 
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Cook speaks directly to leaving irresolution in place. His thoughts also align with how 
creativity in music invokes the ineffable in the sense that Bergson and Jankélévitch 
claim, and lends support to Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to overcome the problems caused by 
mind-body dualism. 
Before moving on to decide upon what would constitute a suitable method that 
might lead to further understanding of our subject matter, we note that phenomenological 
observations concentrating on perception, ineffability, lived time and body-subject 
integration, will significantly condition the choices to be made. That decision-making 
step is discussed in the next chapter.
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5 Method 
 
5.1  Choosing the Context 
Exploring creativity in art music composition has taken us into how even forming 
a working definition of creativity itself—a reasonable step—has difficulties. When 
reviewing intellectual approaches already offered, the difficulties do not resolve. What 
we regard as significant evidence compromises the two well-established methods for 
building knowledge, those of hypothesis verification and eidetic reduction. Many of the 
concepts and meanings reviewed here assume disruption, identified by properties 
highlighted in this thesis, are present. But these advocates for their separate viewpoints 
regard it as aberrant or not of direct interest. This situation should not be surprising 
because of the way disruptive properties actually undermine the validity of the two major 
methods used for understanding. Evidence of creativity contemplated here in the musical 
context does not set aside the way it exhibits unexpectedness, the unusual, surprise and 
irrational content; the evidence appears overtly intellectually disruptive. For many 
researchers, further refinement of evidence is ipso facto expected to reduce its perceived 
disruptive content, not to use such a property as evidence per se. The context now 
becomes one of choosing an environment that can reveal art music composers’ intentions 
and motivations concerning creativity expressed in linguistic terms that can be 
communicated, notwithstanding its disruptive intellectual effects. 
In looking for a different way to understand creativity, if tackled from a 
phenomenalist point of view, Fred Maus refers us to Wittgenstein’s views of 
experiencing the musical and how it points to embodiment in a lived experience: 
Does music, as Wittgenstein asserts, ‘conceal’ the ‘infinite complexity’ that 
the observable forms of other arts ‘suggest,’ by placing it in the body, or the 
relation between body and music? … Wittgenstein links the ineffability of 
musical and poetic understanding to embodiment [by saying]: ‘If a theme, a 
phrase, [ein Thema, eine Wendung] suddenly means something to you, you 
don’t have to be able to explain it. Just this gesture [Geste] has been made 
accessible to you.’1  Someone who understands a musical phrase has learned 
a new gesture: not, obviously, a specific physical gesture that one could 
                                                          
1 Quoted by Fred Maus as found in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von 
Wright, eds., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 28. 
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demonstrate, but something like a bodily gesture. Again, Wittgenstein 
suggests that the experience of embodiment and bodily movement seems to 
hold an important key to musical experience.2 
Maus is pointing directly away from both hypothesis verification and eidetic reduction in 
his search for musical understanding and the creativity that therein lies. In his case, he 
points towards somaesthetics and the role of the body as a lived experience. Maus and 
Schusterman both indicate the possibility that knowledge may be contained in a lived 
experience somehow, as opposed to some form of analytic abstraction as explanation. 
Coupled to and intertwined with the experience of embodiment and bodily movement is a 
disruptive creativity in music that attaches significance to the aesthetically pleasing and 
attractive, appearing beautiful, new and perhaps sublime. The appeal is to concepts like 
taste and style that defy definition because of the disruptive nature of their presence. All 
these considerations distance creativity in this context away from any reliance upon 
normative, straightforward rational explanation and expertise. 
Cartesian separation of body and mind suggests a priority of mind over body. It 
emphasizes that whatever our senses experience, it is somehow controlled by the mind. If 
Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject phenomenalist approach is adopted, that priority no longer 
pertains or even exists. Without this prioritization, a method choice can then raise the 
significance of perception as evidence in its own right, and then look for how expressions 
of perception show an inseparableness between mind and body. Phrases like “I just feel 
it,” and “I can’t explain it but it’s there for certain,” take on significance as pointers to 
this integration. Method can also include the ways expressions of “I can” are made, 
whereby composers speak in a way that talks of possibilities they have realized in their 
music that are not just extensions of a factual base extended by logic or proof. The I (ego) 
of an intellect is inextricably coupled to the physicality of a body (soma) that ‘can’. 
Method can also elicit information on views about sedimentation into a habitus, which is 
often expressed as idiom in words like style, taste, flavor, charm and flair. This is all in 
addition to citing the usual musical structuralism of melody, harmony, form and genre. 
Method can thereby address the way it is possible to promulgate, not between separate 
entities, but as a form of infection or invasion, often as empathy with perceiving 
disruption. Merleau-Ponty also opens the door to showing communication sits at the 
                                                          
2  Fred Maus, “Somaesthetics of Music,” Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 9 (2010): 14. 
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heart of all this promulgation of effect, not simply by passing on information but by the 
substance of the music, the medium itself, entailing (embodying) the infectious message. 
As part of trying to make sense of what is encountered, forms of reflection towards 
reduction can be seen to involve percepts, then concepts and possibly precepts. In art 
music composition, unlike in science-based disciplines, even if the emphasis is on 
phenomenology, the act does not have to be truth-bounded or problem-solving. In other 
contexts, these constraints are implied by teleological imperatives. This three-stage act 
has already been given some semantic form in Figure 2.1. In perception, intentionality 
relates what is perceived to beliefs, desires and notions, reflecting into propositions or 
simply exercising ‘vision’. In conception, the mind forms (bright) ideas, imagines, 
cognites, understands propositions to then subjectively embody thoughts as concepts. In 
preception, external influences, such as rules and regulations, standards, ideals, 
meanings, aspirations and plans, play their part in adjusting the reasoning, 
communicability and acceptability of the concepts and ideas. All the while, imagination, 
intuition, innovation, insight, inspiration, invention and discovery can play a role. In this 
melting pot of mental activity, general creativity can be expressed as the degree to which 
exercising perception, forming concepts that speak of product, process and behavior that 
is exemplary, then makes us reach for describing what we see as creative. Since general 
creativity can embrace invention and discovery, the last preceptual stage sees general 
creativity mainly in how, within the confines of particular rules and regulations, the new 
or revelatory appears. 
This intellectualized landscape changes radically when coming from a musical 
viewpoint. Aesthetics, which can include poietic considerations, is invariably invoked 
where beauty, value, taste and style are but four, among many, criteria that are used to 
understand what is perceived, bringing more concepts into play. These extra criteria 
cause rational thought to be only a (perhaps small) part of new rules of thought, some of 
which are now self-generated and self-imposed. Beauty can arbitrate (dis)-pleasure but if 
constrained into rational thought, according to Kant, an excellence of beauty becomes 
sublime like a Platonic form. Value can arbitrate priorities of worth but not necessarily in 
a monetary sense, whereby taste gives us a proclivity for value as a kind of objectivity 
without reasons. Style can differentiate between musical expressions whereby form and 
genre can then be considered as types of style. 
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We surmise Kant did not esteem music that well3 where aesthetic musical judgment 
is seen by him as necessarily relating somehow to the rational. But in an aesthetic 
musical context, the rational no longer dominates the interpretation of subject matter or 
effect. Phenomenal effects such as the new, surprising, unexpected, illogical, non-
reasonable, unpredictable, unusual, the bright idea, intuitive play, Eureka moments, and 
the sensational, are invariably present. All of these effects are in addition to, not 
displacing, understanding structural integrity through melody, harmony, form, genre and 
the like in our musical context. Other intellectual domains may also experience these 
phenomena as part of justifying using the word creative, such as in other arts or in 
inventive architectural design. However, creativity in art music composition epitomizes 
the degree to which what we experience, normally through performance, is suffused with 
these effects. They are over and above the normal perceptual, conceptual and preceptual 
stages of deciding on using the word creative. The musically creative is effectively 
present in a disruptive newness of the world a composer creates in conjunction with (or 
through) performance. The exemplary in the musical context can involve the teleology of 
solving say a harmonic cadential problem. But it may, in contradistinction, and as 
proposed by Longinus as evidence of expertise, involve the breaking of all previous 
notions of form, genre and like conventions that determine rules. 
Art music composers are there in our world. We are drawn to their activity to 
understand them and their motivations in some way, if not as composers ourselves. We 
might then have confidence in knowing more about them, avoiding any remoteness 
dimming our perceptive faculty. That confidence relies on having a method of approach 
that comes close to their world, but interfering with it in a minimal way. Since music as 
art is a social (shared) affair with no context or meaning if separated from what the others 
(peers, associates, observers) make of it,4 we need to use, handle, package and 
communicate concepts in a sociably empathic way. 
To explore how creativity in art music composition comes to light, it is proposed to 
directly interact with the composers through some form of interview as part of an 
empathic method. Using an interview, rather than say a questionnaire, generates a 
                                                          
3 Emily Dolan, The Orchestral Revolution: Haydn and the Technologies of Timbre (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 83. Dolan claims: “Kant’s dismissal of music galvanized Herder’s 
return to musical aesthetics leading to the publication of Kalligone. As a whole, Kalligone alternates 
between describing Herders own aesthetic theory … and attacking Kant’s Critic of Judgment. Though 
Kalligone addresses the arts in general the project is centered on rescuing music from Kant’s low 
ranking.” 
4 I do not explore the solipsistic case in this thesis. 
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personal interaction that gives the composers the opportunity to communicate in their 
own way, other than through the music itself. Inviting and then spending time with them 
is a significant and crucial catalytic step to obtaining an interview script. The script then 
might contain some evidence upon which intuition can work to find essences of the 
composer’s approach to their creativity. Conversation is particularly revealing of the state 
of mind of the speakers. It reveals how they might choose language to communicate and 
as to how, being also co-respondents, the immediacy of the other provokes thoughts from 
them. Conversation of itself is a method whereby the participants can be encouraged to 
be all manner of advocates for points of view as role play. They could be protagonist, 
antagonist, observer, empathizer, respondent, initiator and so forth. Each of these roles 
moves the conversationalist into a different perceptive environment to then act out how it 
feels to be there. By way of example, questions that invite a composer to contemplate the 
effect their music has (when performed) upon others also invites them to compare such a 
perception with any intention they may have in composing the work. Their answers are 
asked for in the immediacy of conversation, not as polished written replies that are 
worked over and continually revised. The need for revision inexorably moves us more 
towards the formalism of definitions. With a hermeneutic and phenomenological 
investigation, interpretation and meaning need to remain personal to the giver rather than 
be consolidated (defined) into a profile type as in psychology. However, the method of 
capturing composers’ views in the immediacy of conversation also has its own 
limitations of perhaps working with first impressions and limiting reflection. A balance 
has to be struck between straightforward priorities in the mind, and opportunity to 
reconsider what one has committed to. In this research, the balance is hopefully restored 
by giving the script of the interview back to the composer for a brief time of reflection 
and modification if, in re-rereading, the composers wish to change their minds. 
 
5.2 Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis as a Method 
An interview generates an agreed script or record upon which both interviewer 
and interviewee can rely. Methods that look to a syntactical count of word or phrase 
occurrence in that evidence, such as QTA (Quantitative Text Analysis),5 are not used. 
Such a linguistic analysis of this evidence would yield a purely statistical result. ICA 
                                                          
5 Quantitative text analysis is available through software such as the IBM SPSS suite of programs for 
linguistic predictive analytics or WORDSTAT or CATPAC text analysis software. Also, Harvard 
University maintains and offers a ‘General Inquirer’ suite of programs for text content analysis. 
117 
 
(Inductive Content Analysis), the qualitative counterpart of QTA, embodies what is 
termed the verstehen, the interpretive understanding of information. ICA works on 
similar lines to its counterpart but allows such steps as open-coding where the researchers 
note and choose categories as the text is read and scanned many times, after which 
statistical data is produced. The open-coding aspect of ICA is considered appropriate to 
handle interview scripts, where no preconceived categories to group interviewee’s 
responses are devised. The categories emerge from a continual re-reading of transcripts. 
In ICA, the presentation as statistical data is not considered a major form of evidence. 
However, another similar technique, IPA (Interpretive Phenomenological 
Analysis)6 has been used to study creativity in psychological research and is hermeneutic 
in nature giving freedom of choice of expressive terms. It too does not rely upon 
statistical presentation of data. Its major use has been in understanding disorders of the 
human mind and body. Its title suggests an emphasis on being able to analyze the 
information (by interpretation) to obtain meaningful results, rather than simply describing 
phenomena. It is normally used to make sense of interview content where the main 
concern is cognitive understanding of meaning about experience that is hard to categorize 
or explain. It is not specifically designed to handle aesthetic matters. The precepts of IPA 
are used in psychology to handle qualitative data in a teleological way, e.g., where a 
person is ill or maladjusted and there is strong purpose for trying to solve the ‘ill-health 
problem’ as it is conceived. This makes it generically teleologic. A small but 
homogeneous set of persons are chosen where the sample size is conditioned 
significantly by the willingness of the potential candidates to take part. The best medium 
in which to do this then becomes a semi-structured interview where questions can be 
modified on-the-hoof if necessary to bring out more detail. It is essential that the 
interviewer establishes a rapport and empathy with the interviewee, giving ample time to 
do so. The technique examines the mental and emotional condition of the interviewee by 
                                                          
6 See URL http://med-fom-familymed-
research.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2012/03/IPA_Smith_Osborne21632.pdf. See also Jonathan Smith, 
“Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: using interpretative phenomenological analysis in 
health psychology,” Psychology and Health, 11 (1996): 261–71: this is the theoretical root of IPA. 
Samad Seyidov, Phenomenology of Creativity: History, Paradoxes, Personality, (USA: Author House, 
2013). See also Christopher Nelson, “The Creative Process: A Phenomenological and Psychometric 
Investigation of Artistic Creativity,” (published by Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences: 
Psychiatry, Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Australia, 2005–8),where Nelson 
says: “In the first phenomenological study focusing on the links between creativity and extreme mood, 
an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) approach was used to collect and analyze in-depth 
interview data from seven people diagnosed with BD in the UK.” See also Clarke Moustakas, 
Phenomenological Research Methods (London, Sage, 1994). 
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detecting instances of experience and the effect they have on the interviewee. In this 
context, how the composer sees herself would be important. The interviewer needs to 
speak as little as possible, avoiding prompting, using questions more as starters for the 
interviewee to focus on before choosing their own direction of thought. Questions are 
open, giving the possibility of follow-on to go deeper into the subject or how the 
interviewee is moved or affected. Value-free questions are preferred to reduce 
introducing bias. Recording of interviews can be made but there might be important 
reasons not to. The interviewee may not like this being done because it interferes with the 
naturalness of their response. The recording may also not capture the atmosphere of the 
moment, as it rigidly freezes out a wording that the interviewee is then committed to. 
Efforts to use IPA in the musical context have already been made but concentrate 
on performance, not composition. The focus is more on socio-cultural issues, not 
creativity. Patricia Holmes and Christopher Holmes review the appropriateness of 
phenomenology for music performance research.7 They advocate a sense of realism in 
this regard in that aesthetic communication is ephemeral. They consider it advantageous 
to have semi-structured interview techniques that use empathic interviewers (embedded 
narrative and most natural), small sample sizes (topics can be explored in depth), 
capturing an in-the-moment experience from elite performers as subjects (their ability to 
concentrate on the music itself rather than be distracted with limited technique) and to 
recognize the limitations of computerized techniques. These issues are further discussed 
in this thesis. Jane Davidson and James Good study the interaction between members of a 
string quartet as they work upon preparing a performance.8 They discuss a range of 
influences on the players and divide issues into two categories:  
broadly socio-cultural issues, [and] moment-by-moment social and musical co-
ordination, [in a search for] development of a comprehensive theoretical 
framework reflecting a more adequate conception of music ontology.9 
Davidson and Good use IPA to verify the appropriateness of labels and analysis criteria. 
They use some independent assessors, who also watch the footage of the string quartet in 
action. Anjelique Stevenson-Taylor and Warren Mansell tackle the role of art as 
                                                          
7 Patricia Holmes and Christopher Holmes, “The Performer’s Experience: A Case for Using Qualitative 
(Phenomenological) Methodologies in Music Performance Research,” Musicae Scientiae, 17 (2013): 
78. 
8 Jane Davidson and James Good, “Social and Musical Co-Ordination between Members of a String 
Quartet: An Exploratory Study,” Psychology of Music 30 (2002): 186–201.  
9 Jane Davidson and James Good, “Social and Musical Co-Ordination between Members of a String 
Quartet: An Exploratory Study,” Psychology of Music 30 (2002): 186. 
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therapy.10 They use IPA to extract the key themes from participant accounts. Their 
account continually refers to the “creative process” and is psychological in emphasis, 
also using PCT (Perceptual Control Theory) to build psychological models. Their 
research is problem orientated in that it is recovery from illness which is the measure of 
success, and makes their quest almost entirely teleologic. Bryony Walker and Mark 
Burgess look at the jazz scene where results of interviews are analyzed using IPA.11 
Comments on creativity are extracted in a general use of the word to show that the 
musicians appreciate jazz has a format open to being creative, saying something in a 
musical way with one’s own voice and personality. Angela Taylor12 studies mature age 
keyboard players’ lives, using IPA in conjunction with three feeder-type methods, 
‘Rivers of Musical Experience’(RME), conversation-based repertory grids and audio 
stimulus recall. These feeder-type methods are used in interviews to help interviewees to 
bring forth their ideas about their musical lives. IPA is also used to construct what is 
termed ‘emergent theory’. An example is of RME with IPA suggesting a finding that 
lifelong involvement with music leads to pain, disappointment, liberation, empowerment, 
pleasure and social enrichment, in some way mixed together.13 This finding is drawn 
directly (intuited) from the transcripts of quotes from the interviewees. Other intuited 
findings speak of using [musical instrument] practice to help structure one’s life and keep 
motivated.14 
Some aspects of IPA are appealing in forming a method to find out about creativity 
in the world of an art music composer. But some are not. As already mentioned, the 
teleological and problem-solving orientation of much IPA research constricts the way 
creativity might be viewed, in that aesthetic properties as evidence would then be 
suppressed. Creativity in art music composition invokes the aesthetic as much as any 
other phenomenon and need not be aimed at solving any problems. 
                                                          
10 Anjelique Stevenson-Taylor and Warren Mansell, “Exploring the Role of Art-making in Recovery, 
Change, and Self-understanding: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of Interviews with 
Everyday Creative People,” International Journal of Psychological Studies 4  (2012): 104–130. 
11 Bryony Walker and Mark Burgess, "Creating Voice, Creating Being: an Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis of Professional Jazz Musicians' Experiences," Existential Analysis, 22 (2011): 119. 
12 Angela Taylor, “Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis in a Mixed Methods Research Design 
to Explore Music in the Lives of Mature Age Amateur Keyboard Players,” Music Education Research, 
17 (2015): 437–452. 
13 Angela Taylor, “Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis in a Mixed Methods Research Design 
to Explore Music in the Lives of Mature Age Amateur Keyboard Players,” 445. 
14 Angela Taylor, “Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis in a Mixed Methods Research Design 
to Explore Music in the Lives of Mature Age Amateur Keyboard Players,” 446. 
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My method is similar in form to IPA and ICA but with no problem solving, 
teleology or ontological supremacy present. This gives interviewees the freedom not to 
have to give reasonable grounds for what they say and not to think of intentionality as 
having to find a real object to fixate upon. All of their thoughts, no matter how ill-
conceived or ill-communicated, are regarded as real. They are able to point to objects in 
the real world, objects in their head or whatever to justify their views if they so choose. 
The IPA method of interviewing is close to what is desired and automatically carries with 
it a caveat that it is only after the interviews are conducted that it becomes possible to 
intuit how such information can be interpreted and understood. Themes are looked for 
that sit behind the sentiments and perceptions of the interviewees and give rise to 
meanings and intentions. Any grouping of themes, meanings and intent is to be noted 
such that a distillation, connectivity or commonality to them is intuited. At some point a 
choice of essence may gain credibility if it can be grounded in quotes from the 
interviewees. 
The next chapters describe how my method is put into practice on encounters with 
the composers and what, if anything, can be concluded from using the method. 
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6 Evidence via Interview 
 
Evidence in art can often be called sparse data and thereby elusive to systematic 
detection. It is part of art’s attraction in appearing creative. There is no a priori reason 
that creating and understanding music has to take place via conceptual thought, but 
speaking conceptually does help communication. Communication becomes an important 
issue in music when debating whether or not music is a language. If music is considered 
a language, its role may reduce to being one of messenger only, not message, and purely 
utilitarian.1 As already discussed, if the interaction with, and the understanding of, music 
is not exhaustively characterized as a rational encounter, any concepts about such an 
encounter will leave an unexplained or even ineffable remainder of the kind Ted Cohen 
calls inexplicable.2 Ineffable remainders are evidence that can neither be ignored nor 
regarded as non-central to understanding creativity in music because they are part of 
what has been intentionally generated or liberated. We can mensurate to reduce the 
ineffable remainder to the smallest part achievable but, in the arts, we should be 
concerned that the remainder is of itself significant and potentially fecund. 
Just what constitutes evidence about creativity in art music composition is now 
brought into focus. What composers think and do will appear somehow in manifestations 
of their music and, of importance here, its linguistic entourage in discourse. Interacting 
with composers, in the form of one-on-one interviews, is meant to encourage them to 
describe their views and produce evidence in their own way. Apart from the interaction 
being interview-like, any formalism of a method is not mentioned to them. The 
interviewee has the freedom to say as little or much about any question posed, including 
ignoring the line of argument a question might suggest, or just declining to give an 
answer.3 
The sections in this chapter describe how this interview procedure is put together 
and carried out. Firstly, a review of interview-type research on what composers think and 
                                                          
1 Lawrence Kramer, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge, (Berkeley: California University Press, 
1995), 68. Kramer writes: “musical representation is one of the basic techniques by which culture enters 
music, and music enters culture, as communicative action.” 
2 Ted Cohen, “The Inexplicable,” 138–147, in Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston, The Creation of Art 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Cohen analyses Kant’s views on aesthetic judgment 
and makes a case that it is impossible to conceptualize on how creative art came about when depicted as 
a series of sequential steps. 
3 The method described here has been formally approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of 
Sydney, HREC Project No. 13154. 
122 
 
do is made. Then, for a set of relevant intellectual domains, questions are formed within 
each domain. Particular note is made of the interviewees’ demeanor and response when 
being invited to answer these questions. Then the technique used in the interviews is 
described. 
 
6.1 The Interview as a Communicative Medium about Composers 
As mentioned, a method with similarities to the IPA research technique is used 
for interacting with art music composers. The focus of interest is to treat the interview as 
a window into understanding how contemporary art music composers see creativity in 
their lives and works and thereby impute meaning and value via linguistic description of 
music. We may thus ‘come close’ to the composers, their works and their interaction with 
canon, peers and artistic endeavor. 
The question as to what the interview can and cannot bring to light can be answered 
in part by referral to previous interview-type encounters with composers. In this context, 
the conversation can range from having a specific focus to wandering over whatever 
interests and reflections composers have at the time. Information normally relates to 
comprehending the significance the composer’s corpus of works. But the concept of a 
musical work, when improvisation or computerized and electronic means are present, 
becomes ill-defined and ambiguous. Revelation can thus range widely even to the point 
of being serendipitous. 
The results of interviews with composers, where art music compositional creativity 
may have come under scrutiny, are reported numerous times in the literature. They show 
a diversity of interest and subject matter, only referring to creativity in an oblique way. In 
1976, Stan Bennett interviewed eight composers using a pre-formed list of questions.4 
His focus is the process of musical creation, in effect presupposing creativity to be 
present. The questions asked do not allude to creativity per se but to composition as a 
process and also to career progression, canon and market place, with answers collated 
into final objective statistics. Bernard Andrews approaches the interview more from an 
educational point of view in asking why composers compose.5 He uses the interview 
along with a wide variety of other techniques such as KAMI (knowledge accessing mode 
inventory) and personal journals. Creativity is mentioned but treated as an inherently 
                                                          
4 Stan Bennett, “The Process of Creation: Interviews with Eight Composers,” Journal of Research in Music 
Education 24 (1976): 3–13. 
5 Bernard Andrews, “How Composers Compose: In Search of the Questions,” Research and Issues in 
Music Education 2 (2004): Article 3. 
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understood phenomenon. At the end of the article, benefits of understanding musical 
creativity and understanding how composers compose are briefly mentioned as if the two 
were concomitant, but with no reasoning offered for this assumption. In an interview as a 
conversation with Keith Muscutt, David Cope, as a computer music composer, recalls his 
parameterization of past composers’ characteristics.6 In his research he generates, via 
computational analysis, ‘new’ works symptomatic of such composers. Here, the focus is 
composition with a specific computational input that treats music as a process enacted 
through algorithm. As their conversation ensues, the topics of authenticity and creativity 
are mentioned and become important in debating the worth of outcomes from Cope’s 
research. Cope records that he eventually became exasperated by others questioning the 
creative and authentic nature of his output—unjust aspersions in my opinion—that 
caused him to lose enthusiasm for helping others to emulate his work.7 In an interview 
with Wolfgang Rihm conducted by Richard Mcgregor, many of the questions put are 
similar to those that are put in this study.8 In his answers, Wolfgang Rihm does not allude 
to creativity, but he discovers the same idiosyncratic diversity of approach found in the 
composers who are interviewed for this thesis. 
From a different disciplinary direction, the anthropologist Yara El-Ghadban 
focuses on what he terms ‘rituals of belonging and recognition’ in his interview 
interaction with two young art composers, as they fight for musical survival in their 
chosen profession.9 The focus for El-Ghadban is the contrast between ‘identity, 
affiliation, and belonging’ and ‘musical authorship, subjectivity, and agency’, 
specifically involving post-colonialism. Mention of creativity here is limited to phrases 
such as “creative ways of navigating the structures of contemporary art music”10 and the 
idea that agency gives capacity to “transcend power structures … through performability, 
creativity, and imagination.”11  
                                                          
6 Keith Muscutt, “Composing with Algorithms: An Interview with David Cope,” Computer Music Journal 
31 (2007): 10–22. 
7 David Cope, Computer Models of Musical Creativity, 345. Cope has written his personal account of how 
the criticism came about. 
8 Richard McGregor, “Hunting and Forms: An Interview with Wolfgang Rihm,” in Contemporary Music, 
eds. Max Paddison and Irène Deliège (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 349–359. 
9 Yara El-Ghadban, “Facing the Music: Rituals of Belonging and Recognition in Contemporary Western 
Art Music,” American Ethnologist 36 (2009): 140–160. 
10 Yara El-Ghadban, “Facing the Music: Rituals of Belonging and Recognition in Contemporary Western 
Art Music,” 153. 
11 Yara El-Ghadban, “Facing the Music: Rituals of Belonging and Recognition in Contemporary Western 
Art Music,” 154. 
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Andrew Ford compiles a collection of conversations, in interview form, that he 
conducts with art music composers over a period of a few years.12 His intention in the 
interviews is “to let them [the composers] speak about their work and their attitudes to it 
… [and] to allow the composer’s real personality to emerge.”13 Mention of creativity is 
not solicited and is only present in a serendipitous way. Here, John Tavener says of his 
own attitude: 
But [in contradistinction to feeling close to some music] as I find with 
almost all Western music, it doesn’t inspire me to go on doing what I am 
doing. … It’s beautiful, and I can see why people like it, but … it doesn’t 
speak to me creatively.14 
Shira Lee Katz and Howard Gardner’s15 findings are based on interviews with 
twenty-four ‘creative’ New Music American composers. Their findings concentrate on 
the creativity present being seen as a process. They find they could discover two 
prototypical composition strategies called ‘within-domain’, inspired mainly by musical 
materials, and ‘beyond-domain’, influenced by conceptual frameworks. This finding 
suggests composers are combining the theoretical with the practical, balancing the 
possible with their own choice of boundary conditions. It is suggestive of wanting to 
adopt a Merleau-Pontian viewpoint.  
David Bennett16 poses a series of questions to art music practitioners, including 
composers, inviting written responses to his set questionnaire in correspondence. The 
questions probe the relevance of postmodernism to music. He then frames their responses 
within his own explanation. Postmodern reference to the superficial, pastiche, and 
quotation is seen to undermine the need for authenticity, creativity, and personal 
ownership, by invoking the author-function.17 In another context, Eleni Lapidaki does not 
use the interview per se but selects a range of composers with whom to ‘interview at a 
                                                          
12 Andrew Ford, Composer to Composer (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1993). 
13 Andrew Ford, Composer to Composer, xi. 
14 Andrew Ford, Composer to Composer, 91. 
15 Shira Lee Katz and Howard Gardner, “Musical Materials or Metaphorical Models? A Psychological 
Investigation of What Inspires Composers,” in Musical Imaginations: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on 
Creativity, Performance and Perception , eds. David Hargreaves, Dorothy Miell and Raymond 
MacDonald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 107–123. Page 122 directs us to Katz’s thesis: 
“Dichotomous Forces of Inspiration in the Creative Process: A Study of Within-Domain versus 
Beyond-Domain Music Composers,” (PhD diss., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2009).  
16 David Bennett, Sounding Postmodern. Sampling Australian Composers, Sound Artists and Music Critics. 
17 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon, in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 124–127. Foucault’s ‘author-
function’ eventually leads to a view that it really doesn’t matter who is ‘speaking’; in this context, the 
issue of needing and linking creativity to any one person largely disappears. 
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distance’ (a temporal rather than physical distance). The writings of each composer are 
explored to draw out themes from an educational and pedagogic point of view. The 
choice of composers examined is made to “embrace serialism, avant-garde, modernism, 
minimalism, musique concrète, and electronic music and who placed emphasis on 
innovation and creative freedom as inseparable from expression.”18 Lapidaki focuses 
attention on creativity as a process, highlighting three issues: the significance of the 
unconscious, acceptance of an inability to explain but still generate output and the tension 
between tradition and innovation. These issues are explored in this thesis. 
A questionnaire-type approach is used to solicit the views of thirty composers, 
mainly from an American background.19 Daniel Thompson, as editor, reveals his own 
brief to be similar to that used in this thesis by ‘getting out of the way’, saying: 
… there is a school of postmodern ethnography that attempts to ‘get out of 
the way’ of the interview, and let, as far as possible, interviewees and other 
mentors in the field speak for themselves. For these postmodernists, 
authorial voice, in a monograph or anywhere else, is a vestige of modernist 
practice. … This particular credo is similar to what I had in mind when I 
asked the 30 composers presented herein to answer the question: Who are 
you that you compose music the way that you do?20 
The range of approach to composing is found to be wide and often postmodern with 
many composers choosing to tell their life stories.21 There is little reference to creativity, 
most probably because the singular question asked does not solicit or hint at such an 
approach to their chosen pursuit. 
General views on associations between composing and creativity are present 
throughout the literature, including those of Igor Stravinsky who regards it impossible to 
teach much, if anything, about how to compose.22 David Ward-Steinman met with 
composers Darius Milhaud and Nadia Boulanger in the 1950s and himself developed the 
                                                          
18 Eleni Lapidaki, “Learning from Masters of Music Creativity: Shaping Compositional Experiences in 
Music Education,” 93–117. 
19 Daniel Thompson, ed. Current Musicology, “Special Issue: Composers” 67, 68 (1999). 
20 Daniel Thompson, “Editor’s Preface,” in Current Musicology, ed. Daniel Thompson, “Special Issue: 
Composers” 67, 68 (1999), 5. 
21 Daniel Thompson, “Editor’s Preface,” 5. Thompson’s editorial also notes that: “As I read the initial 
manuscripts, what I was most struck by is the sheer diversity of compositional attitudes, approaches, 
techniques, and ideals. … In short, [the question] has been answered in 30 different ways.” 
22 David Ward-Steinman, “On Composing: Doing It, Teaching It, Living It,” Philosophy of Music 
Education Review 19 (2011): 9, where we are reminded that, in conjunction with Robert Craft, Igor 
Stravinsky proposed: “Technique is not a teachable science, neither is it learning, nor scholarship, nor 
even the knowledge of how to do something. It is creation, and, being creation, it is new every time.”  
126 
 
musicianship curriculum at San Diego State University over forty years. His recent 
reflections about classical composing are meant to reveal craft and pedagogy and, in their 
own way, are based on a quasi-interview. Ward-Steinman’s reflections refer to Ned 
Rorem saying that Boulanger was “the most remarkable pedagogue of our century, and 
perhaps (who knows) of all time.”23 He contrasts this with his own view that “the fact 
that Boulanger was no longer a composer (‘uncreative’ as Rorem mistakenly would have 
it) was, I think, a surprising advantage for her.”24 Nadia Boulanger stopped composing 
early in her career, but Ward-Steinman would say of her that she remained inventive—
not necessarily creative—in her musical criticism.25 Ward-Steinman records Mike 
Vernusky, in 2009, as saying: 
As many predicted in recent years, a new type of composer skill set is 
needed to maximize our effectiveness in creativity: artists who can 
quickly adapt to new environments for musical creation, and maintain 
their own unique musical language inside of that environment.26 
Here we see Vernusky saying that a maximizing of effective creativity is central to art 
music composition, similar to the optimizing research of Csikszentmihalyi. We also see 
music naturally alluded to as language. 
In a search for understanding creative issues in music, sometimes the interview 
plays little or no role in personal collections of composers’ reflections or 
correspondence.27 What follows then is necessarily a hunt for relevant phrases that focus 
on creativity, assuming that the semantics can be satisfactorily interpreted. Sometimes an 
objective parametric investigation is made, as with David Simonton, who focuses upon 
melodic structure, using computer analysis to cope with the large data base of 15,618 
                                                          
23 David Ward-Steinman, “On Composing: Doing It, Teaching It, Living It,” 6. Also Ned Rorem, 
“Screeds,” in Current Musicology, Daniel Thompson, ed., “Special Issue: Composers” 67, 68 (1999): 
367–375. 
24 David Ward-Steinman, “On Composing: Doing It, Teaching It, Living It,” 7. 
25 David Ward-Steinman, “On Composing: Doing It, Teaching It, Living It,” 7. 
26 David Ward-Steinman, “On Composing: Doing It, Teaching It, Living It,” 18. Ward-Steinman quoted a 
reference to Mike Vernusky, “Embodying the Future of New Music,” in newmusicbox (American 
Music Center Online, May 1, 2009): 1, to be found at URL = 
http//www.newmusicbox.org/article.nmbx?id=5978. 
27 Arnold Schoenberg, Style and Idea, ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black, (London: Faber & Faber, 1947). Igor 
Stravinsky, The Poetics of Music, (Toronto: Random House, 1975). Lother Klein, “Stravinsky’s Poetics,” 
in Music Educator’s Journal 60 (1973): 64–67. Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, Memories and 
Commentaries (London: Faber & Faber, 1960). Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, Expositions and 
Developments (New York: Doubleday, 1962). Igor Stravinsky and Robert Craft, Conversations with Igor 
Stravinsky, (New York: Doubleday, 1959). 
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themes from 479 composers.28 Simonton then claims his own work has the potential to 
“reveal an enormous amount of information about musical creativity and aesthetics,”29 
which is sustainable only within his boundary conditions chosen, i.e. a scientific remit. In 
the musical context, Aaron Kozbelt30 has gathered together accounts of eminent 
composers to try and find some commonality in their experience. He contrasts two 
divergent views on creativity—‘domain-specific knowledge’ with ‘rational problem 
solving’, as opposed to ‘inherent chance and serendipity’ (BSVR)—to conclude that the 
latter: “is more pessimistic about prospects for either controlling the creative process or 
improving with age.”31 He links success in being creative to career trajectories with 
statement such as: 
Composers show strong and consistent individual differences in career 
trajectories: some continually improve, while others show either early 
peaks and lengthy declines or relatively flat trajectories.32 
Kozbelt is process and problem orientated, moving the debate about musical creativity 
onto a platform of judgment. The criteria for creative success are derived from a 
successful career trajectory. 
In these interview-type contexts, the authors approach their research mainly from 
an objective explanatory viewpoint, giving less regard to the phenomenal aspects of 
experiencing creativity in music. The aims of the interviews are more about the skill set 
needed to be successful (finance and kudos) as an art music composer, and not directed at 
creative issues. The interviews build up a picture of these composers seeing their creative 
role as mainly process orientated, i.e., trying to discover a way that will give them some 
degree of confidence in becoming successful composers. That way includes fighting for 
financial and reputational survival in an indifferent environment. The review shows that 
there is little evidence available of interviews reporting on creativity in art music 
composition when seen as an experiential way to affect others. 
 
                                                          
28 Dean Simonton, “Computer Content Analysis of Melodic Structure Classical Composers and Their 
Compositions,” 31–43. 
29 Dean Simonton, “Computer Content Analysis of Melodic Structure Classical Composers and Their 
Compositions,” 41. 
30 Aaron Kozbelt, “Process, Self-evaluation and Lifespan Creativity Trajectories in Eminent Composers,” 
in David Collins, ed. The Act of Musical Composition: Studies in the Creative Process (London: 
Ashgate, 2012), 27–52. 
31 Aaron Kozbelt, “Process, Self-evaluation and Lifespan Creativity Trajectories in Eminent Composers,” 
29. 
32 Aaron Kozbelt, “Process, Self-evaluation and Lifespan Creativity Trajectories in Eminent Composers,” 
32. 
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6.2 Interview Aims 
As a successful investigative technique, the interview relies upon asking socially 
acceptable questions in a way that brings forward authentic information, but with 
minimal constraint. Any suggestion of an interrogation would not be beneficial. Art 
music composers are unlikely to respond to questions in a uniformly logical and 
reasonable way. A significant output of musical composition is solely instrumental and 
can take on an abstract nature.33 Erudition then becomes that much more challenging and 
needs focus on some initial views on what might be found. The task needs more than 
passive inquiry to gain information here. It is impossible to start from nowhere. 
However, composers are invited, using minimal prompting and guidance, into an 
environment of answering questions that do not inhibit abstract thought. They are invited 
to talk about their own experience and how they view others. This takes place as part of 
an empathetic dialogue with an informed interviewer. The interviewer follows and 
records arguments or viewpoints put forward, no matter how obtuse, detached, and 
esoteric they might seem to be. In addition, no particular dialectic, genre, format, 
protocol, etc. is imposed other than the observance of social courtesies. 
The series of questions that are asked explore intellectual domains regarded as 
pertinent to art music composition that might (but might not) involve creativity. The 
nature of study or research into musical creativity is that you do not know in advance 
what is relevant until you spend time being with art music composers and listening to 
them. After that, evidence is accumulated and examined, including the effects it has had 
on people. Confidence concerning relevance grows as responses are obtained in that 
composers feedback that they have been able to voice their opinions by speaking freely 
about their chosen role. The interview process is subject to and controlled by the precepts 
of the Ethics Committee of the University of Sydney.34 
A cohort of twenty-seven composers based in Australia has been chosen to 
represent contemporary art music composers. However, the persons who agreed to be 
interviewed are effectively self-chosen by way of receptivity to invitation and word-of-
                                                          
33 In claiming that music starts out as being abstract, the overlay of meaning placed onto music can take 
place concomitantly with composing, such that the abstract phase is fleeting and quickly forgotten. If 
composers think in terms of music being used as an auditory semiotic toolkit, with no abstract phase 
needed, they adopt a default position. That position assumes (maybe unwittingly) a previous composer 
devises form and meaning which the present composer acknowledges, relies upon and reproduces, but 
is perhaps unaware of. 
34 HREC Project No. 13154, University of Sydney. 
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mouth introduction.35 In the year it took me to conduct all the interviews, there were 
some common characteristics of those who were interviewed. A significant number (but 
not all) of composers were based in the Sydney district of Australia and all composers 
were resident in Australia. The age range spanned from younger and emerging 
composers through to the well-established and beyond retirement (if that is really 
possible), covering all ages. All composers considered themselves as professionals, with 
their profiles accepted on the website of the Australian Music Centre and with significant 
numbers of works already publically performed. Some already had built international 
reputations and following. Almost all the composers interviewed have now become well 
known, gaining accolades for and performances of their compositions worldwide. 
Despite many strenuous efforts to achieve gender parity, less than forty percent of the 
composers interviewed are female. 
In forming questions, axiomatic views of the question deviser will inevitably 
condition or shape the questions deemed appropriate. To counter this effect, question 
format is made open unless there is a need to encourage focus on an issue. This stance is 
in full agreement with IPA. The interaction contains questions that explore beginnings, 
finished product, technique and process, understanding, purpose and the unlimited. The 
last aspect looks at effects to include what unpredictable, paradoxical, ineffable, esoteric 
or mystical parts of life art music compositional creativity tries to awaken in us and 
portray. It is arguably the hardest topic to deal with and could be termed transcendent.36 
Works attributable to the one composer are often clearly distinguishable from 
others by idiom or such means. Even with composers being eclectic, I expect them to 
show distinctive traits throughout their output. Whatever the type of question used, some 
idiosyncratic record of particular composers and their proclivities is somehow captured 
and recognizable. Responses from composers will often address their own interests, not 
necessarily any aims of the interviewer. In this case, answers may be connected but 
loosely to any question they might have been asked. Such anticipation and response is 
regarded as de rigueur in a political forum. 
                                                          
35 This is often called a snowballing sampling technique. 
36 The use of the word transcendent is not in the sense that Kant uses it for reasoned thinking 
(transcendental idealism) to find cognitive paths to understanding through judgment. The term is meant 
to indicate here that the person experiences effects that take her completely away from a reasonable 
thought path that might convey what is going on. In particular, we are entertaining the concept of being 
‘lifted out’ of our normal world into some other state of being or mind, one that defies explanation or 
even description. 
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Mention has already been made of not wanting to treat composers as if they were in 
a musical zoo, because of the inherent artificiality the zoo environment engenders. A 
better analogy of the interviewer’s (researcher’s) role would be close to that of an 
ornithologist. Birders, that special class of ornithologist who pride themselves in having 
watched particular species of bird in native habitat, take great care not to disturb their 
subjects when the birder is in the watching pose. 
 
6.3 Interview Technique 
As mentioned, the questions are put to the composers in interviews that took place 
over a period of a year. They are conducted face-to-face if possible, but a few took place 
over the telephone when distance is an obstacle. All composers interviewed are based in 
Australia. The number of composers interviewed rose as interest in the research grew. As 
I contacted composers, they responded in a range of ways, from no response to my initial 
contact through to welcoming the opportunity to take part and being readily available. I 
gained many contacts by virtue of having conducted an interview and finding the 
interviewee enthusiastic about recommending participation to other composers. The 
interviewees are asked not to prepare any content for answers in the interview. I wish to 
receive their ideas and views that are current in their minds when triggered by a question. 
Premeditated essay-like responses are not solicited. Of course, the intervening time 
between fixing a date to be interviewed and meeting with me must have given each of 
them opportunity to ruminate in expectation of what I might ask them. 
All questions give scope for the topic of being creative to be used by way of an 
answer. But the interviewees are not continually reminded that they are being encouraged 
to use the term creativity by way of an answer. They are told only once that the topic of 
interest to the interviewer is creativity in art music composition. No suggestion is made 
by the interviewer that a musical work, once conceived and launched in whatever way, is 
expected to be improved or optimized to become nearer any ideal, canon, genre, standard 
or Platonic form. Neither is it suggested that such a musical work then needs to be seen to 
contribute to the validity of genre, style, taste, camp or creed in any inductive or 
deductive methodology. An invitation for each composer to nominate a work for scrutiny 
via its score and/or performance is extended. No suggestion is made that this work has to 
be associated with their best ‘creative’ effort, but only typical of their valued output. 
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I could not avoid problems in terminology used in the questions. Sometimes the 
accent is on composing, sometimes on composing creatively and sometimes on being 
creative. Interviewees find their own terminology for responses. Only one question is 
inserted to check the composers’ stances on how they differentiate between composing 
and creating. It is up to the interviewees to show how they make the composition-creative 
connection, not for the interviewer to impose a connection for them. 
I built relationships with composers that generated almost too much information to 
absorb and record. That situation is considered a blessing, not a problem. On a few 
occasions, I was greeted with polite reserve at first that then quietly turned into having a 
good rapport with me. The interviewees invariably enjoy answering the questions as the 
interview unfolds. Each question is presented by the interviewer in direct communication 
rather than written form. I write down as succinctly as possible what has been said in 
response, selecting verbatim wording where possible. Answers to questions are accepted 
as-is insofar as they could be written down and be intelligible even if I, the interviewer, 
could not initially make sense of them. My writing down their answers to questions 
forces me to listen carefully to the essence of what I think is being said. I watch carefully 
to see how the question generates effects on the interviewee. Often the interviewee 
wanders a little from the question but is given free rein to do so. An invite to relate their 
answer to the question in hand is made from time to time. The experience of being in the 
interviews is illuminating as I come across such a wide range of responses, emphases and 
opinions to my questions. I was pleasantly surprised at this diversity and the many times 
composers commented that I had taken them to places they either had not known about or 
could say were important to them in their act of composing. I often receive: “I’m glad 
you asked that question.” and: “I have never been asked that before.”37 
Hermeneutics plays a major role in following a line of response to a question. A 
composer’s mention of a dual (or binary opposition) such as ‘subject–object’, which is a 
modernist dialectic, could also be expressed as ‘in–out’ and so forth. What is discovered 
in the interview necessarily develops as each composer gives their perspective and 
reaction to the questions in turn, referring back to or elaborating on previous answers. No 
false starts, obvious repetition of answers, and minor hesitations are preserved except for 
body language suggesting significant mood such as laughter, seriousness, aversion, and 
                                                          
37 Daniel Thompson, “Editor’s Preface,” 6. Thompson writes: “Several composers thanked me for asking 
them to contribute, and on more than one occasion it was remarked that musicologists don't often 
enough ask composers questions that they should ask them.” It would seem that composers are 
continually seeking to have their views known but have few good means to do so. 
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empathy. Interviewees make no mention of the two-hour time span taken for interview 
being long or an unwelcomed use of time. I, as interviewer, am normally required to 
politely invite the interview to close. 
My later written-up version of the notes from the interview is then sent to the 
interviewee within a day or so after our encounter, with an invitation for interviewees to 
consider how I had captured what had been said. They are asked to amend, amplify if 
necessary, and finally approve the version they then send back to me. This process gives 
each interviewee time to reflect upon and reconsider all their answers. The validity check 
is invariably accepted and welcomed to avoid any misrepresentation of viewpoint. 
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7 Essentials 
 
At this point, a recapitulation is needed on an appropriate intellectual treatment 
the evidence from interviews might now be subjected to. Paradigms1 offer intellectual 
frameworks or structures that illuminate a way of thinking so that particular properties of 
the subject matter are regarded as significant as evidence. Michel Foucault uses the term 
episteme2 to enable the widest of meanings to be inferable, rather than use paradigm with 
its attendant adopting of Popperian or Kuhn-like constraints. Conceptual ‘grasping’ takes 
place within both of these thought environments constrained by their preceptual stances. 
Definitions as explanation can be shuffled and re-defined to expand prospective 
knowledge into a cogent world view. Both paradigms and epistemes offer explanation 
rather than description.3 To describe decreases the importance of definitional means. 
Description also embraces incompleteness of understanding, enables intuition and the 
‘grasping’ (intuiting) of essences. 
An understanding of evidence from composers is potentially richer via description 
and by adopting Merleau-Ponty’s view of us being body-subjects, not body-objects. The 
richer dialectic or thought environment comes from removing what could be artificial 
delineations such as mind-body dualism. Interpretive possibilities are now enabled from 
manifestations of “I can” as a body-subject, one that is not grounded in logic or reason. 
These possibilities can be understood more in terms of inspiration, imagination or just 
                                                          
1 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
Kuhn is the normally-recognized originator of the term paradigm in connection with describing the way 
scientific revolution takes place as a paradigm shift. The original Greek word paradeigma speaks of 
showing alongside, revealing patterns of thought alongside the reality they are trying to explain, in a 
sense being mimetic, but maybe not diegetic which reaches for unrestrained description. 
2 In Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, Colin 
Gordon ed., (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 17, Foucault’s explanation of episteme is enigmatic. He 
writes: “I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of 
separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I 
won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. 
The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but 
of what may from what may not be characterized as scientific.” Foucault has enigmatically, in the last 
point, pulled his epistemic horizon back within scientific bounds and weakened the direct criterion of 
truth-boundedness. Both Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault are influenced by the writings of Gaston 
Bachelard and his ‘epistemological rupture’, i.e., that some form of cognitive discontinuity provokes 
new paradigms and epistemes. But both address only truth-bounded situations. Perhaps we may now 
say this type of disruption is an indication of creativity at work in ‘intuiting’ that a paradigm shift is 
needed.  
3 That this is so is brought out in Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans., Sheridan Smith, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 211, where he says: “This episteme may be suspected of 
being something like a world view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which 
imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, …”. [my italics] 
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play, instead of knowledge and fact. In Kivy’s terms, they are simply ‘bright ideas’. This 
scenario provokes a reassessment of what is significant as evidence when taken from a 
Merleau-Pontian viewpoint. 
The body-subject role thinks of composing as ‘living through’ the experience of 
music by characterizing and communicating it, aided by semiotics. Others then find their 
own creative experience of its creation out of a composer’s “I can”. No distinction is 
drawn between the I of the composer (the psyche, thought or mind) and her physicality in 
craft or skill. All of this is often communicated solely through notation. Performance then 
becomes living through turning that notation (semiotics?) into a body-subject experience 
as perceived through the score. Interactions take place whereby the composer and/or 
score is allowed to invade the performers’ worlds. The performers then invade all who 
listen (and look) when the music is played. Listening is living through the experience of 
hearing music performed in as direct way as possible. Its effect is absorbed to become an 
indivisible part of the recipient I, both physically (as sound) and intellectually (as 
thought) as if one could not distinguish between the two when asking the question: “How 
did the music affect me?” Only then is the I of the listener in a position, armed with that 
as evidence, to characterize or analyze the music later. This later reflection takes place 
necessarily after the immediacy of impact is passed. Of course there are non-central 
aspects to these new roles. A composer may seek to stay invading4 the music through its 
performance. Notation may play little or no part in performance such as in improvisation. 
But these aspects can be dealt with as special cases. 
Mention has already been made as to what is evidence of essence, be it in the form 
of properties, attitudes or experiences. Returning to the opening theme of the thesis, 
creativity in art music composition could be perceived as manifesting properties of the 
disruptive (the unexpected, illogical, unreasonable, unusual, ineffable and paradoxical) 
and indicative of essence. A creative discourse is detected at work between the human ‘I’ 
and the other ‘I’s, all as body-subjects. A description (not an explanation) looks to 
intuiting the background or fundamental intentionality of composers and the effect upon 
others. Merleau-Ponty speaks of this intentionality as the spreading of self to invade, 
influence or infect others, all of which are effectatious and could be affectatious. When 
composers try not to separate the physical (the sounds that are to be made) from the mind 
(the subjective meanings attributed to them), this becomes a way of showing ‘essence’-
                                                          
4 This invasion can take the form of performing herself or being pre- and proscriptive about what the score 
means to a point that leaves little or nothing for the performers to be creative about. 
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ial integration as per Merleau-Ponty. My view is that essences speak of a creative 
musical attitude when cast as a behavior. They describe a diegetic,5 not a mimetic, 
attitude over and above any musical truth or veracity thought to be present.  
Essences of what composers say are now considered important. They are to be 
understood through an intuition of their baseline motivation and intentionality, via first-
person speech. A direct consideration of composers’ responses in interview is embraced 
by adopting this revised viewpoint about evidence. A perception of their verbal responses 
is made but not as a factual syntactic analysis of text. Cavell believes composers create 
their own boundary conditions.6 Composers can thus eschew working within constraints 
other than those they choose to put there themselves. If this is so, answers to any 
questions are unlikely to obey normative grammatical constraints anyway. Such inherent 
freedom is automatically present in composing instrumental music. Interviewee answers 
are searched for where instances of the disruptive occur, such as to experience surprise 
and like effects. Answers that speak of sedimentation and habitualization are taken in the 
context of portraying fundamental abilities or motivation. Vocabulary that uses words 
such as charm, taste, style, ineffable, paradoxical, incomplete and other hard-to-define 
terms need scrutinizing for other properties they are suggesting are also present. Multiple 
essences could be present if a form of Pareto optimization has been used.7 A specific 
tensional mix of several essences then becomes part of the composers’ basis for being 
creative. 
Such a diverse collection of intellectual ideas appears uncoordinated when turned 
into evidence from which to intuit essence. That would be so unless it is recognized it 
calls for a significantly different approach to that of understanding via the methods 
already reviewed. These former methods try to create formal systems, partitioning the 
thought processing of evidence into well-defined pathways. Percept becomes concept and 
thence precept by reasonable and logical means. However, the thought processes can be 
brought into association in other ways by some form of corralling, without such strong 
                                                          
5 Michael Woods, “What is it? A Question on the Derivation of Musical Meaning,” Journal of Aesthetics 
and Culture 2 (2010): 3. Woods speaks diegetically when he writes: “Musical expression did not 
picture facts: its discourse was its own mirror.” 
6 Stanley Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” in Must We Mean What We Say? 199. 
7 Pareto optimization, attributable to Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), is most frequently invoked as a set of 
metrics that become the criteria for optimizing an overall scenario with disparate or conflicting 
properties. By weighting the properties’ relative importance to one another, properties are necessarily 
seen to be ranked in importance in that scenario. Taking two separate properties in a musical context, 
the degree to which the performance adheres to the score’s notation may be regarded as more or less 
important as the degree to which an emotional response is to be engendered in those who hear the 
music. 
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dependence upon definition, consequence or causality as forms of reductionism. Yet 
associations can still interpret some evidence to be subservient or dependent upon others 
when grouped. Corralling has similarities to rhizomatic thought 8 and to the concept of 
constellation. Max Paddison refers to Theodor Adorno’s method of tackling musical 
matters as “the principle of the constellation … the rupture between self and forms.”9 
Paddison then explains this to be the split between the expressive needs of the composers 
and the reified character of handed-down traditional forms and genres. The use of the 
word forms is Platonic but is then extended a little into social norms or ideals. This 
description suggests that we can use creativity in music composition to identify how 
composers have recognized all that preceded them, yet created afresh. In this way, a 
sense of creativity ex nihilo is possible. We do not see just one method here, for Adorno’s 
concept of constellation makes epistemology heterotopic with liminality. We have 
diverse entities dwelling in proximity in a yet-to-be-fully-formed state. Liminal entities 
and relationships do not yield to definitional form since they are in the process of 
forming and contain the inexplicable and the ineffable. 
To extend the analogy of to corral one more step, wild horses do not stop being 
wild when first captured and penned. Only later on do the horses cohabit and adjust to 
their environment to find a new normality. This is metaphorically similar to what 
happens in a making a Kuhn-like paradigm shift by adopting what, at a first encounter, 
might be seen as ‘wild ideas’. 
                                                          
8 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987), 7. Deleuze and Guattari explore epistemology and, in their first chapter 
(“Introduction: Rhizome”), establish rhizomatic principles. They write: “1 and 2. [principles 1 and 2 ] 
Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, 
and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order.” Many 
analogies between biological growth and thought patterns are made by them. Later, on page 11, they 
refer directly to music, in writing: “Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many 
‘transformational multiplicities,’ even overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it; that is 
why musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations, is comparable to a weed, a rhizome.” 
9 Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 21–23. Paddison sees the constellational principle as 
constructionist as it develops into Theodor Adorno’s negative dialectic, as Paddison later explains on 
pages 36–37. Before Adorno even broaches the term ‘negative dialectic’, ‘negative capability’ is a term 
brought into use by John Keats, the poet, in the middle of the nineteenth century. Keat’s term refers to 
being creative but in an oppositive way such that it allows one to break the bounds of intellectual or 
social constraint, i.e., to be transcendental and reject the constraints of any closed system one might 
find oneself embedded in. In Roberto Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the 
Service of Radical Democracy, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2004), Unger develops ‘negative capability’ 
into a theory that enables one to resist social, cultural and institutional pressures. Unger’s context is 
politics, not music. Another way of seeing the relevance of Adorno’s term is to consider the difference 
between parataxic and hypotaxic representations. Whereas hypotaxis has entities arranged in some 
obvious connective way, parataxical arrangement affords no such expectation, quite the opposite. Then 
we find meaning attached to music can flow over all the parataxical entities to link them together. 
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7.1 Composers’ Responses to Questions 
The interaction between interviewee and interviewer gives rise to an agreed text 
as a combination of perceptions from both the interviewee and interviewer. The 
interviewee often helps the interviewer decide upon how to word the note-taking in its 
immediacy and then, later, approves the final text version. Once all texts are available, 
they are read many times to absorb their content as well as search for themes and possible 
clustering of commonalities and differences. For each question posed in the interviews, a 
study of the answers gives rise to some form of categorization, but the emphases of the 
composers and their terminology used (with my unavoidable immanent contribution) is 
preserved. Note is made about the way a question is answered, ranging from it being a 
belief statement through to an experience of how the question affects the interviewee. As 
well as and, in contrast to forming categories, the way composers qualify their 
viewpoints is always upheld. A summary of their responses has to be made through 
properties that are regarded as important by the composers, not necessarily by the 
interviewer. Any difficulty in choosing categories comes from the paradoxical ways that 
art music composition is referred to when involving creativity. The answers are so varied 
that it could be said that creative reference thrives on being uncategorizable. 
Questions put in interview with answers received are reported in the Appendix to 
this thesis. The order starts with beginnings and practical issues. The emphasis then 
changes to, and ends with, issues concerning effect and more esoteric views. Each 
question has reasons attached to it for why the question was posed and what could be 
forthcoming by way of an answer from the interviewees. The listing in the Appendix 
bears a modest relationship to the order the questions are asked in the interviews; the 
interview question order simply makes sure all questions are put if the occasion permits. 
In order to give the reader a visual feel for the commonality or otherwise in the answers, 
they are illustrated in the form of a bar graph at the right of each set of answers to a 
question. The verbatim wording has been preserved in the text on occasions to illustrate 
what has been put into precis on other occasions. Comments as to my own opinion on 
value and meaning of what is said forms part of the text. Some of my summary sentences 
look ill-formed or overtly long as far as good English language practice is concerned. 
However, the text tries to include a sense of the variety and disparity in the richness of 
answers given. 
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Salient features derived from the answers need summarizing before any attempt at 
intuiting essences can come into play. The premise that it is possible to identify a typical 
art music composer, when creativity comes under scrutiny, loses the individuality of each 
of their responses. They become types not persons. However, the next few paragraphs are 
based on this premise to give a first guide to the sort of evidence that has been generated 
from the interviews and what might be interpreted from it. In this respect, the interview 
summary is one stage in pointing to matters of interest, but more by way of explanation.10 
To preserve the anonymity of participants, identification of an answer from a particular 
composer has been achieved by using a number in brackets. 
In summary, the beginnings of music in a composer’s life are often the self-
motivation to get involved with music or being given opportunity by parents, e.g., by 
being given a musical instrument. When beginning to compose a work, there is a trigger 
point that can come from just about anywhere or anything. Less often, the work might be 
cast as an interesting case of problem-solving or the response to a commission 
(Beginnings 1, see the Appendix for all the answers). Newness does have some 
importance when trying to compose but may not be a central motivation (Beginnings 2). 
Defining what is the ‘finished work’ is seen to be a contentious issue but is often 
cited as being achieved by a good performance. However, it is conceivable that there is 
no end here but just a continual evolution of the work, including development and 
revision (Product 1). Juxtaposition and change are very common in works (Product 2). 
Change is most often episodic but can be random too (Product 3). By and large, others 
hearing their works from start right through to finish is much preferred by composers, 
                                                          
10 Reducing properties down into explanatory atomic definitions takes many forms but also reduces the 
scope for metaphoric, intuitive, poetic and like freedoms. In Michael Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical 
Thought, 92, Spitzer points to constraints when one uses phonemes, morphemes and sematemes, and, in 
contrast, points to the work of Paul Ricoeur, saying: “ … prioritizing of discourse over words, of 
semantics (and, ultimately, hermeneutics) over semiotics, is extensively developed … into a theory 
which celebrates the creativity and imaginative quality of language that metaphor epitomizes.” 
Creativity is identified as a property to be celebrated and valued by breaking constraints. See also Paul 
Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, 
trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, (London: Routledge, 1994), 68, where 
the text claims that metaphor ‘creates’ meaning through semantic innovation. It is problematic as to 
whether atomistic terms constrain or enable our grasp of creativity; see Foucault’s epistemes (Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. from Les Mots et Les 
Choses, 1962, (London: Tavistock, 1972), xxii; see also Michael Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical 
Thought, 133), phonemes (Kenneth Pike, Phonemics, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1947), 
memes (Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) and musemes 
(Philip Tagg, “Analysing Popular Music Theory, Method and Practice,” in Popular Music 2: Theory 
and Method, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Each -eme categorizes thoughts into 
atomism in speech, culture and music respectively, as a bottom-up clarification. Yet, at the same time, 
each atomization constrains descriptive freedom. 
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although there are times when this is simply not appropriate (Product 4). Composers have 
idioms in their music but the idioms may be better detected and described by someone 
other than the composer (Product 5). Most often, a work will contain some reference or 
reverence to previous influences on the composer, intended or otherwise (Product 6). 
Music is mainly regarded as structured sound, as per Edgard Varèse, but can be as 
communication or discourse involving our humanity (Product 7). 
Form and structure are important and can come into play at any time in the course 
of composing, although the desire is for form to emerge the earlier the better (Technique 
1). Complexity is often built-in to composing somehow but may not be central or overtly 
considered by the composer (Technique 2). Fragments or sketches often form part of the 
source material for composing a work (Technique 3). Agreement on the method of 
creating ‘glue’ that might bind such fragments together into a work, is contentious but 
there is often a framework or master plan where such fragments can find their place 
(Technique 4). Stasis and silence are important properties in a work and should permeate 
them.11 Minimalism has a place in composing but not a major role (Technique 5). Stasis, 
minimalism, and silence can often form ends in themselves in a work (Technique 6). A 
musical arc is a metaphor for a work that has limited acceptance (Technique 7). 
Modernist dualities are prime vehicles or sources of explication as metaphor, to be able 
to describe how music is portrayed and ‘works’ by those who compose it. Often 
extremes, as opposition dualities, give rise to spectrums or continuums of meaning 
(Technique 8). Composition does not normally take up all of a composer’s creative 
output, but can be a primary outlet for some (Technique 9). Keeping regular times to 
compose is valued although family life does impinge, can be welcomed, and be included 
somehow (Technique 10). A need for space, quiet, peace, and lack of distractions are 
essential for being able to compose (Technique 11). 
The purpose of composing is a combination of wanting to communicate, express 
oneself, being capable of doing so and simply fulfilling one’s job specification (Purpose 
1). Composing is sometimes seen as an optimized process, but can often be a simple 
knee-jerk reaction to situation (Purpose 2). The word ‘process’ is used to depict a means 
of control and optimization via feedback.12 (In these terms, compositional creativity is the 
                                                          
11 In Daniel Thompson, “Beyond Duality: Stasis, Silence and Vertical Listening,” 488, Thompson thinks 
that Jonathan Harvey’s abiding interests are put in the form of a question: “Who is the composer?” 
along with the role of ambiguity, unity, stasis, and silence. 
12 It would be no surprise to any professional engineer that, in investigating the concept of creativity as a 
process, dependence upon feedback occurs. Success in the control of technological processes depends 
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major nascent part of a contribution in a feedback loop—a creative cycle that links 
composer, performer, listener and analyst together.) Composers are absolutely compelled 
by and fulfilled in their act of composing but have significant doubts about whether they 
are destined in doing so (Purpose 3). The composition can be some form of expression of 
who the composer is, as a communication to others, but may neither be intended that way 
nor central in the act (Purpose 4). A work would be deemed successful if it seriously 
affected the performers and listeners in terms of their emotion, aesthetic, and maybe 
spirit but much less so politically (Purpose 5). 
Without doubt, being creative and composing are virtually synonymous to these 
composers (Understanding 1). So whenever composers use the word ‘composing’, it 
ushers in being creative in some way. The almost equal divide in the type of answers 
showed how the same question could bring forth both structuralist cognition and 
perceptive thinking. Composers thought one did have to be intelligent in some way to be 
able to compose (Understanding 2). Music becomes overloaded (polysemous) and can 
stand for itself as a paradoxical or ambivalent pair of roles (Understanding 3). A 
composition does have the ability just to be itself without further explanation, but often 
the performance and explanation are significantly helpful (Understanding 4). A 
composition must normally communicate something but there may be doubt about this 
on some occasions (Understanding 5). As to whether, in the end, music is or is not a 
language, there is a tendency slightly in favor of it being so (Understanding 6). On the 
issue of whether music helps us understand it by making it into a language, various 
properties make it so and others do not, depending on the composer asked 
(Understanding 7). To the composers, spoken language is a formal system and, thereby, 
logical and reasonable but musical language can also be a personally chosen medium, 
bearing little or no resemblance to other formalized languages. The contemporary art 
                                                                                                                                                                            
upon efficacious feedback, which is normally negative, i.e., feedback is resisting change to obtain stable 
results. But, paradoxically in music, we might wish to claim the precise opposite, i.e., that it is positive 
feedback that leads to success. In David Hargreaves, Jonathan Hargreaves and Adrian North, 
“Imagination and Creativity in Music Listening,” in Musical Imaginations: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives on Creativity, Performance and Perception, David Hargreaves, Dorothy Miell and 
Raymond MacDonald eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 156–172, the question of how 
distributed creativity might be in a musical context is discussed. On their page 158, Fig. 10.1 reduces 
musical feedback to interaction with the world understood from a listener’s point of view; on their page 
160, listening as an ‘active construction’—a potentially creative act—is mentioned. On their page 162, 
they make reference to Reybrouck’s feedback loop and repeat it within their Fig. 10.2 (see Marc 
Reybrouck, “Musical Creativity between Symbolic Modeling and Perceptual Constraints,” in Musical 
Creativity: Multidisciplinary Research in Theory and Practice, Irène Deliège and Marc Richelle, eds., 
(New York: Psychology Press, 2006), 42–60). The diagram by Hargreaves, Hargreaves and North is a 
basic starting point to understanding the presence of feedback in music. 
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music composer delights in referring to music as a language13 that is his or her own, and 
as varied as the number of composers consulted (Understanding 8).  
Most music is not meant to be ineffable but may appear mysterious or awkward at 
times (Understanding 9). The listener should be able to relate to or understand a work in 
some way. A first hearing should offer much, but definitely not all, with subsequent 
hearing(s) yielding more each time, in a sense ‘drawing back’ the listener (Understanding 
10). Composers are all very happy that others may make what they like of the composers’ 
works (Understanding 11). 
A number of questions were put that tried to place the onus on the interviewees to 
find a way forward themselves. The open nature of this group of questions was greeted 
by the composers with difficulty when answering them. This is where they said “That is 
such a hard question” and, at the same time, were appreciative of the invitation to 
answer. The questions formed a backdrop for their most profound understanding of what 
they did and why. In trying to speak of what is made accessible via composing rather 
than speaking in a mother tongue, many limitations are cited as being removed. There is 
recognition by a few that if we could say it in words, we would not need to use music in 
the first place (Unlimited 1). The Cartesian subject–object or mind-body duality is used 
to understand seeing how ‘minds manifest’, sometimes with a to-and-fro between them 
to get a finished result and sometimes not naming the duality in this way, e.g., by using 
in–out (Unlimited 2). Very often, the music is intended to suspend reality and transport 
the listener to another world (Unlimited 3), as a kind of transcendence. 
With respect to this last point, art music composers talk about what their works 
are trying to achieve, amongst which is access to ‘other worlds’.14 In this regard, we note 
Edward Jacobs: 
does not see his [Jacob’s] job as a composer to be that of finding and 
molding ideas so that they will fit into some world that seems ‘right’ but, 
                                                          
13 Wilfrid Hodges, “Tarski's Truth Definitions,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 
Edition), Edward Zalta ed., URL = http//plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/tarski-truth/. 
Section 1.1 stressed that Alfred Tarski, back in 1933, became aware of the need of a meta-language 
with which to express the truth values of sentences in the specific language we wished to 
understand. Notwithstanding further advances in language theory, the question arises as to whether 
music could be that meta-language, i.e., a universal language, of all the others that are normally 
called object languages (where we speak in the normal sense of conversing). However, if this is not 
so, then music ipso facto must be explicated (not necessarily understood or appreciated) via one or 
more of the object languages, an epistemic assertion that remains contentious if music ‘is’ and can 
‘speak’ for itself. 
14 Jonathan Harvey, Music and Inspiration, 151. Harvey writes that “music’s ability to convey what lies 
beyond and above everyday life … [is] its most important characteristic,” and quotes Gabrielle Fauré as 
saying “ … reaching out to that other world. This in fact [is] where music begins.” 
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on the contrary, to create the worlds into which those ideas live and 
breathe. His [Jacob’s] efforts to imagine such worlds test the limits of 
the imagination.15 
With respect to music’s power to transcend, Michael Spitzer refers to Leonard Meyer’s 
insight that: 
‘musical originality may result through exploiting limits rather than 
through transcending them.’ … Yet his [Meyer’s] theory is not supple 
(dialectical) enough to show that limits may be transcended in the course 
of exploiting them. 16 
At this point it could be said the summary gives us but a first grasp of what art 
music composers think is creative and how it figures in their work and lives. But now 
more exploration of the interviews can be done by treating their contents in reflection and 
intuition that may detect the presence of essences. 
 
7.2 An Intuited Thought Pattern 
In reviewing the responses to questions, intuition can be exercised in numerous 
ways where it necessarily operates inexplicably. The essentialne ss of properties chosen 
helps to coalesce or bring together separate events into a fundamental understanding. 
This begs the question as to how one goes about selecting properties with which to intuit. 
But that question is simply not answerable. However, one property, communication, does 
stand out to me as fundamental in enabling any form of discourse possible about 
creativity in art music composition. At the same time, other candidates could be seen as 
essential properties. They are conjunctively cited in the search for communication being 
an essence in the answers given. The findings may have relevance to other artistic 
contexts and experiences. In that regard, it is possible its fundamentality is too broad and 
can be assumed as almost axiomatic. Then some other (more relevant) essence may need 
be found. But this exercise will reveal how such other potential essences could be present 
and co-habit with communication, as some form of Pereto or corralling or constellation 
of properties. 
A choice of questions and responses is now used that moves through the following 
thought pattern about communication and creativity in the evidence:  
                                                          
15 Edward Jacobs, “Elements of a Style,” in Current Musicology, ed. Daniel Thompson, “Special Issue: 
Composers,” 67–68 (1999): Abstract. 
16 Michael Spitzer, Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style, 12–13. 
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If composing and creating are synonymous, what creative expression might be 
present in composers’ outputs? What motivation is that meant to convey from 
within themselves? What effects do composers think their music has upon others? 
With respect to those effects, what possibility is there for this all to be the 
necessity to communicate, one which can involve non- or mis-understood or 
other-worldly aspects? Is the act of being creative or spotting creativity, and its 
communicability, potentially disruptive to participants’ normalcy? If so, how 
significant is it to see communication as the intentional essence to motivation and 
reception of creativity in this musical context? How much of this significance is 
linked to being human? 
The thought pattern will use the interview content in such a way that communication is 
intuited as a possible fundamental ingredient or essence to being creative. The questions 
used were not necessarily broached in this order with composers. Thoughts about the 
disruptive properties of interest in this thesis are automatically included and provoked by 
asking questions such as about other-worldliness and (mis- or non-) understanding. 
The preponderance of any collective viewpoint by the composers has been assessed 
in the Appendix and in the summary in section 7.1. Those viewpoints are now available 
for reference when intuition is exercised directly on the text of the interview transcripts.  
A reinterpretation of the thought pattern in terms of the questions that were asked, 
thus works in the following way: 
Are composing and being creativity the same? (Understanding 1 – as synonyms 
for each other.) If so, what is going on inside oneself? (Purpose 3 – in terms of 
compulsion, fulfilment and destiny.) How might others perceive this? (Purpose 4 
– in terms of expression.) How might others be affected? (Unlimited 3 – in terms 
of emotion, spirituality, aesthetics and politics.) Is this essentially 
communication? (Understanding 5 – as an intuited property.) Is this 
communication meant to be unclearly put? (Understanding 9 – in terms of non-
understanding, awkwardness, unreachability or mysticality.) Is reality meant to be 
in any way suspended by your efforts? (Unlimited 4 – in terms of other 
worldliness.) 
The next sections take each of the answers to the chosen questions in turn to intuit 
essential properties of the responses from the composers. A check on the format will 
show we start with a question in Understanding, then take three questions concerning 
Purpose, then return to two questions of Understanding that involve expectation, before 
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ending with a question regarded as Unlimited in scope. Verbatim wording from the text 
is quoted as much as possible in this thesis and throughout the Appendix.17 Quotes are 
also used in illustrating some of the responses to each question in sections 7.3 and 7.4. As 
in section 7.1, numbers in brackets, normally attached to quotes, refer to specific 
composers, but not by name, to preserve anonymity. 
 
7.3 Presuppositional Understanding 
We begin with the question that points to what is presupposed about specific 
concepts used by the composers. They are asked the question: ‘How synonymous are 
the concepts of composing and creating for you?’ (Understanding 1 – the first question 
in the group called ‘Understanding’ in the Appendix).  Most composers give answers in 
the form of belief statements (conception), not as to how they are affected (perception). 
Yet conception is also equivalent to internal or even self-perception. The majority of 
composers make very close links between the two (composing and creating) as concepts. 
All other statements based on ‘I compose’ then effectively become equivalent to ‘I am 
being creative’. This linkage gives credence to composers wanting the (intangible) 
property of creativity to be present in them and their output. Such sentiments are typified 
by: “Extremely. To compose is a creative exercise (24),” and said many times. Creativity 
is sometimes seen as a broad concept that is human. There is confidence in inferring that 
creating and composing are virtually synonymous to these composers. 
They are then asked a question to find out about motivation that comes largely 
from within: ‘Is there any sense in which you feel compelled, fulfilled, destined in 
being creative?’ (Purpose 3). The concepts suggest affectation may have a role to play. 
Compulsion garners an almost complete positive response, making one oblivious 
to others’ receptivity (26). Structuralism and pedagogy are seen to actually impede 
compulsion (20). Responses illuminate in various ways, in not being able to switch off 
(16), a natural state of mind (18, 15, 6—“Yes. I cannot escape being that way. I am made 
like that and do not fight against it”), need-worthy (3) making it a near biological 
imperative, and an internal drive showing self-motivation almost as ex nihilo creative 
activity (7). These views suggest that all-nature and no nurture pervades but can also be 
seen to show clearly how the body-subject naturally combines skill, craft and intellectual 
ability together. Disruption plays a strong internal negative role when getting irritable 
                                                          
17 There are numerous verbatim phrases that could be quoted in each of the answers to questions. The text 
shows but some of the answers to keep the length of this section within bounds. 
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and cranky if not creating via composition (11, 19, 15, 14—“One year, I did not compose 
and it was terrible. I got really snakey”). Commodification and communication are 
intertwined (17, 25). 
Compulsion comes from within and may have triggers such as opportunity. Here, 
compulsion is seen as not being able to switch off and is a natural state. This is Merleau-
Pontian sedimentation or habit of motivity in a body-subject. The disruptive is indicated 
in that being irritable, antsy, snakey and an itch to be scratched provokes more creative 
composing, but from within not without. 
Again, only positive sentiments are expressed about fulfilment. In saying “Yes! In 
composing, I can lose myself in ‘composing space’ and escape from all the boring, loud, 
irritating, practical, frustrating, un-extraordinary things of life. Such fulfillment engages 
my intellect, abstract thought, emotion and spirituality, giving me an active visceral 
experience that is almost like a high (5)” and “Yes, sure, because it involves all of myself 
and is a health-giving effect (14)”, there is emphasis on the integrated body-subject. 
What it means to be fulfilled is illuminated in many ways and shown in the Appendix. 
Here are just a few of them: “Yes. I can help myself get out of an attack of the blues by 
creating (9),” a statement linking being creative with control over mood and emotion, 
“Oh yes. There are few better feelings than that of having had a good day’s composing, 
especially if it has generated some pleasant surprises (19),” with the need for surprise 
(disruption) as per Boden, “Yes – there is a sense of achievement in creating something 
that was not there before; to enjoy the act of bringing it into existence (16),” connecting 
creativity with an ex nihilo activity, “Occasionally, when I come to a realization the score 
is complete or I have found an elegant solution to a specific structural problem (13),” 
where self-generated constraints are then made into a problem but given an aesthetic 
resolution, “Without creativity, life would not be fulfilling across the whole of the 
spectrum of experience (6),” emphasizing the relevance of experience and the need to 
address it phenomenologically. All quotes suggest creativity, fulfilment and experience 
are bound together somehow. 
Fulfilment comes both from within and as reactions to external stimuli. Fulfilment 
speaks of perceiving completion and the satisfaction at the ‘payoff’, ‘when my works are 
performed’, ‘bringing into existence’ and so forth so that fulfilment ‘is complete’. 
Disruption, a generic break from the expected, is present in ‘pleasant surprises’ and 
‘cracking an idea open’. 
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Destiny provokes some degree of aversion but still has its adherents. Those who 
are positive here (8, 22) amplified that with “Personally, as a student, I had a strong sense 
that God wanted me to compose” (6), clairvoyance (22) and always knowing this is 
[going to be] the way for them (7, 24). The naysayers (12, 13, 1, 2) offer disbelief in the 
concept (19, 16), having [destiny] imputed upon them (14), a categorization now passé 
for them (10), and “I am not religious; destined sounds a bit missionary” (11) or simply 
being disinterested (27). 
Destiny can come from sources such as ‘good at this’, ‘not allowed to do 
otherwise’, and ‘inspiration’. Yet destiny is linked to fatalism which speaks of not being 
in control that then renders experience of no account. Perhaps this sentiment is behind so 
many interviewees just dismissing the question with an unqualified ‘no’. This aspect of 
answers to the question was not explored further. 
The internal reflection invited in the previous question is extended to find out how 
composers think about affecting others. Communication is essential in conceiving of an 
answer to the question: ‘Is your musical creativity an inevitable expression of who 
you want to be seen to be? If so, what does that expression say?’ (Purpose 4). If the 
answer is in the affirmative, ‘wanting to be seen to be’ can generate some idea of the 
impact these composers anticipate they have on others. However, answers vacillate 
between caring greatly and not at all whether this communicative connection can be 
made and used. The answers change as they go from underlining good creative 
communication, through to detracting from this viewpoint. They show how 
communication has little or no import if one does not care about image in the market 
place, or the motivation is self-centered. 
From yes through to no, we have: “Yes. … Add to what you will find in my music 
a lot of hope in the act of giving people something pleasurable or challenging or 
reassuring about being human (11)” where disruption sits alongside pleasure and 
reassurance, “(a pause) Yes … Much of my music is of a nature to make you feel good, 
to breathe, transport you away from the mundane … (22)” giving transcendent 
experience to others by communicating with them, “Not necessarily at a conscious level, 
it is hard for me not to operate that way – I just keep on composing. I connect with my 
emotions and other peoples’ emotions coming back to me. I participate in the beautiful, 
the real and impacting, by this means. We get born into life and have to make sense of it 
by giving and receiving – music enables this necessity (6)” where ‘connect’ and 
‘participate’ are communicative terms, “It probably does. Much of my music is meant to 
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be engaging with a vitality about it. My heart is on my sleeve. … The listener would 
hopefully see or hear ‘one like themselves’ (16)” where engaging is communicative, “I 
don’t know. When I think my composition ‘works’, I am happy to be attached to it. … To 
admit to any point here makes me feel vulnerable (12)” with a clear sense of risk that the 
composition doesn’t achieve an aim of representing the composer’s thoughts well, “Not 
really. This is a hard thing to answer. … I like people to ‘see’ me, i.e. I write beautiful 
music, presenting my best side (20)” and “Nowadays, I couldn’t give a stuff about ‘want 
to be seen to be’. I do things because I want to … (a reflective pause) I should have done 
this a long time ago (26)” showing a paradoxical disregard as to what the music might 
convey or represent, “It is not about communication. It is just who I am and like a private 
diary. It is about inviting others to engage. Is the music me? Yes, (1)” again hinting at a 
conflict between not caring, just to protect oneself, and caring, so that others have the 
privilege of an invite to participate too. 
The mention of the necessity for health and well-being (perhaps as an essence) is a 
connection inevitable for some, that says the whole person is involved as a body-subject, 
inextricably combining consciousness and act. The final comments show the focus 
turning inwards as if communicating is not important to them, except internally because 
it is now affecting them. Inevitability and necessity also speak of essence but there could 
be many other candidates. 
The next question is designed to help interviewees consider how composers might 
think their pre-suppositional thought could affect those that are engaged with their music. 
They are asked: ‘How much would you expect or hope listeners to your music to be 
affected emotionally, spiritually, aesthetically or politically?’ (Purpose 5). Of course, 
such effects are not possible if no communication of any sort takes place. In each 
category, the interviewees have opportunity to say how the effect is meant to take place 
and whether such affectation forms a basis for their motivation to compose, and thereby 
be creative. 
Almost all desire an emotional response, with phrases such as: “That is crucial. I 
want ‘Mandelbrot sets that make people weep’ (14)”18, “This is the greatest one [of all 
four]; very much so. No tears needed but deep down change would be nice! And maybe 
                                                          
18 The meaning of this phrase is paradoxical. On the one hand, a Mandelbrot set is quintessentially 
predictable (determined) at any level of scrutiny. That is its prime geometric property. On the other, to 
make us weep is to acknowledge we are concentrating on experience, not abstract fact. The experience 
affects us in a significant way, unpredictable and disruptive. For we all do not burst into tears in normal 
circumstances. 
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laughter … (24)”, “… it is one of the primary aspects of my music. I wish for them to 
decipher the emotions within the music; one of my primary goals (27)”, “Hopefully a lot. 
I don’t ever write music without an emotive content (15)”, “I would like to think that the 
listener might derive some pleasure from being there and listening to the music (7)”, “I 
would like this to happen; joy, a sense of wellbeing, happiness (22)”, “It gives me great 
pleasure if people tell me they are moved. This is an objective for me in writing (20),” 
and “Yes … to take them out of their comfort zone in a guided way (25),” where 
disruption is present in virtually all the answers to this question. 
The way that disruption occurs takes many forms, such as: “… indeed that is one of 
my ambitions – to the full range of affectation possible in every piece (11)”, “I hope so – 
what presses buttons for me may do so for others (26)”, “I hope for resonance from the 
listener (13)”, “I hope listeners would be affected … but it would depend on the person 
(3)”, “I do expect the intellect to be involved – engaging with their mind helps 
performers and audiences with all other aspects of appreciating my music (5)” and “It 
may happen. I hope so. I build opportunity. The audience contributes to the enjoyment. If 
they are genuinely engaged, they might experience those things (21).” The last comment 
is talking about opportunity as if it were an infection from Merleau-Ponty’s “I can”. 
Expressions that directly refer to disruption being present are ‘Mandelbrot sets that make 
people weep’, ‘take them out of their comfort zone’, ‘full range of affectation’ and 
‘presses buttons’. Authenticity is emphasized with ‘genuinely engaged’, coming from 
being human as part of meaningful communication. 
Spirituality, that engenders thoughts of other worlds and transcendentalism, causes 
a strong contrast in response. For strong affirmation we have: “I hope for such affectation 
in all these ways depending on the work.  Indeed I think this might describe a set of 
higher-level aspirations for everything that I write (8)”, “In quite a lot of my music, it 
could be meditative, a rush of feeling to be transcended (22)”, “In a real way but not in a 
religious way, maybe tied in closely to emotions (24)” and “I believe in inspiration (I was 
brought up a Catholic). There must be something there – a transcendence of language – a 
powerful sense of experience (25)”. Apart from general support for enabling a spiritual 
experience, transcendence is mentioned specifically on a few occasions. The phrase ‘I do 
hope that listeners will sense something deep and engaging in the aesthetic and spiritual 
scope’ brings together experiencing properties in communication, seen as a two-way 
process. And now the contrast: “I don’t intend spiritual meaning (2)”, “I don’t expect 
them to be affected this way (23)”, and “I don’t aim for any spiritual result. I doubt that 
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anyone will find spirituality in my music (17)” and “Spirituality itself is not of prime 
importance for me – although I do like Latin texts! (7).” It is as if these interviewees have 
aversion to the term ‘spiritual’ because of negative religious connotations it stirs up in 
them. 
Aesthetic responses are desired more often than not and are invariably aspirations 
to generate particular qualities, such as: “I want captivation (14)” where the composer 
exercises some form of control, “Yes in terms of artistic intention (25)”, “ … I hope it is 
there for the listener, that somehow an aesthetic enjoyment is triggered by the music 
itself, and for myself as well (7)”, “I hope listeners would be affected … but it would 
depend on the person (3)”, “It gives me great pleasure if people tell me they are moved. 
This is an objective for me in writing (20)”, “Emotion and aesthetics are important to me 
in being able to touch the listener (23)” as a form of communication, and “The form 
should sit well, like listening to a jewel (22)” as a synaesthetic approach. But one said: “I 
don’t understand aesthetic reactions (16)”. 
Moving to political effects, only a few composers are modestly wanting this effect. 
Most are strongly against trying to invoke it. From the positive to the negative: “I 
compose to communicate something in an immediate sense. Politically? Yes, my … [an 
explanation of the political meaning intended in a piece is given] (12)” with a clear 
identification of the desire to communicate, “I use political concepts yet I am surprised 
when others find my work political. …  I’ve come to the realization that just being a … 
[a type of composer is cited] is seen as political by many. If I had to talk [in context as 
this type of composer] I only do what I want to, not what I ‘should’ do (17)” where 
politics is communication and ethically put by this composer, “… – not overtly political 
but a hint and therefore may be so. I am not like Martin Wesley Smith19 (26)”, “I am not 
interested in the political side of things, … I think that everything we create has a 
political aspect to it – especially in terms of the style of music and the way the music 
relates to society (or not) (7)”, “I hope listeners would be affected except politically but it 
would depend on the person (3)”, “I don’t think a ‘Political’ response to music has 
meaning (13)” and “I refuse to engage my music politically. It would take away the 
abstract nature of it – it must stay abstract. … I can’t relate to any particular event that 
would motivate me in such a direction now (27)”. The aversion to involvement in politics 
                                                          
19 The effect of experiencing (hearing) works by Martin Wesley Smith can be, as intended by him, to 
receive political messages, and seen by some as quite successful in this regard. 
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appears to come from music being tainted by a political overlay that seems to reduce 
music’s status and scope to one of utilitarianism. 
To conclude effects that composers think they might have on others who engage 
with them and their music, here are some more panoramic viewpoints offered: “Ideally, I 
want to change peoples’ lives! I hope a musical moment will stay crystallized with them 
forever (9)” which is a form of sedimentation, “I do expect the intellect to be involved – 
engaging with their mind helps performers and audiences with all other aspects of 
appreciating my music (5)”, “It continually remains ‘in the eye of the beholder’ (2)” 
placing the onus on personal accountability of the perceiver, “How they like it is none of 
my business (19)” showing complete detachment from the music once launched, and 
similar to “The question makes me uneasy. The idea of prescribing a listener’s response 
in any sense is quite distasteful to me (18)”, “I expect my music to communicate at a 
number of levels such as the physical in enjoying the sonics of the sounds, the intellectual 
in engaging the listener and as musical drama including the emotional level. There are 
many variables. I expect the creation to be an experience via performance (4),” with a 
clear identification of music as essentially communication. 
This final response brings together neatly a significant number of threads of 
understanding that support the intuitive approach and how Merleau-Ponty would see this 
as a creative body-subject situation. The notion that communication is the essence of 
music is put first. The ‘physical’, ‘intellectual’ and ‘emotional’ are linked as if in a body-
subject way, but referred to by way of levels. The ‘creation to be an experience via 
performance’ shows links between being musically creative by composing, and 
performing being an essential part of a composer’s creative manifestation. 
 
7.4 Expectational Outcomes 
Composer (4) has almost begged asking the next question as further clarification of 
what composers expect to happen: ‘Need a composition communicate?’ 
(Understanding 5). The initial summary records most composers agree with 
communication being a motivational cause in composing. The question does not 
presuppose any involvement of the composer once a composition is somehow 
manifested. For communication to be essential, comment perceives the music to be in 
some way medium and message such that the message could not be communicated 
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without music in the motivation or intent of composers. Such dogmatic words as ‘must’ 
and ‘should’ (which are also indicators of ethical viewpoints) are good indicators.  
At this point in dealing with answers, a difficult choice about presentation has to be 
made. The need for clarity in conveying understanding might call for reductionist 
attitudes to handling the evidence. However, such an approach runs the risk of omitting 
the richness of what is contained in the answers. It categorizes evidence, subsuming 
individual viewpoints that simply do not fit plausibly into such a treatment. A middle 
course is chosen here, retaining the richness of answers given and graded in some way, 
but can appear to wander in unprincipled ways at times.  
Here is a selection of those who are much in agreement with compositions 
communicating, listed first, through to those implacably against the import of the 
question, listed last: “It must (20)” as an ethical imperative, “Yes, it must do so but the 
message need not be clear; it can remain altogether obscure (13)” as disruptive in the way 
meaning has to be worked for, “I think that is what music does. It presses buttons – one’s 
own and if you are lucky, it resonates with others too (26)” where musical essence 
disrupts the mundane with resonance, “Yes, because when I go to a concert, I want 
myself to be engaged and taken into the work, to then respond on an emotional and 
intellectual level. This is a communicative act both ways (16)” with an identification of 
two-way communication being important, “It can simply be but I want my music to 
communicate with others (2)”, “(pause for thought) To answer, I believe all music 
communicates because, a priori, it does ‘need’ to (23)” with the need being indicative of 
sedimentation or habit in the body-subject as an innate quality, “(pause) I am an idealist. 
I want all sound to communicate something – I specifically look for that (25)”, “Very 
much so. (a pause) It is almost an alternative way to communicate human emotion and 
idea that is not possible through text and speech (27)”, so that music is made a unique 
form of communication, one that works well for emotion and ideas, “The communication 
can be as much abstract as literal. Composing is a form of deep listening as propounded 
in psychology, where deep means recognizing oneself connected to all other things in 
some way … In order for their music to communicate effectively the composer(s) must 
have shared in some of the same sets of experience as the audience (8)” where being 
‘connected to all other things’ is a Merleau-Pontian form of invasion or infection, “What 
is the point of composing otherwise, except perhaps for one’s own mental health? It is 
giving voice that the performer is then able to complete in a performance. It is 
transmitting ideas (10)” where the notion of ideas being transmitted or communicated 
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comes to the fore and is also present in other responses, “It can’t help but be seen that 
way but I admit I don’t understand what a composition communicates. I believe the 
ephemeral nature of music is a strong quality within it. The importance of ‘liveness’ 
could be seen as a communicative process present in the act of performance (17)” where 
inevitableness is essential in qualitative terms, giving live performance a pre-eminent role 
as communication, “This cannot be avoided. This is a human utterance and someone, 
including the composer, will derive something from the music being played or composed 
(6)” showing communication to oneself is present, “ - In a base form, it is inevitable this 
happens. This is an important part of me bringing a piece into being.  Harrison 
Birtwhistle thinks oppositely. For him, it is getting the object expressed as perfectly as 
possible. For me, the communication of an idea (sometimes programmatic or suggestive) 
is an important part of the whole reason for composing (12)” clearly speaking of essential 
properties, “Can a composition not communicate? It inevitably does. Humans are 
emotional so even music brought forth in a dispassionate way will always get some 
response (15)” so that if communication is an essence, then the question put is rhetoric 
with a ‘no’ answer, “It can be both for different people. Each one of us finds different 
things in a work. That is good for it triggers off plenty of meanings. … the sonic response 
… was entirely on what the words meant to me (3)” where plenty of meanings is 
ineffable, “It can but does not have to do so. It could simply be a well-crafted 
composition. What a piece of music might be ‘communicating’ is entirely up to the 
individual listener – not even the composer has total control over that (7)” which can 
mean the analytic view does not preclude whatever is perceived by the listener; the music 
still relies on being seen as communicating, “A composition does not need to 
communicate but a successful one will in some way (4)” as a concession to the 
fundamentality or yardstick of success being to communicate somehow, “No, of course 
not. It is still a composition. I happen to think that there is no point in writing music that 
won't be listened to, but that's another matter. And the word 'communicate' is funny, I 
always think. It seems to suggest that music is communicating something, but I'm firmly 
with Stravinsky and Boulez on this: music is communicating itself. And that's quite 
enough (19)” indicating self-communication is sufficient, “I don’t think it is possible. I 
put symbols, representation, ideas forward for others to interpret. There is nothing 
‘authentic’ to communicate. By which I mean, each individual’s experience and 
interpretation is distinctive and therefore, my compositional purpose is many things, not 
chiefly about communication (21)” suggesting a non-truth-bounded environment which 
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doesn’t necessarily center on communicating at all, “No in the normal sense. Music is a 
language of the emotions, it triggers specific or general feelings. I offer a narrative to a 
work to try and lead the listener to an understanding of its structure and trajectory but it is 
not necessary, indeed listeners can get something positive and valuable to them that is 
completely different from what I thought the piece was about (11)” suggesting there is a 
complete transformation of meaning from that initiated to that received, and lastly “The 
listener by paying attention expresses sympathy with the music (1)” so that music is 
primarily not about communication but more listening. 
It is tempting to conclude there is contention here between a strong need to 
communicate and it playing no part in motivation. But that bifurcation is not really 
present. The responses are simply saying composers choose their own raison d’être for 
entering into composing (creating) even if it is not primarily to communicate. Cavell’s 
point of view about choosing boundary conditions for one-self comes into play. Just what 
sort of communication is intended is explained by each composer and is idiosyncratic, 
using such notions as ‘ideas’, ‘itself’, and ‘meaning’. 
Composers reveal a bipartisan view on how their music is to impact others when 
answering the question: ‘Is there any sense in which you desire your music to be non-
understood, awkward, unreachable, mystical or in any way ineffable?’ 
(Understanding 9). An outright ‘no’ comes in the form of underlining intent. “No,” is the 
complete response from many with no further qualification. However, with qualification, 
we get “(interviewee laughs) No, I don’t like wankery. Pardon my crudeness. It is hard 
enough to be articulate. This is pretentiousness. To deliberately be obscure is to regard 
ones inner life as not understood. We are sharing so why would you withhold? Music is 
‘trying to clarify’ for me (20)” shows the composer is communication-orientated, sharing 
and wanting to clarify meaning in a helpful way. Saying “I do not aim for any ineffability 
but some listeners say they experience it in my music. It doesn’t matter if it is not 
understood; just listen to the sound and hopefully enjoy it (3)” is an almost Herder-like 
concentration on sound and its effect on the listener. There is reference to sharing 
(communicating and clarifying), doing it well, and to just enjoying the music without 
ineffability being an issue. When answering ‘no’ but less emphatically, this is often 
followed by some position that accounts for perceived ineffability to be seen as a 
disruption in these responses: “No. I find arcane things intriguing. Perhaps that is the way 
others hear my music and don’t understand it as if it were an alien culture (1)” and  “I 
want my music to be accessible to as many as possible but I cannot make music for that 
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reason (17)” makes disruption almost innate and “No. (interviewee laughs, a pause) This 
is really hard to answer. Mystical? I like the sense that the listener can’t ‘put their finger 
on it’ (15)” is recognition that initial ineffability that could impact the listener is there but 
it is made symptomatic of an experience of the music. 
When answering ‘yes’, we could infer that the creative musical output from the 
composer(s) would invariably be non-understood to start with, as if this was part of its 
impact. “[I think] It already is to some degree because it is music (25)” says music is 
ineffable, and is further supported by responses such as “Yes but … I definitely don’t 
want it to be. I don’t intend to make my music unreachable, but I understand why some 
listeners may feel that way (17)”, “Everybody has inner desires for making the 
mysterious or untouchable – this is always a good thing (23)”, “Mystical, yes, perhaps 
this applies to all music – like God is a mystical being. We don’t understand why music 
works the way it does (8)” as ineffability, and “I do like to challenge an audience to be 
stricken with ideas even if not from the composition itself – basically for them to ‘have 
an experience’ (18)”, which comes from an interviewee who is focused on music being 
an experience and phenomenological. 
These positive responses show how ineffability is almost inherent in the music, is 
meant to be enjoyed as an experience in its own right, perhaps overcome and is even an 
ethical condition. But no interviewee took the position of seeing ineffability as too much 
choice as per Jankélévitch. Whether it is intended or not, the ineffable seems to be 
present and disrupts before further understanding may overcome the effect upon the 
listener.  
The last question, ‘In what ways does your music try to suspend reality by 
creating another world?’ (Unlimited 4), is asked towards the end of the interview and 
suggests taking a big picture and unlimited attitude to what creativity in musical 
composition could aspire to. As can be seen in the responses, when they identify with this 
other-worldly possibility, composers account for it in their own way. The responses start 
with full agreement and end with less enthusiasm for the notion. “That is precisely what 
it is meant to do! (5)” says music is other-worldly and almost axiomatic as an 
assumption, “As much as possible. It would be its own musical world and all the 
conditions applying to it (25)” says there could be many different worlds, “That is how I 
design my works. I actually try to create another state of mind (27)” is a structural 
imperative, “Yes, it does try to do so. This is part of the process of engagement. And, yet, 
not just another world but to reflect upon their own world and relate that to what they are 
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hearing (16)” where engagement involves perception and communication to make this 
possible, “I try to do that. I think that is what music is for. I try to create a sound-world in 
my music. Good music creates its own world or landscape (12)” and “I do think in these 
terms a little bit. It is a good analogy for what I set out to do. A piece of music is like a 
unique world. It has its own laws of nature, its own customs. The listener is invited into 
the world and is free to explore (19)” are clear indications of composers setting their own 
boundary conditions, “Oh, look, I think I try to do this all the time. That is the beautiful 
thing about music. It is not reality itself but takes you into a heightened awareness of 
reality. It is why I like music being called beautiful (20)” is an epitome of the aesthetic 
experience, “Oh! I like that question. I guess that is what I love about music – its ability 
to suspend reality. I put this alongside another important quality about music, mentioned 
before, [that of] ephemerality; the possibility music has to remove you from the everyday 
(17)” where ‘removal from the everyday’ is clearly disruptive, “I try to do this by 
creating a sound world for people to get lost in, where they can forget about reality for a 
short time – a sense of timelessness or ‘forever’ existing in the present. The moments 
where I think I am being most self-indulgent in my music are often the moments when I 
think that I have personally created another world or a space outside reality (7)” is 
Herder-like in concentrating on the effect of the sound, and Bergson’s durée is also 
invoked, “Oh I think probably to a large extent. I often try to find the essence (mood, 
emotion, sense of something) and promote it for the whole piece; this is taking you away 
from reality – and can come back to reality too (24)” identifies an essence that takes one 
away from reality, “O Boy, this is an inside-outside question for me. [a dualism] Music is 
both another world and intersects with reality. It enhances or enriches our sense of being 
that would not be there otherwise. Most importantly, it takes me out of myself. This is 
quite frankly an ultimate goal but is so elusive (8)” suggests an essence of enriched 
being, “I mess with time.  … Yes, in answer to your question: it would be great if it 
happened, to draw the audience into the music’s world (9)” with an allusion to Bergson’s 
durée, and finally “Oh, what a weird question. Music works in an artificial construct of 
time. It is a different reality but works in parallel with physical time. I think it is 
unavoidable that it does work this way (21)” mixes Bergson’s durée up with a change of 
reality. 
Many but not all interviewees think music should have an effect that aims for an 
other-world type experience, i.e., a transportation, even a transcendence, an adventure 
with risk and inherent disruption. The effect is described as being taken or moving away 
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from reality, the suspension lasting for a while perhaps in Bergson’s durée time or as 
long as the music lasts. 
If interviewees do not readily identify with this ‘other-worldly’ aspiration, there is 
concession it is still there somehow as in “My music is not an attempt to do this but, at its 
best, it does. … it is all up to the listener (13)” as a recognition of communicating with 
‘the other’ and “It takes the listener out of the present situation and into imagining other 
things. This harks back to my original thought that music is distraction from the horror of 
not knowing the purpose of existence. To put it in a positive light however, I hope in my 
music to trigger a creative response in listeners so that they are taken out of being aware 
of the passing of time and, instead, their minds are stimulated and engaged in a more 
“otherworldly” non-corporeal state (14)” where ‘creative response’ recognizes a two-way 
communication that is creative both ways and ‘non-corporeal state’ hints at Merleau-
Ponty’s body-subject. Finally “I would not try to suspend reality. However, I am 
interested in creating a new listening experience that may appear ‘unworldly’ to an 
audience. I do like to surprise people … but is this unreality? (18)” makes ‘surprise’ the 
disruptive effect as per Boden. 
 
7.5 Corralling Properties 
The text of responses from the composers contains instances where to 
communicate can be seen as essential to making sense of what the interviewees say. 
Their efforts are seen as creative through composition in a direct or undiluted manner. At 
the same time, a number of other properties are mentioned that do not appear to be 
subservient to communication but sit in some form of synergy with it, as a form of 
corralling or as a constellation. They can all be grouped into approximately three 
perceptive attitudes towards art music composition and its inherent creativity. 
As previously discussed, it is difficult to clearly identify that we are referring to a 
composer’s creativity as opposed to that of a performer. Their creativities manifest 
closely in performance. But the business of communicating and how it is done is seen as 
creative. It is impact through a perception that detects the disruptive nature of what is 
communicated as an almost objective content. That impact comes from being met with 
phenomena that appear unusual, surprising, illogical, unreasonable, and non-pedagogic. 
Treating the meaning of music as ineffable or inexplicable, perhaps in newness, 
contributes to its mystery in not necessarily being communicated via a standard language. 
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If music is regarded as emanating from a body-subject, the music stays personal and 
authentic as it then invades, infects, or is contagious in the effect it has on other body-
subjects. This view is quite distinct from engendering a detached intellectual response 
alone, one that is normally the basis for analytical judgment, and emotionally vacuous.  
Secondly, in considering the meaning of what is composed and performed, a sense 
of creation ex nihilo is deemed present, irrespective of how rational explanations might 
account for experience. Composers regard being truth-bounded and thereby refutable, 
‘solving problems’, teleologic (non-aesthetic) and optimized, all as unnecessary 
restrictions, with no direct relevance to instrumental music. Instead, the composers 
choose their own boundary conditions (as per Cavell) and how well or otherwise they 
then stick to them. This involves inherent risk in what they aspire to, such that those 
boundary conditions are used to indicate where the transgressions might have occurred 
(as for Longinus’ genius). A sense of the transcendental contributes to the music being 
seen as creative and breaking rules such that the experience of being ‘transported’ to 
another world is a specific aim of some composers. 
Thirdly, the sense of ineffability, even if temporary, provokes interest in structure 
and form as creative intent. In perceiving the music as ineffable, three properties then 
seem to be valued—analytics, algorithm and relationship—but for aesthetic rather than 
utilitarian reasons. There is a natural view that wishes to resolve ineffability. 
Communication is one way of sharing ideas that may offer resolution. The paradox is that 
music, especially when instrumental alone, can be both medium and message and can at 
the same time both resolve and add to ineffability. The creative content can be generated 
by the fecundity of possibilities in this situation (Merleau-Ponty’s “I can”), rather than 
approaching this lack of knowledge as prohibition or inadequacy. To view ineffability as 
being fecund opens the door for performers and listeners to also add their own creative 
actions and views on how the music affects them in their participation. The significance 
of composers’ creativity can then be seen in how it engenders the interest and willingness 
in both performers and listeners to engage with composers’ new offerings. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored what it means to understand creativity associated with 
composing art music. The basic assumptions are that such creativity is potentially present 
and sharable. We naturally look for ‘boundary conditions’ to what we understand the 
music to mean to help us. But these are often chosen by the composer. They become a 
form of authentication that the source is human. A key manifestation is the way of 
describing music as creative that is linked to a disruption of a normative view to 
understanding the music. The disruption takes the form of experiencing the unusual, the 
unexpected, surprise, the illogical, the unreasonable, bright ideas and like effects. To 
perceive such effects is to be receptive to being provoked in some way by partaking in 
the music. Unlike other contexts which use the word, this disruption need not carry any 
pejorative implications. 
Since creativity in general has been researched mostly in science-based disciplines 
such as psychology, this work is reviewed to perceive the motivation and systematic 
thought supporting these investigations. An assessment of whether such work is 
extendable into a viable method for understanding creativity in art music composition is 
made. Ways in which creativity could be present are discussed and draw attention to how 
difficult it is to both isolate causal roots and pre-eminence of contribution in a context 
deemed creative. 
Two main conceptual approaches encompass the ways studies of creativity in the 
literature are conceived. One approach depends upon the scientific paradigms of 
causality, objectivity and refutation. The other depends upon eidetic reduction of 
phenomenological perception. They both rely upon explanation more than description. 
The first approach uses reason, logic and consistency for successful conclusions. The 
second uses intuition that then substitutes the perception with something essential but 
again in the form of consistent and plausible conclusions. The validity of both of these 
approaches is undermined by the nature of the evidence deemed significant and now 
under scrutiny. Creativity, seen through its disruptiveness, does not contribute any 
perceptive consistency to feed into either approach. The scientific and computational 
approach to creativity specifically treats disruptive evidence as aberration. One of the 
main protagonists for scientific investigation, Margaret Boden, has now extended her 
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studies into artistic disciplines. She has recognized how much surprise, a disruptive term, 
is a key element in discerning the presence of creativity there. 
Explanation requires truth-bound discovery that is consistent and maybe absolute. 
It succeeds through reduction as in the solving of problems, clarification, optimization 
and abstraction. Ineffability and inexplicability are thereby classed as aberrant and to be 
reduced as much as possible. But description reaches for terms such as style, taste, flair, 
charm, beauty and the sublime in which the ineffable and inexplicable are always present 
and welcomed. The significance of this research is that it does not seek to explain 
creativity in musical composition. It attempts to find and describe essences of the subject 
matter the effect of which actually disrupts the consistent grounds for finding them in the 
first place. 
When seen as process and system, creativity becomes utilitarian and pedagogic, 
properties which then reduce the prospect of aesthetics being a component of creative 
content. Psychology cites originality, newness and adaptivity to be key components of 
creativity. Psychologists do not then see these components as extraordinary, but arising 
from ordinary and explicable processes. Psychology also depends upon regular scientific 
investigation to give rise to new knowledge of creativity, a stance taken up by Pamela 
Burnard. In her musical studies, musical creativity is seen as an ordinary collective, 
consistent attribute in social terms. It is thus the normative which is being sought when 
considering creativity from a psychological point of view. Types of persons are 
discovered (a strictly limited form of newness) and some form of pedagogy is put in 
place that might enable such types to be promoted or repressed. This is effectively 
optimization, something musical endeavor does not need to invoke. 
When creativity is related to conjunctive concepts, a number of associations can be 
drawn that may reveal structure and help understand it in music composition that way. In 
making these choices, newness is made contextual reducing the emphasis on a need for 
progress through universal-type conclusions. When creativity is linked to genius and 
inspiration as forms of behavior, it leaves unresolved how much creativity is made up of 
learned technique or is ‘inspired’. If inspired, Muses do not then become explicable. 
When genius as creativity in extremis is coupled to inspiration, both are seen as 
components of creativity. But they then remain open to all possibilities and influences no 
matter what form they take. This means understanding then remains incomplete and 
ineffable in some regard and resistant to reduction. We do not know how a muse-like 
160 
 
transfer of knowledge occurs, what gives rise to genius’ thought, or the kind of osmotic 
transfer found in Plato’s Euthyphro. 
When creativity is linked to expertise and intuition, authenticity (the genuine, the 
real thing) comes into play in that some think creativity can only emanate from being 
human. This stance affects the acceptance and identification of musical works. Problems 
automatically arise if reason and logic are used for explaining how intuition works and 
expertise accumulates. Explaining (not describing) the final stages of becoming expert as 
involving play, rather than reasoned rule application, is actually more a form of intuition 
than analysis. It calls into question whether explanation is what we are invoking in place 
of just a perceptive description of behavior. The Euthyphro method, that expertise is 
acquired by observing the expert at close range without any formal system that would 
offer a complete explanation, sits well with many aspects of how musical expertise is 
passed on. 
When creativity is linked to beauty and imagination in promoting aesthetic 
properties, Stanley Cavell points out the way that artistic persons choose their own 
boundary conditions much more than having them imposed by societal and cultural 
norms. Such choices, coupled with an intentionality that is always alert to creating or 
spotting the unusual, become a form of authentication about the music being human. In 
this way the self-imposed boundary conditions, and any unpredictability or risk that 
therein ensues, contribute to an aesthetic effect. The effect attracts the assessment of 
being creative through terms such as beautiful, stylistic, tasteful, charming, and full of 
flair. 
In the desire to construct a philosophy of creativity, structuralism and formalism 
are themselves seen as possible hindrances to effective method. Yet truth-boundedness 
and consistency of evidence is still relied upon. Words such as style and flair, taken from 
an aesthetic viewpoint and as possible essences, are given due consideration but continue 
to be used as definitional means to circumscribe what creativity is. But by its own nature, 
intuition cannot contribute a major role to generating the reasonable definitions with 
which, in being philosophical, further knowledge is constructed. 
The difficulty in focusing on creative presence arises in the present literature in 
debating whether the creativity is seen as embodied in a person, contained somehow in 
documentary evidence, evident as a behavior, or involves them all and maybe other 
manifestations. Since the word is used in so many different contexts, care has to be 
exercised in noting any change in intended meaning. Once a move to understanding 
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musical creativity through phenomenology is made, evidence becomes available in the 
form of experiencing music in performance and in how it becomes communicable 
through description that naturally embraces aesthetic effects. The move also entails 
setting aside judgmental means as offered through Kant’s transcendental idealism and his 
reasonable concept of the beautiful. A change in intellectual dialectic is required that 
shifts the emphasis from ontological substance onto evidence as given or perceived. 
Herder anticipates this move by concentrating on how sound (as music) in performance is 
seen to affect the receiver over and above analysis of form. Bergson changes the 
scientific concept of time into a lived-time where performed music unfolds in the way it 
is perceived, not just by measurement against the clock. Jankélévitch then emphasizes the 
ambivalent and undefinable nature of musical experience, seen by Lydia Goehr as 
‘expressing the inexpressible’.1 Creativity in music comes from unlimited states of mind 
provoked by the creator concomitantly mixing essence (fundamental motivation) with 
existence (a recognition of possibilities). Bergson and Jankélévitch introduce the 
importance of incompleteness in musical knowledge, one that involves paradox and an 
ineffability that speaks, not of limited knowledge but, of unlimited possibility. Merleau-
Ponty’s body-subject offers a way of seeing how creativity has some form of ex nihilo 
origin in a pre-reflective state of “I can”, not just as an analytical “I think”. 
The move to a phenomenological approach to understanding creativity in art music 
composition brings to light evidence which can be interpreted intuitively. General 
creativity, as described in the review chapters, depends upon reasonable grounds built up 
through percepts, concepts and precepts. Musical creativity, in embracing aesthetics, 
welcomes the musically disruptive into the intellectual domain. Disruption could be seen 
as in addition to and perhaps more important than wanting to rely and build upon the 
normal structural integrity of music indicated by melody, harmony, form and genre.  
In order to come close to understanding phenomenal effects, spending time with 
composers, who are a significant part of the subject matter, is key. In seeking good 
evidence with which to work, a direct interaction with composers was set up. Even 
though music can speak for itself, there is much to be learnt from the way composers talk 
about their role and the effect they and their music might have upon others. 
An interview setting with informal receptivity to what composers say generated this 
helpful evidence. In choosing an interview technique that is close to IPA (Interpretive 
                                                          
1 Lydia Goehr, The Quest for Voice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 4. 
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Phenomenological Analysis), we then make problem solving, truth-boundedness, 
optimization and reasoned causality as non-essential precepts. Aesthetic viewpoints can 
then be voiced in an unchallenged way if these precepts are removed as constraints. 
Responses are simply accepted as is, even though meaning may not be immediately 
apparent. A one-on-one interview technique provides information in the phrases the 
composers use about creativity in their music. A first summary of the answers is formed 
after all the interviews are conducted so as not to pre-empt categories and subsequent 
conclusions. That summary has a significance of its own in offering a psychological 
explanation of art music composers and their creativity, seen as a cohort or type of 
persons. At this point, essential properties, concerning creativity in, and surrounding, the 
composers, are then brought into consideration. The texts of answers are grouped in such 
a way as to intuit essence from piecing together trains of thought based on how 
composers’ music is seen to affect all participants. 
A train of thought is chosen which intuits communication as an essence. It also 
shows further connectivity to other possible ‘essential’ candidates. They are co-explored 
in how they are seen to be embedded in the evidence from the composers. The chosen 
example brings to light perceptive attitudes that are all present at the same time. 
Composers make reference to the links between communication in musical composition 
and disruption and how they relate to aspects of being creative. Since composers link 
composing and being creative so closely, disruption can manifest in many ways. A 
“Wow!” factor when the piece concludes.” (11) makes ‘wow’ newness and disruptive. A 
knee-jerk reaction to music brings forth insecurity (20) which is disruptive. When 
composers say: “Yes, I guess compelled. I now know that if I don’t write music, I get 
quite irritable (11),” and “I get antsy and an itch to be scratched (19),” and “Oh yes. I get 
very grumpy if I do not compose over a long period (15),” and snakey (14), this is 
disruption at work internally. When saying “Yes. Stasis for humans makes them 
uncomfortable”(8) and “intrigue is rich and enjoyable (14),” we are actually conceding 
this type of disruption could be seen as non-pejorative and enjoyable. 
What composers generate is seen to be creative communication by the manner in 
which it infects, infiltrates and invades the perceiver, more than in generating detached 
intellectual assent. In addition, composers’ offerings have properties of a newness that 
can suggest no causal origins, i.e., they appear ex nihilo, where the composers generate 
their own boundary conditions to how a work might be understood. This freedom, in 
turn, opens up the way to all who encounter the music to be transported to ‘other worlds’ 
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by it. A perception of the music as being ineffable becomes a reflection of a desire to see 
structure and form, but one that is not resolved. This perceptive stance agrees with 
Jankélévitch claiming that ineffability generates infinite possibilities rather than limits 
formal understanding. Each of the perceptive attitudes is triggered in some way by 
disruption of sonic expectation. Composers play the generic or seminal role in creating 
the music that performers work with. When adding their subsequent creative capabilities, 
the performers offer to listener/critics an experience from which, in turn, they offer 
creative commentary and analysis. Creativity in art music composition thus becomes the 
essential front end into the ways this music communicates through disruption of musical 
expectation. 
 
R Willgoss 2017 
-
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Appendix 
Interview Data 
The Data is arranged as Question-Answer Pairs using the headings Beginnings, The 
Finished Product, Technique and Process, Purpose, Understanding, and The Open 
or Unlimited. The reader is encouraged to bear in mind that evidence, obtained in 
interview and portrayed through the scripts the interviewees agreed upon, is extensive. 
Some of the evidence has been condensed into precis form and some retained as direct 
quotes. 
 
Beginnings 
Beginnings 1. What or where is the real beginning point of your musical creativity? 
(The question gives the interviewees the opportunity to paint a picture of how their 
present role came about from some form of genesis. Composers could look at origins in 
at least two ways, either in terms of early influences on themselves or the way(s) each of 
their works come into existence.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of composers mentioned they were self-starters (3, 5, 10, 13, 17, 19, 25, 
26, 27) with various triggers such as ability (10, 17, 25, 26) or a strong (visceral) 
response to music (5, 25, 27). Being put to or acquiring a musical instrument was cited as 
a major influence (2, 8, 16 - “It was completely new to me and, similar to the previous 
incident, set off a bomb in me in terms of thinking about musical creation”, 20, 23, 24). 
Influential people came to the fore such as mum (24), a music maker (15) and “It comes 
from my father who is a creative tragic” (18). Realizing that musical orientation was 
there from birth figured for some (9, 21), whilst others were affected by place (14) or an 
outlet for teenage angst (11). 
(In Life) 
I started composing and playing from my own motivation: 
I was given or put on a musical instrument: 
I was influenced by specific persons: 
It has been that way since birth: 
The ambience of a place or situation brought it about: 
It was a teen angst outlet: 
 0           5          10  
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Being a self-starter and feeling visceral (from within) figured in many responses as 
if some internal force played a role. Answers point to the desire to compose (creatively) 
being self-generated although having facilities and influential persons around is also 
important. The essence of self-starting is to be able to motivate oneself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trigger points for a work come from a wide range of sources such as one idea (3, 6, 
18, 24, 10—being poetic),1 commission (3—being ‘wanted’, 6, 8—an agenda only, 26), 
other music (texture etc.) (1, 19, 24), a title (8), emotional reaction to situations (11), 
relationships with people (11, 26), unaware from where except by hindsight, e.g., “ A 
new work often surprises me in its unexpectedness and timing” (12), instrumentation and 
unique sounds (16, 25), just from ‘me’ (26), visual analogues (26), pragmatism followed 
by lots of personal input (14), places (26), “it was like walking into a room never seen 
before” (4) and “My immediate answer is a combination of feeling and desire to create” 
(27)... Those who see a problem-solver type answer stated the ‘problem’ is bunching 
ideas into a narrative (5), placing boundaries (7, 13), filtering in gematrial2 space (9), 
assembling a massive jigsaw puzzle (13), familiarization with the instrumental acoustic 
space (13, 25) and finding a beginning early on (20). Those blessed with commissions as 
their starting point also mentioned specific-period visual art and novels (23), the medium 
creating its own ideas (3), other fields of meaning (8), a developing aesthetic (15) and 
perhaps just writing the piece they were always going to write anyway (19). Mention of 
just doodling (2), improvisation (22) and using pragmatics (14) is made. 
Finding trigger points speaks of being affected by one’s environment and having 
the ability to spot and be moved by the effect it has upon you. Some interviewees 
translated their answers into a problem-solving paradigm as if it helps to see their role as 
                                                          
1 The germinal idea, the seed, leading on to the single entity of a work is discussed in the context of being 
inspired in Jonathan Harvey, Music and Inspiration, 139. 
2 Gamatria is a Kabbalistic method of interpreting the Hebrew Scriptures by computation. Numerical value 
is seen as present in words and in the letters that make up words. 
(In a Composition) 
Trigger points of inspiration or ideas: 
Problem solving: 
From commission (as my usual starting point): 
Hearing other music: 
Doodling or improvising: 
Using pragmatics: 
 0           5          10           15          20 
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specifically goal-orientated and part of art being to place self-imposed boundaries around 
their effort. Motivation through commission is low. 
 
Beginnings 2.  How much is newness involved in what you try to compose?  
(Newness can play a role in creativity in many different ways. The interviewees are 
encouraged to wax lyrical here—and they do.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This question sometimes raises the sub-question as to ‘new for whom?’ Some 
immediately answer ‘always’ (4, 15, 16, 26). Issues wrapped inside being affirmative 
about newness involve balance (15), an individual voice (15, 26), being personally new 
(2, 7—“I do not have to be creative.  I just am”, 13, 16, 20, 24), to extend oneself (2, 4), 
building it in (3), a responsibility (25), freshness (7, 8), instrumental technique and 
structure (9), uniqueness (20), use of old elements (19, 22—“You take old elements and 
place them together in new ways. Each composition should be new in some way. 
Otherwise you are repeating someone else’s stuff”), (19)—“If you have nothing original 
to say, there is no point in writing music”, non-iconoclastic (6) and uncertain as to what 
is new (5). In not being the main aim, the ‘main’ was stated to being original or unique 
(10, 18—“tasty title”), exploration (14), personal interest (17), fulfilling the piece’s 
demands (11), newness [is] a priority of the young (11), built into innovation and 
challenges (1) and trying not to repeat oneself (23). In claiming there is no objective here, 
other objectives cited are avoiding the sameness of new music (13), layering and timbral 
nuance (21) and progressive and experimental (21). In deferring to others, ‘the other’ is 
more capable (7) or some knowledge reference point such as other opinions to force 
evaluation (27). In having no idea, there is suspicion we can swim in murky waters 
(research) but maybe we should prefer the clear water of being accepted such as in 
conservatism (12). 
Newness plays varying roles, the most important being that the other (performers, 
listeners, critics) should experience it at some point. Little comment on the differential 
effect of newness is made in that the effect of newness normally decreases with 
I aim for it somehow:  
It is not the main objective for me, but still present: 
It is not an objective for me:  
It involves others’ judgment more than mine:  
I am clueless and possibly suspicious of motives here: 
 0           5          10           15          20 
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familiarity. No composer talks of newness being refreshed by repeat listenings to their 
works (via this question) and finding new effects and things in the re-listening. If we 
propose newness as an essence to creative composing, it appears it is taken for granted 
that the other will naturally experience the new when being affected by the music for the 
first time. 
 
The Finished Product 
Product 1. What is the nature of finished product in creative composition? 
(This question appears straightforward if we view musical composition as writing the 
score and then handing it on to others to work from. But the question is potentially more 
an open invitation to obtain a wide variety of answers about how we conclude our 
creative offerings, if at all. The question does not say ‘What is the finished product ….’ It 
avoids the inference that it is a real object that should form part of the answer.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In choosing the performance as a finishing point, the work’s success must be 
concentrated there (16), hopefully signing off on the first performance (13), finality 
depends on a good performance (25, 22, 24), being performed at least once (26), a 
performance that is listened to (and is also its renewal) (19) and an important milestone 
(3). Some interviewees want finality in letting the work have a life of its own (24, 22, 
26). In choosing no particular end point, reasoning includes that creativity never stops (1, 
17, 23), we always have a work in progress (4, 20), the composition outlives the 
composer somehow (11), to be able to ‘fiddle’ with the score whenever desired (12) and 
any stage can be an end (15). Ambiguity is suggested in many ways such as completeness 
in having some form of physical manifestation (14), the solving of problems has reached 
critical mass (6), finality fulfilling some form of plan (7), perhaps doubting a work’s 
existence until it is performed (21), aspiring to some manifestation of beauty (8) and 
having secured the carrot [as opposed to being subject to the stick] in the situation (18). 
In choosing the score as the finished product, reasoning involves Platonism (9), an end of 
It is mainly in the performance: 
There is no end point here: 
Some ambiguity is involved: 
It is mainly in the score: 
No answer is given: 
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the composer’s responsibility (10), it is the first tangible point (5), enabling to then move 
to a performance (12) and a certain finality (that might then change!) (2). One composer 
is unable to answer the question, it being ‘too subjective’ (27). 
 
Product 2. When studying your compositions as finished works, how much 
juxtaposition3 and change do you see in them? 
(This reflective question invites a view that there is such a thing as a finished product 
and, having reached that point, the composer then chooses between the extremes of 
letting go through to being a serial revisionist. The use of juxtaposition invites the work 
to be seen as a collection of parts in some way put together, albeit with what might be 
termed creativity. But this question also tests composers’ abilities not to be bound by the 
terminology of others so that they could easily say with credibility: “My works don’t 
have any juxtaposition in them—it is not needed; they are seamless.”) 
 
 
 
 
 
Some composers see lots of juxtaposition (23, 2, 26, 27, 3, 16) coupled with stasis 
(13), used as structural tools (24), a means to the end of contrasting movements (7), a 
breaking of symmetry (9), to create a chemical reaction (12), as part of a jigsaw approach 
(6), as contrast to raising questions (20), maintaining the attention of the audience (22), 
present in larger works (8) and as negotiating between extremes (25). Some see change 
manifested all over the place (4, 17, 26, 27), as sudden (11, 6), as structural (24, 17), 
different from work to work (15), highlighting spectralism (5), tightly monitored in film 
music (18), having a narrow bandwidth (12), as a servant to finding a coherent narrative 
(20), needed for variety and change in a long work (22) and a negotiation between 
extremes (25). Some have their attention elsewhere such as hearing works in full (1), 
wanting works to slowly unfold (8), avoiding the label of being chunky (10), being 
organic and flowing (19) and it not being possible to view works this way (21). 
                                                          
3 Nicholas Cook, “Uncanny Moments: Juxtaposition and the Collage Principle in Music,” in Approaches to 
Meaning in Music, Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006), 109. Cook sees music in terms of montage and as ‘collage transferred to a temporal medium.’ 
When experiencing juxtaposition and discontinuity, he notes that the place of “intellectualized remote 
musical relationships … [is] meaningless if not built on the foundation of a moment-to-moment 
listening.” 
I see juxtaposition: 
I see change: 
Not really; it is something else: 
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Product 3. Is the change [in these works considered as finished entities] episodic, 
regular, random, or what? Does this constitute form or structure to you? 
(This question could bring preferred form or structure to the fore and why that 
preference is made. It continues the exploration of how constructionist the composer 
wants to be, raised in the previous question.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All manner of connections are made here with a few commonalities: ‘Episodic’ 
figures (5, 4, 17) as part of form or structure (16, 6, 7, 18, 23, 26, 22, 10, 24, 12), as 
abstract narrative (27), as ideas evolving (13) and with sporadic outbursts of randomness 
(18), making connections (8) and growing out of sequencing (3). One composer avoids 
episodes using layering to obscure them (11). The regularity of episodes (5) is connected 
to song writing (17). Logic figures are significant in this respect for some (1, 2). Random 
elements are eschewed by some (14, 4, 8, 20, 25) but are also hinted at as being aleotoric 
(4), irrelevant (19) but also regarded as present by design (21). Narrative is cited as being 
invoked here (9, 15). 
 
Product 4. Is there any sense in which your creation/composition is spoilt if not heard 
from start to finish? 
(This question invites a recognition of the coherence and completeness of a composition 
through performance such that there would be loss if not experienced this way. It also 
tests the sensitivity of the composer to their product perhaps being commodified and 
traded in the musical market place somehow.) 
 
 
 
 
It is episodic and can involve structure: 
There is randomness: 
It is regular: 
It is logical: 
There is narrative involved: 
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The positive answers (25, 18, 21—causing offence, 3) are amplified with that 
works are designed to be heard in entirety (10, 13), waiting for the pay-off (19), you 
would otherwise miss the point (27), or otherwise only seeing the lips of the Mona Lisa 
(4), we are not dealing with musak (5), you would miss the whole structure (1), miss all 
the places in the journey (11), miss the whole context (2), miss the non-teleological 
approach (14) and the composer being possessive of the work (26). In being partly in 
agreement, this answer is supported with it depending on the piece (7, 12, 20, 22, 24—
pragmatic, 15), understanding more if heard in entirety (8), detesting ‘ignorant insensitive 
event non-musical managers’ hacking at the performance (12) and excerpts being 
difficult to choose to represent the whole (16). Not being concerned about this point (6) is 
also noted, by being happy for the listener to tune in halfway through (17), Ok if we are 
dealing with a labyrinthine structure (9) and simply being pragmatic (23). 
 
Product 5. In what way is your music idiomatic?  
(This question is meant to provoke thoughts on whether idiomatic properties are present, 
important or observable, and by whom.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is some diffidence present in composers here even in the affirmative 
answers. In terms of specific content, idioms are made out of always being jazz (2), 
slipping in odd notes to color chords (3), a dialog with the many (6), frequent repeats of 
harmony, rhythm as mannerisms (7), Asian-inspired sources (8, 26), a deception of sound 
origin (8), practical performability (9), calling-card fixed chords that spread the registers 
(10), blurring of harmonics, ambiguity, elusiveness and nostalgia (11), controlled chaos 
(25), minimalism and bitonality (26) and favoring violin sounds as building blocks (27). 
Some choose to be idiomatic for the instruments used (15, 20, 23, 24).  Some point to the 
importance of comments from other than themselves (13, 17, 4, 1, 12, 22), adding that 
improvisation is important idiomatically (18). Several composers are told that their music 
There is a specific content: 
Someone else says so: 
It is made idiomatic for the instruments used:  
It is identified by others as ‘that is your music’: 
I don’t know: 
 0           5          10           15          20 
171 
 
could be readily identified (16, 14, 19, 27). Some composers just find themselves unable 
to answer the question (13, 21, 5). 
 
Product 6. Do you need to show any reverence or reference in your work to previous 
influences? If so, why? If not, why not? 
(This question provokes views on any historical, influential or provenancial connection 
to what has been produced by the composer.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some emphatic positives and negatives are found here, with the positives justified 
with many reasons, quoting composers, works and other persons. ‘Mentioned in 
dispatches’ are: 
(Composers mentioned) 
J. S. Bach (8) 
Anne Boyd – was influenced by in every way (15) 
Brenton Broadstock – to help find one’s own feet (24)  
John Cage – like an uncle (8) 
Frederick Chopin (8) 
George Crumb – influenced by (9)  
Miles Davis (8) 
Claude Debussy – a ‘great uncle’ (8) 
Chris Dench – major flute repertoire (9) 
Brian Ferneyhough – major flute repertoire (9)  
Olivier Messiaen – the concept of musical color (3), influenced by (9),  
Sergei Prokofiev - Piano Sonata No.6 (1908) first work was a direct response to (15) 
Sergei Rachmaninoff (3) 
Peter Sculthorpe – a musical father (8), a lasting impression on being a composer (11), 
gave a large-scale aesthetic view (12)  
Maurice Ravel – a ‘great uncle’ to me (8) 
Yes:  
I don’t need to but do it anyway: 
It will happen somehow: 
No: 
I am ambivalent or unconsciously so: 
 0           5          10           15 
172 
 
Arnold Schoenberg – western tradition (23) 
Dmitri Shostakovich and Fats Waller - quoting both composers’ works together in one 
piece Staklanov (2006) (25) 
Igor Stravinsky – influenced by his late music (9) 
Toru Takemitsu – a lasting impression in living-out being a composer (11) 
Edgard Varèse – referenced his works (9) 
(Works or performers mentioned) 
Louis Andriessen, De Staat (1976) - (he was my teacher) spectacular impact and 
gesture (23) 
Béla Bartók string quartets (11) 
George Crumb, Black Angels (1970) - stunned, shocked, exited by the work (1) 
The Flinders Quartet, in String Quartet No.2 (2011) of (20) 
György Ligeti, Volumina (1962) opened up the use of graphic scores (17) 
Karlheinz Stockhausen, Trans (1970) – a spectacular impact and gesture (23) 
Karri Tiki – an inspiration for Fearless Dreams (2011) (26) 
Iannis Xenakis, Keqrops (1986) a spectacular impact and gesture (23) 
Howard Skempton, Aftertrace (1994) (15) composed in the light of experiencing 
Skempton’s Trace (1980) 
(Persons mentioned) 
John Blacking and his book How Musical Is Man? (1974) (8) 
Bill Evans – an exceptional jazz player (11)  
John Garron – a great commissioner (20) 
Irene Harrow – a supporter (financial, moral?) (20) 
Paul Klee – tabula rasa (8) 
John Meredith – folk song lyrics (20) 
The need to show reference and reverence is emphasized by it not being possible to 
compose otherwise (8, 4, 15), being greatly influenced by having a need (3), recognizing 
previous great achievement (6, 16, 12), having an attraction to personalities that teach so 
much (11), hard not to show reference (20), doing so is part of a great tradition (20, 12), 
having a magpie syndrome (26), by communicating (26), helping to frame a musical pose 
(12), understanding the social and temporal context (23), role modelling (15) and being 
stunned by hearing a work (1). If no need is present, some say it happens anyway (13) 
and by virtue of turning points in a career (17), showing awe and admiration (22), by 
resonating with previous compositions (or composers) (21), the me will naturally imbibe 
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and include where desired (19) and for programmatic reasons (24). If this need to show 
happens somehow, it is probably a talisman effect (5), facing up to them [the 
predecessors] being there (14), being the product of what you consume musically (14) 
and by a non-vacuous looking-back (7). Any ambivalence or unconsciousness is 
characterized by difficulty in avoidance (25) and composing in the shadow of ‘the 
greater’ (9). An outright negation is supported by it happening anyway (2), a certainty of 
position (18), the past being unable to be erased from within us (27) and being young and 
finding one’s own way (10). 
 
Product 7. What do you understand music to be? 
(This is a general question to see how the interviewee can cope with and zero in on 
topics. Composers are given ample opportunity to paint the big picture for me if they 
want to. Any response that becomes extensive meets with encouragement that other 
questions could enable amplification in different ways.) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edgard Varèse’s4 definition is reached for by quite a few composers, some in a 
matter-of-fact manner. Music as structure can enable artistic content (4, 15), semantics 
(21), abstraction(s) (21), to replicate the human voice and body, as song and dance (11) 
and create cohesion (2). Music is an aural art, to manipulate in a creative way (17). 
Semantics distinguishes music from sound (21). The communicative discourse enables 
personal meaning (21), cannot be removed from social context (13), is humanity’s 
beating heart (8), a fundamental human need (14), wavelengths we attune to (22) and 
exhibits purposeful intelligence (9). Bird song (6) and the sound of rain (10) sometimes 
get included in the definition. When composers use ‘being Cagian’, the use is 
conceptually a little problematic to me but I think the intention is to say music can mean 
                                                          
4 Edgard Varèse, “The Liberation of Sound,” Perspectives of New Music 5 (1966), 18. Varèse’s words are: 
“I decided to call my music ‘organized sound’ and myself, not a musician, but ‘a worker in rhythms, 
frequencies, and intensities.’” 
It is structured or organized or cohesive sound: 
It is a discourse or communication in sound,  
often involving our humanity: 
It is Cagian—music can mean anything:  
It is mysterious or changeable: 
It is both structured and unstructured sound: 
It is a way of thinking: 
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anything, which is to treat the question as if it asks what does music mean. A composer 
can admit to there being mystery here (16, 23) and that his or her view can change from 
time to time (3, 23). It could simply be a way of thinking (18). 
 
Technique and Process 
Technique 1.  Where does form and structure play a role for you?  
(This question highlights a constructionist viewpoint—its importance and use—and 
explores the composers’ reliance upon structure in their works.) 
 
 
 
 
There is no clear categorization apparent here, except perhaps in terms of when and 
how form and structure come into play. They are essential for some (23, 18, 5, 6, 21, 26), 
music being form and structure (19), as primary concepts (1), that form is structure (9) 
and ‘higher levels’ are involved too (21). The all-importance and early intervention of 
form and structure (2) is characterized by being non-accidental (10), having a need to 
know ‘soon’ (3), in mapping a structure (7), as an aide memoire (15), being omnipresent 
to fit fragments into (27, 16), being a major decision point (17), essential to making 
progress (16), to enable a break from linear composing (11) and enabling clarity from a 
single seed (8). Sometimes the importance of form and structure fluctuate along the way 
(13, 2, 20), the structure changes (24), there is a concentration more on dramatic intensity 
(4), using a pre-thought scaffold (12), helping to coalesce fragments (15), looking for 
unity versus variation (22) and the right argument of tension and release (25). 
There are no significant dissenters on the primacy of form and structure. It seems 
form and structure are deemed an integral part of composition where being creative this 
way has been given little mention. The question is partly closed so it is not surprising no 
mention of creativity has been made. However composers are indicating that, be it 
deemed creative or not, form and structure figure centrally in their efforts to compose. 
 
Technique 2.  Is your composition an exercise in coping with or controlling complexity? 
If so, why is complexity attractive to you? 
I need to have them early on (or) they are all pervading: 
They are primary concepts: 
They are important and come into play or change along the way: 
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(This question invites the interviewees to explore whether they are at all motivated by 
making their work complex, as if it were a property to be striven for. Composers are 
ambivalent on the significance of complexity, e.g., by writing both very simple and 
technically very difficult music to play. Some composers are observed to give complexity 
pre-eminence.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recognition of using complexity in composition is potentially a contentious 
point with many composers depending on the inherent value of complexity for achieving 
effect. Some composers are very positive on the role of complexity, sometimes calling it 
fun or enjoyment (2, 21, 24, 20), being the way they ticked (9, 27), recognizing life is 
complex (9, 25), part of fundamental communication (27)—“ I don’t need to explain the 
techniques – these are how the aesthetic outcomes are shaped.”, being like problem 
solving (2), unappreciated by the listener (16), used in measure (14), to enable richness 
(21), as a step to getting simplicity (8, 24) and as part of synthesis (20). When complexity 
is regarded as non-central, more emphasis is made on writing expressively (6), making 
music straightforward (26), not being an issue (10, 11), liking simplicity (11), not an end 
in itself (18), making patterns that can be followed (19) and needed for some types of 
music (23). A ‘no’ response is qualified with having no interest (13), being annoyed at 
the prospect (17), having an interest in simplicity (15), used as ornamentation being a 
waste of time (1) and simplicity being the harder challenge (5). Some do not think that an 
exercise in complexity figured at all in it being too abstract a concept (4), being more 
interested in the color concept (3), giving it no consideration at all (7), not understanding 
the concept ‘complex’ (12) and being dismissive of even answering (22). 
Composers have not linked complexity with creativity here. They have, however, 
linked complexity with enjoyment and appropriateness, i.e., its attractiveness. Since 
significantly more composers have downplayed complexity rather than considered it an 
important property, complexity cannot be said to figure prominently for most composers. 
The responses show a wide variety of other reasoning that focusses elsewhere, e.g., 
writing expressively. 
Yes: 
This is not a central issue for me: 
No: 
I do not think of it that way: 
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Technique 3.  How much or little do you put fragments, jottings, sketches together to 
create a work? 
(This question goes to the ‘in-process’ craft or techne of the composer. This apparently 
closed question does not deter answers that don’t recognize technique as a major part of 
their musical toolbox. It is a little difficult to avoid implying a constructionist approach 
to composing when asking such a question. There is a large literature on the 
interpretation of musical sketches, as if this is a recognized (and inferentially successful) 
method of composing.) 
 
 
 
 
 
The question invites a connection between having micro and macro thoughts when 
composing a work. Those who identify closely with the fragment or sketch metaphor (3, 
19, 5, 17, 24), add many other techniques to it such as using the big sheet of paper on 
which to ‘put things’ (15), drafting (21), accumulation of the small (25, 7), “A lot. I have 
meta-cognitive ideas of complex sound that I cannot remember in toto so I need to 
construct layers of detail helped by having what you suggest are called ciphers.” (10), 
going through a series of such moves (7), enjoying the sorting process (20), numeration 
and improvisation (23), “creating a palette of possibilities” (26) [this is the pre-reflective 
body-subject concept], using charts and diagrams (9) and using a dual ‘macro–micro’ 
viewpoint (11). In fragments or sketches being a starting point (12), to this is added 
development (22), using graphic improvisation (14), patchwork mix-and-match (16) and 
discovery to open up possibilities (4). When part of a bigger picture, the focus was 
elsewhere such as a top-down or a big-picture approach (1, 2), teasing out into a larger 
cohesion (13) and solving the jigsaw moving from centrifugal to centripetal thought (6). 
Those who claim not to work this way mention using encryptions or seeds of ideas (8), 
linear operation of sculpting and molding (27) and being simply disinterested in the 
metaphor (18). 
No mention of how being creative is associated with composing in this way is 
mentioned, probably because the question talks in a nuts-and-bolts way about composing 
rather than an attitudinal way. However, there is a suggestion that a sorting process is 
taking place with ‘mind objects’ becoming ‘score objects’ and vice versa to find a way 
A lot, with sketches seen as fragments too: 
This is more a starting point: 
This is part of a big picture involving fragments: 
Not really: 
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forward, e.g., contrasting charts and diagrams or a palette of possibilities and teasing out 
possibilities.  
Supplementary Question: 
Technique 4.  What gives rise to such fragments and what is the ‘glue’ that appropriately 
fixes them together? 
(This question invokes ‘glue’ as if we are adding to the constructionist view of composing 
music. The writer is enabling or gently provoking an understanding that some form of 
creativity as process might be taking place within a composer, but not to prejudge or 
provoke how it happens.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragments (used here as a generic term) are seen to be part of a master plan (1, 2) 
with qualifications such as a regard to overall parameters (13), composing ‘in the score’ 
(19), having a joint macro/micro view (21), having lists (25) and going into a flow state 
(14).5 Sometimes there is a trigger point or event such as a sound (11), a defining 
instrumentation (15), receiving from the ‘outside’ or improvising (17, 24), an idea (18) 
and having a previous painting and drawing (20). A sense of preservation-before-being-
lost is cited, such as recording ideas that come so quickly (3), recall from previous works 
(4) and potential usefulness (7). Some find their genesis mysterious (12) or the fragments 
“just fit together easily” (16). 
The ‘glue’ metaphor is readily appropriated by most composers and overlaid with 
structuralism (17), in terms of combining (7), having foreground and background (4), 
using numerical grids/charts (9), being the genesis of the parts (10), “I guess the Glue is 
the musical ”story” I have to find.  To repeat; for me it is very important to have a notion 
                                                          
5 See Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery And Invention, (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1996). 
(Fragments) 
They fit into a master plan, framework, context, rule base 
 or structure: 
There are trigger point manifestations: 
They preserve thoughts, drawn from improvisation and 
 otherwise lost: 
The matter is mysterious: 
 
(Glue) 
It is structural: 
I don’t work this way: 
Other miscellaneous definitions are given: 
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[or ideal] of the completed piece.  I want to have, and then I want the listener to 
experience, a “Wow!” factor when the piece concludes.” (11) [‘wow’ is newness and 
disruption], having a developmental framework (12), imposing boundary conditions (13), 
seeing parts in context (15), having a harmonic framework and juxtaposition (16), seeing 
embodied quality in each fragment (23), ‘solutionising’ to fit together (24) and having a 
self-contained single idea (25). Other definitions are offered such as finding things in 
common (6), craft and creativity collecting the ‘joins’ (26), almost anything will do it (5) 
and being an uninterrupted readout of an ephemeral state (14). When declining to use the 
glue metaphor, other interests mention finding organic unity (8), using the ‘sticky tape’ 
of insertions (20), invoking organic growth (19, 22), doubt about a definition but aiming 
for integration anyway (21) and not being motivated this way (27). 
The concept of fragments is mainly understood by whether they, the fragments, are 
perceived to ‘fit’ into a master plan, provoked by triggers or captured before being lost 
(and thus valued in some way). It is no surprise that the concept of glue provokes 
structural thoughts, in everything fitting together according to some pre-conceived 
notion. This thought returns us to the answers to the primary question that attached 
significance to form and structure for musical composition. 
 
Technique 5.  Are stasis, minimalism, and silence means to worthwhile end in creative 
composition? If so, how? 
(This question invites relatively recent forms and genres to be given some credence. 
Other forms could have been chosen but the three on offer are more absences than 
obvious presences in music. The composer has been provoked to examine the parts of 
music that might be regarded as ‘saying’ less to see how they explain significance of use 
in music.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Stasis) 
Yes: 
No: 
(Minimalism) 
Yes: 
No: 
(Silence) 
Yes: 
No: 
 
Other answers: 
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Strong positive assertions are present here (2, 26, 3, 19) associating stasis with 
musical drones (17) [pedal notes, not autonomous flying objects], minute changes (5), a 
counterfoil to activity (9), “Yes.  Stasis for humans makes them uncomfortable” (8) 
[disruption], parabolic forms (21), making a lot from a little (7), conveying death (10), 
holding a pose (20), as a form of layering (11), to represent non-teleological concepts 
(14), creating episodic music (23), in tension with activity (25) and efficacious in film 
music (18). Mild interest is expressed in stasis being a valid concept (22), the least 
worthwhile of the three offered (24) and it being a lack of change of harmony (4). The 
naysayers regard stasis as a problem because it is a journey [not standing still] that is 
desired (12) and stasis is regarded as an undesired minimalist technique (13). 
Enthusiasm for minimalism (17, 18) is amplified as being beautiful but limited 
(12), non-teleological (14), making the most of a little (7), mesmeric (11, 10), valid in 
small amounts (22), leading on to go deeper (10), minimalizing the parameters used (23), 
dictating a constricted structure (24), the repetition of little cells (19), treated as a 
resource (6) and “this is a bit passé as a means nowadays but can still be used.” (5). 
Detractors are sometimes quite vociferous (20, 21, 25, 13), troubled by minimalism (8), 
seeing minimalism as ‘idiot music’ (9) or dismissing it as style (4). 
A range of positive reactions to silence include its use as essential or important (5, 
14, 24, 8, 7, 10, 19), associated with texture (10), problematic when unintentional (16), 
giving time to breathe (18), enabling contemplating what has just been heard (9), 
heightening tension (9), used like white in painting (20), as a foil (21), as just another 
note in the scale (17) but should be used in moderation (26, 22). 
Some answers are simply ‘off the wall’ but are not pejorative. For one composer, 
change constitutes form and structure creating moments of flow6 (1). One said: “Do 
composers group themselves into camps? YES.” (15). Another interviewee said: “They 
are all part of a whole (not a minimal answer!)—so keep asking the question.” (27). 
Mention of change speaks of the unexpected, ‘Off the wall’ speaks of the 
unpredictable, ‘uncomfortable’ speaks of being unreasonable, all of which are linked to 
disruption. 
 
 
                                                          
6 See Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery And Invention, (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1996).  
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Technique 6.  Can stasis, minimalism, and silence be ends in themselves in creative 
composition? If so, how?   
(This question is a check on how the composers set out a case that distinguishes medium 
from message. It is left to them to choose which is which if they want to.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A positive response (10, 25, 21, 6, 26, 19) to stasis is augmented by making stasis 
into an aesthetic (27), having a different relationship to time (17), stasis being the initial 
idea (18), yet not meaningful in and of itself (5), 4’33” (1952) [by John Cage] proving 
the point (7), resisting fighting against stasis (16), “Yes – I don’t know how to explain 
this one.  I have used stasis to create music in which we are less aware of time passing.” 
(15) {Bergson’s lived time], concentrating more on rhythm and texture (4), as a 
beginning and relative (8), to induce trance (1) but finally debatable as to worth (12). A 
negative response (22) is further justified with it being an emergent property (14), a tool 
(20), music always needing emotion and feelings (11), apparently present but overridden 
by development (2), not compositionally satisfying (24) and of no interest (13).  To one 
composer, stasis is a chimera (9). 
A positive response (17, 25, 21, 10, 19, 6) to minimalism is augmented by bringing 
out of significance (5), making an aesthetic (27), it was a strong concept for a section 
(26), working [as in a method that worked] for them (2), as a strict “Reichian type” (7), 
as a set of techniques with much repetition (8), the need to stop fighting it [minimalism] 
(16), minimalism generated an atmosphere of excitement (15) and minimalism being an 
initial idea (18). Strong reluctance to agree is buttressed by saying “minimalism is silence 
– nothingness; would that end be reached by its proponents regularly” (9) and debatable 
as to its worth (12). A negative response (11, 22) is supported by saying minimalism is 
(Stasis) 
Yes: 
No: 
(Minimalism) 
Yes: 
No: 
(Silence) 
Yes: 
No: 
 
All three only have impact as a ’one-off’: 
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an emergent property (14), a tool (20), just style (4), “Sure, but not for me.  It is not 
compositionally satisfying,” (24) and of no interest (13). 
Positive responses (10, 17, 19, 18, 9, 27, 4, 6) to silence are added to with silence 
being compositionally satisfying (24), resisting the need to fight against it (16), being 
‘close’ to silence (5), 4’33” (1960?) [by John Cage] being a prime example [and creative 
without question] (7, 15), having a different idea to Cage – an absence of conscious 
thought (8), silence being difficult to judge in length (3), a strong concept for a section 
(26) but of debatable worth (12). Negativity (22, 2) is further amplified by regarding 
silence as an emergent property (14), the need for emotion and feeling (11) and of no 
interest (13). 
One composer comments that all three—stasis, minimalism and silence—only had 
any potential impact in a one-off usage (23). 
One might question whether anything about these three properties can be creative 
since we are talking more about absence rather than presence. But Cage has reminded us 
that there is no such thing as silence because background sound is still there along with 
body language of performers. Most composers recognize the use of these three properties 
to be efficacious in some way. Some composers mention that stasis is as much a state of 
mind as a conclusion drawn from analysis. 
 
Technique 7.  Where do you see the familiar musical arc in your product? 
(The composer is asked to contemplate upon a specific metaphor for how a work can be 
described or understood. It gets hit to the boundary by a few who do not identify with the 
metaphor.) 
 
 
 
 
 
I use the ‘familiar musical arc’ as a metaphor as if everybody in music could be 
aware of it, which is not necessarily true or valid. This provokes plenty of reactive 
comment. A ready affinity to the metaphor is found (10, 2, 20, 12) buttressed by it being 
good enough for Beethoven (20), exactly what is intended (16), to experience a journey 
(25), distorted and plural (6, 1, 3), a clarity–dissolution duality (12), sometimes present 
It is there somehow: 
I do not see it: 
I am not particularly aware of its presence: 
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(13, 1), a climactic point and foothills (3) and stressing how its neatness is infringed (4). 
A lesser emphasis on arch is qualified with it being shape and form anyway (5), being 
dramatic or emotional (7), more a journey (22, 26), being part of a complex pathway (23) 
and finding the top of the arch thence to ‘glide downhill’ afterwards (24). There is a 
resolute ‘no’ from some (15, 17—“Not at all.  I don’t know what you mean by musical 
arch.”, 18, 21, 11), adding a lack of understanding (19, 14), preferring the spiral (8), 
making a labyrinthine structure (9), resisting historical structures (14) and an ad infinitum 
journeying (27). 
The creativity of composers is brought to light by this obviously closed question as 
they indicate that they do not really require any suggestions as to shapes (or any other 
semiotic or form) that could describe their music. A number of composers are almost 
pejorative in dismissing the need for an arc concept, preferring other geometric shapes as 
descriptions of their work and ideas. What does emerge are comments that arc implies 
journeying and experiencing what is happening at stages of a work, e.g., to glide 
downhill. Here it is reasonable to think that a player or listener can sense that an easing of 
tension has come about and the end is near. In saying this, it remains problematic as to 
whether creativity is associated with the way such endings are brought about or that the 
music just makes us feel that way (even if the end is not nigh) or even whether these two 
experiences have a specific relationship to one another. 
 
Technique 8.  ‘Opposites’, ‘duality’, ‘dichotomy’, ‘dilemma’ are words used to define a 
spectrum of facility, view or property. What role does any thinking like this play in 
being creative musically, e.g., cresc/dim? Name some dualities important to you. 
(This question checks how much the interviewee is thinking categorically in a modernist 
way.) 
 
 
 
 
 
The composers readily latch onto imagery, semiotic or metaphor, with only a 
few declining to attach importance to the question; but the decliners do not overly 
dismiss it. The dualities cited are plentiful, so much so that the importance of them 
Dualities are chosen with reasons given: 
Dualities are not central for me:  
Dualities represent spectrums to me:  
No answer is offered: 
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to each composer is voiced more by punctuating their answer than through a direct 
statement of them.  
Dualities or binaries detected: 
 ‘Fast–slow’ (contrast and transitions) (12) 
 ‘High–low’ (for contrast) (2) 
 ‘High–low’ (in register and the opposition to or negotiation between) (25)  
 ‘Light–dark’ (in terms of color as used by Olivier Messiaen) (3) 
 ‘Light–dark’ (plenty of drama) (13) 
 ‘Light–heavy’ (I am not sure if this usage was the same as for light–dark) (13) 
 ‘Pure tone–noise’ (random comes from pure tones) (27) 
 ‘Harmony–melody’ (diatonic, chromatic and microtonal) (23) 
 ‘Silence–sound’ (5) 
 ‘Thick dense–clear’ (3) 
 Mood change (24) 
 ‘Simple–compound’ (7) 
 Juxtaposition (for incongruity, modes, scales) (23) 
 ‘Tension–release’ (2, 25) 
 ‘Unity–ambiguity’ (5) 
 ‘Beautiful–ugly’ (11) 
 ‘Serenity–aggravation’ (or more than two properties) (11) 
 ‘Contrast–complementarity’ (9,14) 
 ‘Clarity–obscurity’ (from the solid to the dissolution) (12) 
 ‘Texture–instrumentation’ (7) 
 ‘Delicate–robust or brutish’ (to create tension) (5) 
 ‘Humor–lack thereof’ (I think that what was inferred) (24)  
 ‘Popular–classical’ (big spectrum available) (26) 
 ‘Traditional skills–jazz elements’ (22) 
 ‘Activity–inactivity’ (to create surprise) (18) 
 ‘Energy (joy)–beauty (bliss)’ (16) 
 ‘Thesis–antithesis (but no synthesis)’ (13) 
 ‘Innovative–musical (restoring a balance)’ (14) 
 ‘Intellect–intuition’ (14) 
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 ‘Instinct–technique’ (19) 
 ‘Time to write (long)–time to experience (short)’ (16) 
 ‘Guessing expectation in others–personal musical desire (can paralyze you)’ (16)  
A range between two extremes is detected: 
 ‘Density–dynamics’ (each can be varied in conjunction with the other) (6) 
 ‘Spectrum–continuum’ (26)  
 ‘Atonal–tonal’ (26—to explore in the middle) 
 ‘Pulse–no pulse’ (26) 
 ‘Order–disorder’ (in the form of a bounded continuum) (9) 
 ‘Abstraction–concreta’ (from one to the other) (9) 
Those who regard duality as non-central to their thinking hold other matters more 
important, such as the contrast of, or between, many properties to imply structure (21), 
musical character and feeling of a work (4), cycles (perhaps in being feminine) (8), 
process and being sociable (17), suppressing the verbal in many modes of thought (20) 
and leaving dichotomy to the performers (17). One composer could not give an answer 
(1). 
 
Technique 9. Is your creativity directly coupled to composition or could it equally be 
coupled to say gardening or strong adherence to a belief system? 
(This question directly examines the proportion of creative output, such as internally 
defined by the interviewee, which goes into composing rather than anywhere else. It 
invites a wider definition of being creative and where the composer might believe that 
creativity is happening.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorization here has difficulties due to choice of phrases of the interviewees. 
However, a close coupling is experienced by some (4, 12, 15, 14, 23—“ … but 
eventually settled on composition as a main interest.”, 19, 11, 8, 27, 3) adding side-
shoots of conducting and arranging (12), teaching (15, 14), cooking (15, 19), gardening 
(14, 8, 3), Bonsai (23), painting (23, 19, 27), curiosity and “I could do that” (11) [lived-
It is coupled to other ways and I am active in all: 
It is directly or primarily coupled to composition: 
There is room for other minor excursions or necessities: 
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body experience]. When making room for other creative activities, others are added such 
as writing (13), artistic direction (13), web design (13), motherhood (24—“It is coupled 
directly to composition for me and also motherhood. I am a hopeless cook or gardener! I 
do think my creativity plays a strong role in me being a good mum – I take that very 
seriously”, 22), drawing (7), decorating (7) and creativity being used ‘all over the place’ 
(24, 20). When mentioning that other activities absorbed their creativity (5, 18—“Yes. It 
is not exclusively directed at music.”, 2), mention is also made of graphic design (16), 
committee service (16), poetry (26, 9, 21), writing (26, 21), chess problems (9), 
(non)conceptual thinking (10), [creativity] being opportunistic in art generally (17), 
photography (21), painting (21, 25), cooking (25), playing squash (25) and simply 
moving along the pathways encouraged into (1). 
 
Technique 10. What sort of routine is conducive to you being compositionally creative? 
(Here, the significance of technique or craft via discipline is checked.) 
 
 
 
 
 
A regular workday attitude comes to the fore (13—“Nine to five”, 12) involving 
balance (2), choosing times in the day (3, 4, 6—“I prefer working in the morning. 
Afternoons are not normally as productive”, 7, 8, 23, 15), having big blocks of time (1, 8, 
12, 19), drinking strong coffee (8) and avoiding excessive alcohol (23, 25—“Later at 
night is good but not too much alcohol.”). Limiting the length of one working block of 
time, to prevent non-productivity, is cited (23, 16). Family life ‘got in the way’ for many 
to limit their aspirations (admitting that family is their personal choice), such as upsetting 
any routine (18, 24), shortened time slots (10, 24), making composing fit around other 
matters (17), recognizing interruptive family life as actually creatively stimulating (20).  
Husbands (26) and wives (12) are a potential interruption to chosen times. When no set 
routine is admitted to (15), it is connected to not responding well to deadlines (9) or the 
deadlines helping (16), having the ability to be able to turn on and off easily (11), 
indulging in a compose-fest on rare occasions (21), wanting large blocks of time (22, 21) 
and “It is directly linked with a sort of cycle of creativity. I don’t need inspiration 
Regularity (in hours or days devoted entirely to composing): 
I don’t have any set routine: 
Aspects of family life impinge on choice: 
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necessarily because I know how to ‘build’, having listened to a particular sound.  But I 
have to be ‘ready’ to write music.” (27). 
 
Technique 11. What ambience is conducive to you composing?  
(Comment on the significance of any form of background effects, environment, muse, 
spirituality, emotion, social context, etc. is invited.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ambience brings forward key words such as:  
 space and isolation (19, 2, 1, 24—resonant, 12, 25, 6, 15, 17, 7, 23, 21—“ Extreme 
concentration to the elimination of all other inputs. It could even be a dark cave or 
late at night here … .”, 8, 21, 4—in the family home),  
 quiet (19, 2, 1—welcomes young daughter, 24, 25, 15, 16, 20, 21, 6, 9—preferred, 
13),  
 peace and stillness (19, 12, 23, 5, 26),  
 lack of distraction or interruption (25, 6, 15, 10, 16, 4—in the early stages),   
 having instrument(s) to hand (4—piano/clarinet/computer/Finale,  6—piano, 9—
recorders, 13—computer and MIDI, 26—piano), 
 a view (22—a vista is too busy, 15, 5—isolated, 21), 
 no phones or emails etc. (8, 3, 15), 
 comfortable (16, 13), 
 no spouse around (26), 
 light (20), 
Space   (separated from others): 
Quiet: 
Peace and stillness: 
Lack of distraction or interruption: 
Musical instruments are to hand: 
A view out of a window: 
Absence of phone, email (or communicating devices): 
Comfortable:  
No spouse is around: 
Light environment: 
A musical environment: 
Ability to be introspective: 
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 a musical environment (8), 
 the ability to be introspective (27). 
It is not surprising that the most valued assets within ‘ambience’ are space, 
isolation, quiet, peace and stillness, all of which can enable a clearer uninterrupted 
access to the sonic world composers wish to shape. 
 
Purpose 
Purpose 1. What purpose is there in you composing? 
(This question is made teleological to promote thoughts about why and how the 
interviewee is motivated to ‘create’ compositionally. Yet the word ‘create’ is not 
explicitly used and the question is made more open in this regard.) 
 
 
 
 
Communication is a key word used by interviewees here. This is positively 
reinforced with “I communicate. … [I] wish to allow for a variety of ‘true’ 
interpretations.” (5), engaging socially and preventing isolation (10), “Reaching back [to 
others] is really important to me - to make connections.” (2), being heard to affirm their 
sanity in the world (18), something to say into an end product (7), a prayer and 
meditation to the beyond (8), shared experience (8), a yearning for the feminine voice to 
be properly heard (8), “Composing allows me to use my entire existence in an effort to 
create and communicate.” (14) [essence-ial thoughts], demonstrate infinite possibilities 
(25), to validly change people (11) and contribute to society (11). Communication is 
negatively reinforced with fear of being the only one who actually hears the music in the 
head (18), sadness that only an isolated few might hear (8), trapped in the ‘selfishness’ of 
composing (25) and simply cannot stop oneself from doing it (11). A strongly self-
generated position stems from many reasonings such as being on this planet (22), 
unabashed selfishness (1), self-fulfilling (1, 20), just wanting to (6), to be awakened (6), 
an idiosyncratic contribution to culture (9), meaningfully (9), indulgent (15, 17), to leave 
the beautiful and valuable behind (15), best way to exhibit abstraction (27), cannot live 
without composing (27), peace of mind (26), enjoyment (26, 20) and a sense of being 
To communicate: 
It is all about me and expressing myself: 
I am able, willing and enjoy doing so: 
It is my job (my position in the world to ‘earn a crust’): 
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(26). In stressing ability and willingness to do so, this is qualified with ‘therefore must do 
so’ (3), a sense of satisfaction (4), trying out the new (12), playful because they can 
(12—“For me, the point of this difficult process (definitely hard!) is (a pause ensued 
here) to make me happy. Long ago, I found playing [an instrument] made me happy but 
now composing does so too.” 13), convey a viewpoint or message their way (12), 
important and a raison d’être (21), to be happy (20) and a creative outlet (22). Reaching 
for the matter-of-fact job, other factors are added such as audience engagement and 
fulfilling a brief (24), complying with the job spec. (23), furthering the intellectual debate 
(23), imagining to add to the pool (23) and having the right skill set (13). One 
interviewee thinks it is presumptuous to specify much further than just ‘job’ (19). 
 
Purpose 2. What gives rise to you wanting to be creative via musical composition?  
(Here we check for how controllable or otherwise the urge to compose and/or create is.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimization comes in the form of skill set (24), training (16), specific better ability 
(23), fluidity of medium (8), the most satisfying medium (26), style coupled with the 
chosen medium (7), expressiveness of multi-anything in abstraction (21), being good at 
(12), expertise and “I have a love of sheer sound,” (9) [Herder-like] and power via the 
medium (5). Compulsion and excitement manifest as infinite possibilities to addictively 
draw upon (18) [a form of ineffability], compositional problem solving (12), closing the 
void that existed without it [the want] (2) and generating one’s own sounds (18). 
Curiosity comes from wondering whether one could compose (11), to understand the 
world we live in (27), not wanting to have to play other’s music (22) and being naturally 
synaesthetic (14). In there being no alternative, talent in only one direction (24) and not 
knowing what else to do (1) are cited as reasons. For those blessed with this being just 
one of a number of active creative outlets, other interests cited could be deemed just as 
important (3), the choice of composing was circumstantial (6) and this form of creativity 
It is my optimized output: 
I don’t know or it is a knee-jerk response: 
To be compulsive, experience excitement and exercise power: 
Curiosity:  
It is just one of a number of creative outlets: 
There is really no other alternative or choice to be made: 
 0           5          10           15 
189 
 
being just one way to support a love of social interaction (10) [communication]. The 
‘don’t know’s are happy about leaving a legacy (15) or apparently ‘clueless’ (19). Knee-
jerk reaction brings forth insecurity (20) [disruption as being out of control], lack of 
others doing this (25), desperation (13) and simply having not thought about this 
question, though social interaction is a strong motivation (17). 
 
Purpose 3. Is there any sense in which you feel compelled, destined, fulfilled in being 
creative?  
(This question speaks to finding any inevitable genesis for the music created by the 
composer. It links into a stream or flow of consciousness that examines the 
unavoidability of the interviewee’s inclination to compose but does not force that 
inclination into a coupling with ‘the creative’. The word ‘creative’ on its own invites the 
interviewee to link or separate composing from being creative. It also invites any 
thoughts of recognition of how the unconscious might be playing a role here or having ex 
nihilo claims.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When saying: “Absolutely (a big emphasis here). There was never any doubt since 
being a small [child]. Extreme modernism actively discouraged me (20),” an absolute 
compulsion is there at the start despite extreme modernism trying to destroy it. A positive 
‘yes’ (21, 27, 8) is also buttressed by such as: “Yes. I cannot switch off my creative 
urge,” (16), not fighting that urge (6), “Definitely, whether anyone [else] wants it or not 
(26),” being oblivious to others’ receptivity (26), unavoidable as in: “Yes because I don’t 
know what else I would do,” (1), hearing other music, as in: “Yes. It is a compulsion 
(Compelled) 
Yes: 
No: 
 
(Destined) 
Yes: 
Maybe: 
I don’t know: 
No: 
  
(Fulfilled) 
Yes: 
Ambivalent: 
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arising from hearing great pieces of music and musicians,” (2) and thus being inspired 
(25), it being natural (23) and as in: “Yes, it is sort of my natural orientation … (18),” it 
being a need: “Yes, I need to compose. After having written a work, the urge to do the 
next invariably comes soon after if not before,” (3), it will ‘out’ as in: “ … even if I 
decide I do not want to compose at a particular time, I would always drive myself 
strongly to compose at some point,” (7), it being part of layering (24), giving meaning in 
life (9), always thinking about ‘the next’ (12), perhaps being a habit (13), by dint of 
opportunity (17) and having to meet deadlines as in: “I guess I am compelled by 
opportunity. I only seem to write music when there is a possibility for it to be played,” 
(17),” or “When there is a deadline! When you hear great music, I am compelled to 
aspire towards it.” (25). The last response highlights aspiration and its triggers as 
important. When composers say: “Yes, I guess compelled. I now know that if I don’t 
write music, I get quite irritable (11),” and “I get antsy and an itch to be scratched (19),” 
and “Oh yes. I get very grumpy if I do not compose over a long period (15),” and snakey 
(14); this is disruption at work internally. Those who are non-compelled speak of 
avoiding making creativity an idol (10) and simply being unmoved that way (22). 
Destiny provokes some degree of aversion but still has its adherents. Those who are 
positive here (8, 22) also invoke God playing a part (6), clairvoyance (22) and always 
knowing this is [going to be] the way for them (7, 24). A choice of ‘maybe’ (9) also adds 
they are excited about possibilities in music (25). The ‘don’t knows’ (18) also doubt its 
[destiny’s] existence (21), whether their art is good enough (15), just can’t answer (17) or 
defer to their parents (20). The naysayers (12, 13, 1, 2) also offer disbelief in the concept 
(19, 16), having that [destiny] imputed upon them (14), a categorization now passé for 
them (10), an avoidance of the missionary attitude (11), being musical anyway (26), 
using the word ‘calling’ instead (4) and simple being disinterested (27). 
No clear preferences are indicated with a wide range of responses from positive to 
negative are given such as: “Yes. I had a fantastic clairvoyant reading … (22),” 
“Personally, as a student, I had a strong sense that God wanted me to compose (6),” “I 
think so – when I think back to my teenage years, … my contemporaries were busy doing 
other things … I just wanted to compose and work with music (7),” “Yes, part way. … 
Often I write a piece and it feels like it has existed for ever (24),” “Don’t know – there is 
permanent doubt as to whether your art is ‘good enough’ (15),” suggesting there are 
standards to be met, “(interviewee laughs with derision) Can’t answer that one (17),” 
“No,” as a very frequent response but with no qualification, “I am not religious; destined 
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sounds a bit missionary (11),” “… probably not destined to it. It is my calling to be a 
composer, probably because of the immense satisfaction it carries for me (4).” 
Apart from one who is ambivalent as in: “Making art is extremely fulfilling 
because I enjoy the process of [continual re-]making … I don’t find being a composer, as 
such, particularly fulfilling (17),” all are positive about fulfilment with plenty of 
qualification. In being ‘absolutely’ so (7), Platonic ideals are present as in: “Absolutely. I 
still have not written the perfect piece … it’s a privilege to express yourself in music and 
have people hear it (11).” In being fulfilled (8, 15), qualifiers are added such as being 
always developing and learning (26), wanting the fulfilment of hearing the finished 
product (22), moving to the academic side (20), “Definitely. I could not be doing 
anything else so fulfilling, despite the lack of money coming in (interviewee laughs) 
(24),” involving giving health to all of one (14), having an immense satisfaction (4), 
[fulfilled] via an unique way (21), being proud and satisfied (1), “Yes; the whole creative 
process leading to a performance is fulfilling to me (2),” being a fully-engaging, visceral 
experience (5), avoiding the blues (9), with the strong place of creativity present (6), 
“The process itself is in its own right fulfilling but I do look towards the payoff [the 
performance being well received] (12),” the recognition of bringing something into 
existence (16), enjoying the act and generating surprises (19), “Now I have moved to 
both composing and playing and my fulfilment is complete (20),” being an achievement 
upon completion or of idea-development (23, 13), “Composition is a necessity for me if I 
am to be fulfilled. I often use my (violin) as a form of fulfillment—to improvise, create 
… (27),” an ivory tower existence might make it [fulfilment] better (18), when great 
performances of one’s works are heard (25), maybe it all being on a par with family life 
(10), and finally “Yes [I am fulfilled]… when I reach a certain achievement; … 
completing a work or just cracking an idea open (23).” 
 
Purpose 4. Is your musical creativity an inevitable expression of who you want to be 
seen to be? If so, what does that expression say? 
(This question asks that, having generated some form of creative product, i.e., it is 
apparently external to the creator, what ‘anything’ does it contain to link it to the 
creator? The question also points directly at what control the composer might want or 
have in this regard.) 
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The presupposition that communicating is present in being creative is offered. In 
answering: “Not necessarily at a conscious level, it is hard for me not to operate that way 
– I just keep on composing. I connect with my emotions and other peoples’ emotions 
coming back to me. I participate in the beautiful, the real and impacting, by this means. 
We get born into life and have to make sense of it by giving and receiving – music 
enables this necessity (6),” ‘connect’ and ‘participate’ are overt communicative terms. 
An outright ‘yes’ is buttressed with showing preferences (2), such as “(sounds of young 
children being ushered to bedtime) Yes because I can’t help but write music I feel 
connected to even if I am trying to escape my own style for a while! (24)”, and “… in a 
performance context, I am more interested in how an audience reacts to a piece, as 
separated from me the composer. But I still think that the music I write is deeply 
connected to who I am (5),” a feel-good spiritually caring for the planet (22) and risk 
taking with vitality and energy (25). Positive responses also invoke interest in audience 
reaction (5, 15), “It is difficult to answer this question. I would almost reword it as an 
answer. Musical creativity inevitably contains a portion of who I want to be seen to be 
(27),”, “Musical creativity gives a sense of who you are [a strong stance], not the reverse 
which is a weak stance (4),” being more than what their music might say (11), giving 
pleasure to others (11), being unaffected by (un)popularity (9) and “I compose music 
entirely for myself, not what others make of it. You can see me through my music but 
comments do have an effect on me (15).”  One interviewee says: “It is not about 
communication. It is just who I am and like a private diary. It is about inviting others to 
engage. Is the music me? Yes. (1)” which hints at a conflict being present between not 
caring, just to protect oneself, and caring, so that others have the privilege of an invite to 
participate too. In regarding this matter as non-central, other matters that come to the fore 
are allowing the music to be emblematic of the self (19), music being a temporally-
dependent snapshot of the self (3), an evaluation process of how music should work (7), 
belief in and compose for the self (7), to do the right for self (13), compose ‘come what 
may’ (14), “That’s complex. I don’t much care what people think of me (19),” and a 
Yes and it involves communication:  
This is not central to me but it can say who I am: 
Partly or probably so: 
No:  
I don’t know: 
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younger pursuit (26). For those who answer no, their main reasoning is “I don’t think 
much in this way. The compositional act is necessary for my health and well-being [not 
necessarily as creative] (8),”  “Not really. This is a hard thing to answer. … I like people 
to ‘see’ me, i.e., I write beautiful music, presenting my best side (20),” presenting one’s 
best side (20) “No. I don’t want it to be how others perceive me. That would be a weird 
filter … people can interpret composition so variously, and it is abstract (21).” The ‘don’t 
know’ category includes those who might feel vulnerable via this sentiment (12—via 
failure) and “To answer with honesty and insight requires an immortal level of self-
awareness. This is very complex – I spend time thinking about it but I don’t know the 
answer (18).” 
 
Purpose 5.  How much would you expect or hope listeners to your music to be affected 
emotionally, spiritually, aesthetically or politically? 
(This open question invites comment on specific proclivities, especially those that are 
strongly preferential on subjective viewpoints and how the mind is affected by the music.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With respect to emotion, a lot of positive response is encountered here (23, 2, 3, 
10—“ … I have anecdotal evidence that this has happened,” 26, 16, 12, 8, 11, 1) 
amplified with “having Mandelbrots7 that make you weep” (14), deep down change and 
laughter (24), deciphering the emotions (27), always there (15), well-being present (22), 
lifting one out of the comfort zone (25), being moved (20, 6), exuding pleasure (7), a 
resonance with the listener (13), and building-in the opportunity (21). One admitted 
“People ask me this all the time. I don’t understand how emotion works in music: but I 
get emotional in the concert hall (17).” 
                                                          
7 The Mandelbrot Set, already mentioned, is actually a special and very attractive version of a fractal 
pattern, often expressed as a colored image, and derived from the solutions arising from a specific 
equation that generates complex numbers. 
                                   Yes, definitely:                                          No. There is little or no effect: 
 
 
 
Emotionally: 
Aesthetically: 
Spiritually: 
Politically: 
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With respect to spirituality, there are plenty of positive responses (1—“I do not 
want to preach onto others but that they may find sympathetic and self-reflection,” 3, 5, 
10, 8—“ … I think this might describe a set of higher-level aspirations for everything that 
I write,” 11), “ … I hope I am doing something that makes the world a better place” (13), 
“A lot of my music is based on religious beginnings in my upbringing. I often aim for 
some spiritual weight … ‘Fragility in the face of an indifferent universe’ is the soul of all 
my music. I am astounded I have only just got around to mentioning that,” (14), “Privacy 
and abstract form appeal to me so this means that my spiritual and aesthetic sense … may 
be entirely different from the listener’s. I do hope that listeners will sense something deep 
and engaging in the aesthetic and spiritual scope of the music, but it is not about sharing 
my specific notion of that, per se” (21), a rush of feeling to be transcended (22), acting 
non-religiously (24) and trying to achieve a transcendence of language (25).  
With respect to aesthetics, positivism pervades (10, 26, 3, 7, 11, 25, 14, 24, 12—“I 
give room for others to contemplate in multifarious ways,” 2, 20, 5, 6—“I am happy that 
listeners might be moved. We cannot connect with everybody”), and other positive 
sentiments such as “Yes, I hope so – it is something hard to measure (15),” admitting to 
scientific limitations, trying to touch the listener (23), “I specifically adhere to an 
extension of musique concrète and acousmatic norms; it takes me to integrate those 
principles in my work (27),” “ … I love my music to exhibit the asceticism of Bach – it 
all comes from the structure without the expectation of more explicit ‘meanings’ (13),” 
like listening to a jewel (22), being more important than emotions (17) and being deep 
and engaging (21). 
Politically, the positivism is muted, but there for some (10, 1, 8) supported by 
conveying a sense of injustice (12), being feminine (17) and being green (26). Covering 
all four effects, we should expect the intellect to be involved (5), we cannot connect with 
everybody (6), have a higher-level aspiration (8), as part of a full range of affectation 
(11), to find sympathetic and self-reflection (1) and to have a different viewpoint to the 
composer (2). 
A negative response with respect to emotion, comes from one composer who could 
not fathom how emotion could be present (17). With respect to spirituality, negation is 
amplified with to be not intended (2, 23, 17, 16—“Not at all. I haven’t got a spiritual 
bone in my body,”), with being repugnant (20—“A more contestable term. I don’t aim 
for this,” 26—“I have a real allergic reaction to this word,” 15—“I am not that way 
inclined but others have seen spiritual content in my music – I really don’t like all the 
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connotations that ‘attach’ by so doing,”), “No. I am going through transitions all the time 
but have not yet been able to deal with this aspect.  It is becoming important now (27),” 
and by liking Latin texts (7). Aesthetics is not understood by one composer (16). 
Politically, many are quite negative (3, 2—“Never”, 23—“Absolutely not at all,” 5, 25—
“Not really,” 20—“I couldn’t give a toss,” 9—“I don’t think art music is political, or 
should be. Politics has no real power to affect music, and vice-versa,” 22—“I don’t think 
that [politics] applies to music,” 13—there is no meaning to it, 14—“That [politics] is 
temporary rather than universal, so no,” 16—“Nah. Everything can be cast as political 
but not really for me in the normal sense”) and amplified with a refusal to engage that 
way which [could] destroy the abstract (27), just not interested (7) and a bit unsure (11). 
 
Understanding 
Understanding 1. How synonymous are the concepts of composing and creating for 
you?  
(This question is meant to be direct. It checks that ‘concept’ is a meaningful or useable 
term for the interviewee and then invites a use in context.) 
 
 
 
 
 
There are positive responses here, from full agreement (8, 17, 2, 12, 19, 18, 24, 7, 
1) to being very close (9, 26), with a qualification about film music (27) and composing 
having more scope (5). Some regard composing as a subset of creativity (10, 6, 13, 16, 
11, 25, 3, 23, 15), as in “Creativity covers all aspects of human endeavor. Composing is 
one creative faculty that people can have.” (22). Other variants are for the two terms 
being subsets of each other (21), creativity as only part of the whole process of 
composing (20), creativity and craft making up composing (14). Belief statements are 
made to connect the two, such as “Effective creativity arises when you get the composing 
process right. I here stress that this previous sentence embodies a credo for me.” (14). 
Conceptual nuances are revealed by saying, “Creating is coming up with ideas. 
Composing is ‘from go to whoa’, the whole process (20),” where a concept of ‘process’ 
is subsumed into a type of Gestalt attitude. There is rare and perhaps elite value present 
They are the same to all intents and purposes: 
Composing is a subset of creating: 
There are variants that separate or relate the two: 
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by saying: “Creativity is a property on its own and given eminence as a rare or special set 
of qualities; it is to be prized and cherished and not taken lightly, otherwise you might 
destroy it.” (4), separating the identity of each. 
 
Understanding 2. What is the role of intelligence/cleverness in being able to compose 
music? 
(This question invites invoking special types of person that could be seen to 
compose/create better than others simply because they appear more intelligent, perhaps 
through an IQ test or the balance of nature-versus-nurture or a propensity picked out via 
a Myers-Briggs test.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
Many composers think intelligence is needed here and qualify their position such as 
that dumbness can’t handle the huge skill set (4, 9, 11, 27) and various capabilities should 
be present as in the ability to juggle a whole continuum (11), to make a ‘meaty’ offering 
(24), enabling newness and individuality (23), savants are only good reproducers (26) but 
lack intelligence (10), [the skill differs] from [that measured by] an intelligence quotient 
(IQ) (8—it is emotional intelligence (EQ)), you need a good IQ and a good EQ (21), 
maybe be a Renaissance person (21), composing is problem solving (6), it enables the 
ability to question (5), [you need] the ability to handle and use duality (5), to generate 
good ideas (18), to add craft and technique (2,18, 19, 26), an appreciation of heritage (27) 
and specific intelligences are needed (15—such as those for handling complexity). [This 
has been an overly long sentence but encapsulates, albeit inadequately, how composers 
go everywhere with their thoughts.] Those viewing this matter as ‘non-central’ give room 
for non-analytics (3), training (22), cleverness is passé for the mature (13), complexity 
may require it [intellect] (25), listening and instinct (19), spatiality mutation and 
                                                          
8 Isobel Myers, Mary McCaulley, Naomi Quenk and Alan Hammer, Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Manual. 
Mountain View: CPP Inc., 1998. Mark Batey and Adrian Furnham, “Creativity, Intelligence, and 
Personality: A Critical Review of the Scattered Literature,” Genetic, Social, and General Psychology 
Monographs 132 (2006): 382. On page 398, they conclude “Attempts have been made to delineate the 
core characteristics of the creative personality. Yet, despite the convergence of results, it has proven 
difficult to generalize the findings across various fields of creative endeavour.” 
It is important to have some: 
It is helpful but maybe not central: 
I decline or am unable to answer: 
It is not needed: 
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patterning (14) and another more important end (unspecified) (1). If intellect is not 
needed, it is because we should articulate in a literate way (12). In declining to answer, 
composers found it is too subjective to deal with (7), there are so many composers to deal 
with (16) and intelligence can signal ‘smart’ in a pejorative way (17). 
 
Understanding 3. Is music ‘overloaded’ or can it stand without explanation, i.e., speak 
for itself? 
(This question invites comment on how much music may be seen to be either a carrier or 
essence in itself of message and meaning.) 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an unclear divide here that slightly favors a ‘stand-without-explanation’ 
viewpoint. The ‘both’ category could be wrapped into both of the two extremes to reduce 
the dominance of one over the other, i.e., a count of 12 over 7 changes to 20 over 15. If 
overloading is stressed, invariably it is qualified, such as a construct or layering upon 
music (7, 12), culturally based (7, 12, 26), polysemic (lots of different meanings) (7, 16, 
26, 27) and a shared experience (12). To choose ‘both’, the either/or is often highlighted 
such as sonic beauty versus pluralist in meaning (1), obvious association versus 
abstraction (14), logos-definition versus many meanings (9), sonic artefact versus non-
musical explication (4) and a composer’s own sense versus audience experience (21) or, 
finally, the listener will choose (6). If ‘stands by itself’ is stressed, a singular reason often 
follows, such as transcending meaning (5), there are musical terms alone present (8), 
music should be unaided (25), offer another (synthetic?) way to view it (11), program 
notes are superfluous (13, 21), there is unbounded meaning available (18, 22) and [this 
is] a visceral experience (21). 
 
Understanding 4. Can a composition just be as your creative product?  
(This question explores the creative independence with which the composer operates and 
the possibility that music need not be utilitarian in any way.) 
 
It predominantly stands for itself: 
It is both:  
It is predominantly or entirely overloaded: 
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To some extent, this question encourages those who answer positively to music 
being overloaded to then entertain the opposite of their viewpoint. A majority are able to 
do so notwithstanding the strong majority who agreed with the need to communicate in 
the previous question. The reasons for this being possible are given as no need for others 
to validate the music (1, 5, 9, 10, 11, 26), music speaks for itself irrespective (17), no 
need for commodification (13), there is no alternative viewpoint (22), self-satisfaction 
(15), God always hears it [howsoever the music manifests] (6) and it being creation 
therapy (26). Many require ‘extras’ for being to be possible, such as a notation specific 
for performance (21), finding it unfortunate if this were so (18), a stage two of three 
stages—stage three is performance (8), that performance is necessary (8, 16, 19, 21, 25, 
27), there must be communication too (2, 14, 24), the composition to be accessible by 
others (7), preventing starved teleology (4, 23) or having-a-Porsche-and-only-driving-
round-the-block if this were so (14). Those who decline to answer regard the question 
posing an invalid stance (12) and that musical works are never fully unheard (20). One 
composer concentrates on polysemics as being important (3). 
 
Understanding 5. Need a composition ‘communicate’? 
(This question explores the relevance of music being defined as a means of 
communication with something to say.) 
 
 
 
 
 
The answers reveal a large number of composers in agreement whether or not we 
amalgamate together the first three categorizations. A definitive ‘yes’ is obtained from 
many composers (2, 5—“A composition can convey meaning to others and can mean to 
itself as well,” 8, 10, 13, 14—“Yes. (a long pause ensued as if the interviewee was to say 
It can just be: 
It can be - needs extras like performance and how it communicates: 
Not really:  
An answer on its own: 
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Yes: 
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It is inevitable: 
It can do or need not: 
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more – it did not happen),” 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24—“My compositions do need to do this 
– it is one of my motives for composing,” 25, 26, 27). Justification comes in many ways 
such as via meaning (sometimes obscure) (5, 13), by resonating with others (26), by 
engagement (16), the need being there (23), something to say (25), inadequacy of speech 
(27), enabling deep listening in shared experience (8), the process of ‘liveness’ (17) and 
there being no point in composing otherwise (10). Several composers took significant 
time before giving an answer (14, 22, 23, 25, 27). The inevitableness of communicating 
is seen to stem from any human utterance being beneficial (6), composing being 
communicating an idea (12), humans being emotional (15) and “Communication relies 
on unambiguous information, of widely agreed-upon meaning being present somehow. 
There is no explicit message … but there is a great deal of encoding of ideas that are not 
necessarily consciously registered: they impart coherence … like DNA. Music works at a 
higher cognitive level than to communicate explicit ideas (9).” In terms of there being 
ambivalence on a need to communicate, what is communicated is left entirely up to the 
listener (3). A composition could also just be well-crafted (7). The nay-sayers often 
mention that they think communication is present for success (4, 11, 18) but some are 
insistent on their refutation of the premise (4, 11, 18, 19, 21). One composer places the 
communicative responsibility fully onto the listener to pay attention and express 
sympathy with the music (1). 
 
Understanding 6. Music is language and is not language. Please comment on this 
sentence if you would like to. 
(The music-language connection is made to see how much significance a composer 
attaches to it.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Music, when assumed to be a language (24, 6), brings forth qualities such as 
abstraction (27), being without verbs (13), having its own order and flow (4), being the 
first language (8), a self-referential meta-language (10), a direct intellectual stimulus 
Music is a language: 
Music is both, paradoxically: 
Music is not a language: 
I don’t really know: 
No comment is offered: 
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(14), the other universal language with smiling (22), with meanings you cannot put your 
finger on (25), style as a semi-language (26) and a language for suspending reality (17). 
The both-ness viewpoint (15, 5) is endorsed as being capable of penetrating cultural 
barriers (21), having a syntax9 with unknowability (3), maybe like Haiku poetry (11) or 
the ability to speak to everybody (23). The case for not so (19, 12[a “perhaps”]) is made 
with languages regarded as musics themselves (9), simply a way of communicating (2) 
and cannot be understood definitively (7, 14). The don’t knows (12) emphasize 
suggestive power (1) and having to the need to give the question more thought (16). No 
comment (18) is made by two composers, one of whom refers the interviewer back to 
previous answers (20). 
 
Understanding 7. How does musical language differ from the more obvious spoken 
languages? 
(This question is a ‘what-if-music-is-a-language’ proposition for the interviewee to run 
with or refute. Since music is perfectly—maybe insistently—capable of ‘speaking’ for 
itself, the way we use a language has significance with respect to understanding how 
someone might support or manifest their creativity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 See Aniruddh Patel, “Language, Music Syntax and the Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 6 (2003): 674–681; 
and also Aniruddh Patel, Music, Language and the Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2008), for 
discussion on the relationship between music and syntax. Also see Nicolas Ruwet and Mark Everist, 
“Methods of Analysis in Musicology,” Music Analysis 6 (1987), 6, where Ruwet and Everist pursue 
both musical and linguistic analysis side by side, adopting Noam Chomsky’s concept of a generative 
grammar. See also Fred Lerdahl, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford 
Books, 1983), and also Fred Lerdahl, “Composing Notes,” Current Musicology, ed. Daniel Thompson 
“Special Issue: Composers” 67–68 (1999), 243. Lerdahl writes: “I sensed in the Chomskian approach a 
fresh way to think about music. If it was possible to study the language capacity, it should also be 
possible to study the musical capacity. If this could be accomplished in any detail, it should then be 
feasible to use this knowledge to guide the development of compositional methods that are structurally 
rich yet cognitively transparent.” Lerdahl conceives of composing as manipulating structure and thus 
able to be understood as a language. See also Michael Spitzer, Music as Philosophy: Adorno and 
Beethoven’s Late Style, 14, where Spitzer’s ternary model of musical style (actually, it can be expanded 
up to six ways) includes the interactions of nature, convention and subjectivity and the search for 
feeling within rules. The model creates three set levels in style, formalism and mediation based on the 
researchers he cites: S1—stylistic convention or rules of language, S2—internal configuration of rules 
within a work, S3—a language of nature, partly corresponding to elemental categories of human bodily 
experience. 
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It is challenging to sort the responses in such a way that would enable a grading 
between a full difference and no difference to spoken language being made. Hence the 
ayes and nays are used as categories. Within this generalization, specific topics that are 
mentioned refine their choices. In still being a language but differing somewhat, mention 
is made of a lack of the imperative (17), predating spoken language (8), there are ‘no 
verbs’ (13, 6, 21), being less direct (5, 7), being more powerful (5) and more right-brain 
(22). As a different form of communication, mention is made of communicating at a 
more emotional (14, 2, 15) and physical level (14). Ambiguity increases by not having a 
syntax (3), being polysemic (24), having more proportionality and space (9) and a wider 
timbre with abstraction (18). A sense of the ephemeral or vagueness (21) is linked to 
having pure sonics (1), more parameters, shades and spectrums (26), more fluidity (25, 
27), being amorphous (25) and infinitely extendable (27, 3). In terms of being less 
specific (11), music is not seen to convey specific meaning unless self-referential (10). 
Complexity (permutation) is seen to increase in music (23). In saying music is not a 
language (19), the stresses are put on there being no relationship even with other arts; 
“you can’t order a cup of coffee in music” (20), occupying different domains (4), there 
being more training in the abstract (22) and honestly not being able to say why (16). 
 
Understanding 8. Is there a musical language common in some way throughout your 
compositions? 
(This question latently asks for what characteristics can be seen in the interviewee’s 
works, whether language concepts dominate for them, how much they wish to find their 
own voice, and so forth. It is meant to be as open as possible and not add “If so, what is 
it?” to let the interviewee offer more than ‘yes’ or ‘no’ if they want to.) 
(The ayes) 
In some way but it is still a language: 
 
(The nays) 
Music is ephemeral, vaguer and more fluid: 
It is a different form of communication: 
Music is not a language: 
Music is more ambiguous: 
Music is more flexible:  
Music is less specific: 
Music is more complex: 
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Here an almost unanimous ‘yes’ proliferates out into virtually uncategorizable 
comments, as should be so if the question is regarded as self-referential, generating: 
 progressing through ‘a’, ‘one’ and then ‘the’ voice (8), 
 drawing from the jazz idiom (2), 
 many musical strands embracing the contrapuntal, octatonic and polymodal (6), 
 a vocabulary involving scales, modes, melodies, harmonies and rhythms (7), 
 taking risks with ideas (25), 
 ‘sing’-able melodies as an essence of an idea (24), 
 rhythmic structure, humor and blurring (18), 
 hierarchical harmonic shaped gestures in a consonance/dissonance interplay (10), 
 simple elements turned into non-teleological texture and complexity (14), 
 rhythm patterns, chordal progressions and sectional structures (16), 
 layering of traditional harmonies, juxtaposing tonalities in registers (11), 
 common threads of rhythm, harmony and melody (13), 
 a combination of harmonics, intervals and melodies into an unique style (21), 
 perfect fifths (15), 
 idea-progression via intervals, harmonies, sonorities and shapes (4), 
 dipping into ‘my’ well, honing ‘my’ voice, acting different parts (20), 
 centered on Vaughn Williams and Tippett as people, not their works (3), 
 a little left into atonality alongside Britten and Shostakovich (26), 
 similarity of process and idioms (1), 
 the ‘me’, expressed in homogeneity and clarity (23), 
 accessible melody that is not angular (22), 
 recurrence of cultural-type motives (27). 
A ‘maybe’ response is colored with recognizing tonal centers, reference to a shaped 
rhythmic human voice (12), trying not to be aware of them (19) and simply recognizing 
involvement by putting in the elbow grease (5). A claim of there being a lack of common 
Yes:  
Maybe: 
No:   
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features is supported by mentioning having many languages (17) or having a personal 
idiolect centered on exuding meaning (9). 
 
Understanding 9. Is there any sense in which you desire your music to be non-
understood, awkward, unreachable, mystical or in any way ineffable?10 
(This question examines the directness or otherwise of how the composers wish to engage 
the performers and listeners and how much or little of their compositional creativity they 
wish to reveal.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An outright ‘no’ is received from many (10, 13, 22, 16, 19, 27, 1) and explained 
further by not liking wankery (pardoning the crudeness) (20), but, at the same time, not 
conforming to what a listener might expect (15), having a non-esoteric understanding (2), 
encouragement to just enjoy the sound (3), having some kind of logical sense (7), but 
may have word-plays and jokes present (12), being reachable in context (24) and having 
no intention [to be obscure] though it may appear that way (17). A positive response that 
highlighted being ‘mysterious’ is coupled with “I would hope my music could be seen to 
be mysterious in some way but I do not want the audience to be un-engaged or bored 
(4),” “Oh yes – I wish my music to be mystical and ineffable in some way; ambiguity is 
very important to me (5),” seeing God to be mysterious (8), providing trapdoor functions 
(9), being obscure (11), not being able to put one’s finger on it (15), letting the audience 
lateralize their experience (21), being vain (23), understanding is naturally unreachable as 
is music (25) and maybe not having the merit to make this claim (26). ‘Ineffable’ is cited, 
such as “I am happy for my music to appear ineffable but not for it to be disconnected 
from the listener (6),” like a Mona Lisa smile [enigmatic] linked to “Yes. But I don’t try 
to be misunderstood. … But intrigue is rich and enjoyable (14),” making disruption 
enjoyable! with no [genuine] intention to confound or obstruct (21) and aiming at a 
                                                          
10 No mention is made in the interviews of the way in which ineffable can be seen as having too much 
choice rather than an ignorance of knowledge. Interviewees invariably thought if it as an ignorance of 
understanding. 
No: 
A positive mention including ‘mysterious’: 
A positive mention including ‘ineffable’: 
A positive mention including ‘awkward’: 
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position ‘too great for words’, i.e. ineffable (26). ‘Awkward’ is cited as being part of a 
likeable challenge (18) and occasionally desired (26). One composer doubts we would 
ever get a comprehensive handle on creativity but says “… both mystical and ineffable 
are desirable to me. I adore ambiguity (9).” 
 
Understanding 10. How satisfied should listeners be that they can relate to and/or 
understand your music? How many repeat hearings could it take for a musically 
literate person to reach this stage? 
(This question opens up thoughts on how much of a message or a language or an effect is 
to be experienced by the listener so that a meaningful communication can take place. 
There is also a social aspect in the composer relating to those who grasp or understand 
why the music is composed in the first place. The aesthetic or the unexplainable could 
also come to the fore.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A single hearing is favored by some to give satisfaction but with more 
accumulating from subsequent hearings (22, 14, 6, 7, 5), noting we are all resonant 
beings (8), the venue is important (10), it must cohere on the first hearing [in any case] 
(20) and knowledgeable people do not treat art music as chocolate and popcorn (21). In 
noting we should get lots from the first hearing, subsequent hearings (2) should generate 
being drawn back (15, 13, 19, 24), still be worthwhile (16), where good pieces can stand 
multiple listenings (11), not all is ‘given away’ at the first listening (12), listening being 
continued layered discovery (13), understanding on the listeners’ own terms (1), forever 
giving up secrets (19) and finding the new amongst the existing (26). In stressing 
multiple hearings are important, mention is made of diverse interests such as being 
enticed back indefinitely (3), nothing being obvious first-off (25), the ‘connoisseur’ will 
benefit (23), otherwise [to understanding something about the music] missing so much 
(27), full comprehension may never happen (17) and being disinterested but hoping the 
musically literate will listen on (18). A few are not able to answer due to their changes in 
They should get lots from the first, then more from later 
 performances: 
A first hearing could be enough, or all you might get: 
Multiple hearings are important: 
I am not able to answer: 
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aspiration (4) and it [what was derived from experiencing the music] being the listeners’ 
business, who may have to hear 100 times to ‘get it’ (9). 
 
Understanding 11. How content are you that what your compositions might say or mean 
can be seen in many different ways? 
(This question addresses ownership and the need for protection of the originator’s 
intention, message or motivation. It also examines the composers’ views on overloading, 
semantics, and hermeneutics in general. The question could be related to the composers’ 
own definitions of music and how they are then put into practice.) 
 
 
 
 
Some variations in terminology are present that I assumed to be synonymous. 
‘Perfectly’, ‘fine’, ‘happy’, ‘content’ and ‘natural’ could be further qualified by adding 
‘perfectly’, ‘very’, ‘completely’, ‘totally’ and ‘absolutely’. I count all of these variants as 
under the synonym ‘content’. Many qualifiers are added to a simple agreement (18, 10, 
13), such as enjoying the multi-anything put there (21), noting music is polysemous (8), 
listeners not being bored (3), liking ambiguities (4), making music ask “Why?” (11), 
recognizing the beholder’s ear (2), having no sense of the prescriptive (6), it is none of 
the composers’ business (19), this is an important aspect of communication (27), being 
welcomed (5) and being inevitable (7), being a main aim (17), modifying one’s own 
music too (16), fitting with the Skempton aesthetic (15), in contradistinction to a 
composer’s own view (12, 20), an aspirational point (1) and reserving a moral right to an 
interpretation (9). In simply ‘coming round’ to the idea (22), it is supported with fingers-
crossed about how the work would be received (23), being cautious about dreadful 
performances taking place (26), receiving feedback that the effect was natural (14), liking 
works to stand on their own (24) and as long as the right way is recognized (19). 
 
 
 
 
 
I am content (happy, very, absolutely, fine): 
I have come round to accepting it or am not bothered by it: 
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The Open or Unlimited 
Unlimited 1. What is accessible to you by composing (creatively?) rather than speaking 
say as in a mother tongue?11 
(This is actually an unanswerable question seen on one level, for how can you speak of 
what your music ‘says’ if it takes music to do it in the first place? A few composers spot 
this paradox and then point out why they can go no further. However, irrespective of 
recognizing that paradox, the question opens the door to handling paradox and 
ineffability in their creative output, if the interviewee wishes to go there.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost all responses are different here with no obvious summary. Composers 
mention that de-limitation [a removal of a limit] enables feeling bigger and more intense 
(6), reveals the less obvious (9), triggers complexes of memories (11), is a more powerful 
mode of communication (25, 24, 12), is more universal as a language (14), shapes the 
listeners’ responses (16), is a faster diffusion of ideas to others (18), the inefficiency of 
music generates [a wanted] ambiguity and layering (21), this faculty facilitates caricature 
(4), is a form of perfection (5), forces (provokes) a choice of representation (7) and 
enables better articulation (23). Emotional positives came in the form of being less 
constrained in music (13), efficient (27), coding deep emotion (8), able to invoke 
emotions and take one on a journey (2), having an immediacy of access (7), having more 
impact (12) and getting to the level of direct emotion (14). Some broach the matter of the 
faculty not being possible using words (13, 19—“that is my answer”, 26, 17, 15, 9) 
likening it to poetry (20). One composer is not sure what the question means (22). 
Artistic positives come from using virtuosity in note playing (10) and communicating a 
non-verbal idea (2). One sees the matter as a private affair, not necessarily speaking to 
others (1). 
                                                          
11 David Walters, “Artistic Orientations, Aesthetic Concepts, and the Limits of Explanation: An Interview 
with Pierre Boulez,” 310. Walters writes: “If you were able to transcribe something into words, then the 
music would not be necessary any more. Therefore there are so many translations of music.” 
It de-limits experience of life beyond normal language: 
There are emotional positives: 
It is not possible to explain in words: 
There are artistic positives: 
This is a private affair, maybe not for speaking to others: 
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Unlimited 2. What, for you, is the connection between a subjective viewpoint and what 
you objectively produce as a score? 
(This question examines how a composer can create from within, then cyclically re-
imbibes and regurgitate to end up with something objective to pass on. The question is 
problematic for some who do not want to handle or do not like ‘subjective–objective’ as 
a duality. Some composers are very much at home in using these categories to describe 
their viewpoint.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The connections take many forms such as inside-to-outside via tension (8, 17), 
accurate imagination forming something and the score reflecting that with limitations (8, 
9, 22), via craft and technique (7, 26), the subjective always remaining (7), objectifying 
can/should suggest the next subjective step (3, 22), decision making interplays with 
parametrics (5), subjectively filtering objective output (25), the objective directly triggers 
the subjective (17, 27) and never questioning what, objectively, we end up with (27). The 
to-and-fro manifests as a dance back and forth (12), a non-Mozartian effect (5), the basic 
idea being layered (24), the score is never the same as the thought (16, 23), a distinct 
difference with what others make of ‘it’ (19), a reduction in the degree of nebulousness 
(6), creating a score so that we can see through the dots (1) and a gradual discarding of 
first thoughts (16). When the connections appear mysterious, any capture that has taken 
place could be the collective human spirit (13), defying analysis (13), coalesced ideas via 
a process (20) and linking sound-making to emotional impact (11). Some view the 
content of the mind and the score as eventually the same (thing) with the score having no 
intrinsic value (4) or that one [the score] is a representation accurately conveying the 
mind’s content (18). Some answers did not get categorized such as there being no 
objectivity (21) or a score being very open-ended for its use (15). Those who did not 
identify with the question did so on the grounds of only seeing loose connections here 
(10) or not knowing what the duality ‘subjective–objective’ meant (14). 
There are specific connections or contexts between them: 
The content in each is essentially different with a to-and-fro effect: 
A sense of the mysterious or magical is happening: 
The content in each is essentially the same (thing): 
An answer on its own: 
I don’t identify with the question:  
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There are a number of panoramic answers that involve affectation and defy being 
placed in the divide of ‘yes’ from ‘no’. One composer said it was none of his or her 
business as to whether others were affected this way (19). Other points of view are 
expectation that the creation is be an experience via performance (4), expecting the 
intellect to be involved (5), wanting to change peoples’ lives (9), thinking elitism is a 
good way to go (10), it all being in the eye of the beholder (2) and (it all) being quite 
distasteful prescriptions upon the listener (18). 
 
Unlimited 3. In what way does your music try to suspend reality by creating another 
world? 
(This question hints to the furthest reaches of how our minds might be affected or 
inspired by our own or someone else’s creative output. It invites the ultimate 
transcendence to be playing a role by mentioning ‘suspend reality’. Some composers 
might view such a prospect as the heart of the matter or, conversely, as impossible, 
beyond our understanding or description, or just irrelevant, and here they can wax 
lyrical.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A unanimous positive response here (5, 1, 17, 26) is amplified with the music 
trying to create its own musical world (25), part of the process of engagement to reflect 
upon one’s own world (16), this is what music is for (12), “A lot. That is an ambition of 
mine. It gets back to ‘my territory’. Debussy takes me to a place I like being there. Even 
a good song from Frank Sinatra can transport me away. I want to take people to “my 
musical place” (11),” a heightened awareness of reality (20), another state of mind (27), 
another ‘musical’ world (4—“Yes, my music does create another world, a musical world. 
I like this aspiration a lot. It can make for a complete experience, rich, filling the whole 
imagination (4),” 1), “Yes, I would love to create another world. Fantasy is under-
appreciated in music. I admire Tolkeinesque creations … not a suspension of reality for 
sanctuary but for adventure (1),” where fantasy is the opposite of being truth-bounded, 
I try to do so: 
I have some other aim: 
I don’t aim for it: 
It is there somehow but I don’t push for it: 
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removed from the everyday (17), a lost-ness in my self-indulgent world (7), finding an 
essence (24), to enhance and enrich a sense of being (8), with its own laws and customs 
(19) and messing with time (9, 21). Without pushing for this aim, composers answer that 
it happens but is up to the listener (13) and a distraction from the horror of not knowing 
the purpose of existence (14). In not aiming for this, there are attempts to create a new 
listening experience (18), simply being not interested in doing so (3—“The business of 
suspending reality may happen but is not intended by me,” 10—“I don’t try to suspend 
reality (10),” and “(pause) This is far too esoteric for me to articulate in words. Perhaps 
another reason why I compose music! (23),” with the suggestion we can only say it in 
music. Other aims instead are “Some of my pieces would take you away from everyday 
worries maybe into a yoga state, transported to another place (22),” to take one away 
from everyday worries (in yoga), “I want to draw the listener in as they hear, and to keep 
their attention. This should be an emotional journey, a story with form (2),” a neat blend 
of fiction that is coherent somehow, “Even mundane music gives us a sense of altered 
consciousness. I like my music to help others to experience another dimension to the one 
we are in (6),” altering consciousness, and finally “It is different from piece to piece. If 
there is a narrative or descriptive title, maybe pragmatic in nature, then yes; I want the 
listener to be caught up in the work. Otherwise, if there is no (overt) message, it may just 
be emotion or mood or just to be taken toward where you want to go (15),” where 
participating in a journey moves us from one ‘place’ towards another (perhaps another 
world) as a spacial metaphor about the effect of music has upon us. 
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